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1 Introduction
The general topic of this dissertation is international trade. We live in a world marked
by an exchange of goods across national and cultural borders never seen before in history.
Moreover, global trade routes and practices change constantly. To give just one striking
example, in 2009, China overtook Germany to become the world’s largest exporter. This
is representative for the recent phenomena of emerging countries participating on a large
scale in international trade. The former was dominated by developed economies from
the 1950s to the 1980s (see Hanson (2012)). Differences in per capita incomes between
the developed and developing part of the world are tremendous. In 2005, Luxembourg’s
average income level was 350 times higher than the one of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.1 Confronting the richest with the poorest country is the most extreme comparison
one can make. However, the country at the 75th percentile of the world distribution of per
capita incomes (Hungary) is still eight times richer than the country at the 25th percentile
(Djibouti). The overarching theme of all three essays of my thesis is how these differences
in countries’ stages of development relate to differences in the structure of their trade
flows. In the first essay, the main finding is that China’s immense penetration of world
markets has affected exports of more and less developed countries differentially. This
differential impact arises because they specialize in different market segments depending
upon their factor endowments. Taking another perspective, the second essay studies how
the vast differences in per capita incomes across countries relate to differences in the
structure of their imports. The third essay goes beyond approximating a country’s stage
of development by its per capita income and uses the whole distribution of incomes to
characterize a country. Furthermore, the import and export perspective are combined by
studying trade among any two economies. In particular, I examine how the similarity of
two countries’ income distributions influences trade among them. The remainder of this
introductory chapter provides a short summary of each essay.
The first essay concerns how countries’ exports adapt to the immense shift of world-
wide export shares towards low and middle income countries. This was one of the largest
changes in international trade patterns in the last decades. As mentioned above, world-
wide exports were dominated by developed economies from the 1950s to the 1980s. During
1This comparison is based on real GDP per capita of all 190 countries included in the Penn World
Table 7.1. I choose 2005 to take a year before the economic downturn in the late 2000s.
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the 1990s and 2000s exports of low and middle income countries grew substantially faster
than world trade. As a consequence, their share in global exports more than doubled from
around 20 percent in the early 1990s to around 40 percent in the late 2000s (see Hanson
(2012)). A particularly impressive example of an emerging country increasing its role in
global trade is China. Since the onset of its process of economic liberalization, China has
penetrated world export markets with a pace and to an extent which is exceptional. China
increased its share in global manufacturing exports from 5 percent in 1995 to 16 percent
in 2009. This has spurred a debate in both politics and academia about the consequences
of China’s outstanding export growth for exports of other countries. The public debate
in many countries centers around the fear China absorbing ever more export markets and
eventually leaving no export opportunities for domestic exporters. While in academia it
is widely acknowledged that, in general, integrating a country into the world economy
is altogether welfare enhancing, the debate is about which countries will experience the
largest reallocation effects.
In chapter 2, I investigate how China’s penetration of world export markets has af-
fected export paths of other countries. By analyzing detailed export flows of 102 countries
between 1996 and 2006, I document a crowding out effect of China. Exports of other coun-
tries grow more slowly in destinations and products in which China had a higher market
share. The magnitude of this effect is, however, rather small. Furthermore, the evidence
suggests that countries at different stages of development are differentially affected by
China’s penetration of export markets. I find no effect on high income countries and a
negative effect for middle and low income countries. The crowding out effect of China
is strongest for middle income exporters and of an intermediate magnitude. In order to
provide a mechanism for why economies at the top and the bottom of the world income
distribution are more insulated from Chinese competition than countries with middle
income, I analyze the role of within-product specialization. Schott (2004) reinterprets
the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model by changing the perspective from horizontal dif-
ferentiation (industries) to vertical differentiation (quality). This implies that countries
with different endowments export the same products but specialize in different quality
segments. As the intensity of competition between two producers increases in the sub-
stitutability of their goods, diversity in terms of quality or sophistication may insulate
one producer from the other. Consistent with this line of argument, I find that the less
similar a country’s production techniques and export unit values are compared to China,
the more shielded are its exports from Chinese competition in third markets. In doing
so, the similarity of production techniques and unit values, respectively, of two exporters
serve as measures of how close two versions of a good are in terms of sophistication.
In the second essay, joint with Tobias Wuergler, we focus on how the division of
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aggregate income into per capita income and population affects the patterns of imports.
Throughout chapter 3, we compare imports of two countries with equal aggregate income
but differing population sizes. In one country, the amount of aggregate income is divided
between fewer individuals and hence per capita income is higher than in the other country.
For illustration, in 2007 Switzerland and Columbia had roughly the same GDP (300 billion
I$).2 With population differing by a factor of five, GDP per capita in Switzerland is five
times higher than in Columbia (37’000 I$ versus 8’000 I$). In most of the prominent trade
theories with homothetic preferences, these two countries are observationally equivalent
importers. In these models, it does not play a role how aggregate income is composed in
terms of per capita income and population, merely aggregate income matters for imports.
Our detailed analysis of imports of 123 countries reveals, however, that besides aggregate
income there is a separate role for per capita income to determine imports. Hence, it
indeed matters for imports how aggregate income is partitioned in per capita income and
population. This implies that, on average, two countries like Switzerland and Columbia,
with equal aggregate income but differing population sizes, differ in their imports.
We find that countries with a higher per capita income have, for a given aggregate
income, higher import values. We decompose the latter into their three margins in or-
der to reveal how values are higher. These are, the extensive margin, measuring the
diversification of a country’s import bundle, the quality and the quantity margin. The
decomposition exposes that the higher import values of richer countries are driven by
both, a higher extensive and a higher quality margin but not by differences in the quan-
tity margin. The relations between per capita income and the extensive as well as the
quality margin of imports hold at various levels of disaggregation. In contrast, there is a
composition effect for the quantity margin. While the latter is increasing in per capita
income at the product level, the relationship disappears at the aggregate level as rich
countries import in many products with typically low quantities.
To show a mechanism through which the empirical regularity of richer countries im-
porting more along the extensive and quality margin may arise, we present a model
featuring non-homothetic preferences. We extend Krugman’s (1980) variety model with
vertical quality differentiation and non-homothetic consumer behavior. Individuals con-
sume either zero or one unit of a variety, choosing a quality level if consuming the product.
Despite the firms’ ability to differentiate quality continuously, richer individuals not only
consume goods of higher quality, but also a broader set of varieties. As a result, richer
countries import, for given aggregate income, a broader set of varieties and higher quality
versions than poorer countries.
2In 2005 constant prices and PPP. One international dollar (I$) has the same purchasing power as one
US dollar, over total US GDP.
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While the second essay focuses on how the demand side shapes the patterns of imports,
the third essay studies how trade between any two countries is influenced by the demand
side. Bilateral trade flows have been studied extensively with the gravity equation, one
of the most successful empirical models in international economics. The gravity equation
predicts that bilateral trade flows depend positively on the economic size of the trading
partners and negatively on the distance between them. The gravity literature was mainly
concerned with supply side forces for trade flows, such as aggregate income. However,
a still emerging literature focuses on the role of demand side forces for the patterns of
trade, such as per capita income and within-country income distribution. Chapter 4 of
my thesis extends this literature by showing that not only the distribution of income per
se matters but that bilateral trade flows are also determined by the extent to which two
income distributions are similar. In doing so, I use similarity of income distributions as
an approximation for similarity of demand structures. The idea of similarity of demand
structures to be intensifying trade has a long tradition in the economic literature, going
back to the well-known Linder hypothesis. According to Linder (1961) countries produce
those goods for which domestic demand is large since proximity to demand serves as a
comparative advantage. He argued that this congruence of consumption and production
patterns intensifies trade among countries with similar demand structures.
Based on a sample of 102 countries, the empirical analysis in chapter 4 shows that
countries with more similar income distributions trade more with each other. The effect
of similarity on trade volumes is driven by both the extensive and the intensive margin.
Hence, countries which are more similar regarding their income distributions trade a more
diversified bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade more within a given set of goods
(intensive margin). The main measure of similarity is the overlap. It is the minimum
integral of two income distributions. In addition to this common measure, I establish
two novel measures of income similarity which also determine bilateral trade flows. In
particular, I find that not only the extent to which two income distributions overlap but
also at which income levels the overlap is concentrated matters for trade. Moreover, the
broader the range of incomes for which two distributions overlap, the more trade occurs
along both margins. These results are identified with an augmented gravity equation
which conditions on importer and exporter fixed effects as well as trade costs. This
isolates the effect of similarity from supply side effects, e.g. technology, as well as from
gravity forces, such as trade costs and economic sizes.
2 Do China’s Exports Crowd Out Other
Countries’ Exports?
2.1 Introduction
China’s development in the 1990s and 2000s has been exceptional. Over the fifteen years
to 2009 China’s manufacturing exports grew by an annual average of 16%, more than
three times as fast as world trade. By rapidly penetrating international goods markets,
China increased its share in global manufacturing exports from 5% in 1995 to 16% in
2009 as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Hence, both the evolution as well as the absolute size
of China’s role in world trade is extraordinary. Moreover, China’s increasing importance
in the global market is not only driven by labor intensive industries such as apparel but
also by chemicals and machinery (see Figure A.1).
Figure 2.1: China’s penetration of world export markets
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These changes in international trade patterns have spurred a debate in both politics
and academia about the consequences of China’s outstanding export growth for exports
of other countries. The public debate in many countries centers around the fear China
absorbing ever more export markets and eventually leaving no export opportunities for
domestic exporters. For example, “China replaces Germany” is the headline of a German
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broadcast company.1 While in academia it is widely acknowledged that, in general, inte-
grating a country into the world economy is altogether welfare enhancing, it is discussed
which exporters are most exposed to Chinese competition in third markets. Hence, it
is debated which countries will experience the largest reallocation effects. Some argue
that Chinese exports will mostly affect labor abundant developing countries because their
export mix is similar to China’s (e.g. Schott (2004), Eichengreen et al. (2004)). Others
believe that China’s penetration of global manufacturing markets is especially relevant for
the developed world which is highly dependent on foreign markets for their manufacturing
sales (e.g. Abraham and Hove (2011), Flückiger and Ludwig (2013)).
This chapter analyzes the crowding out effect of China’s exports on exports of other
countries. Thereby, I focus on the differential impact China has on developed and de-
veloping countries and analyze one particular channel which may explain this differential
impact. From the analysis of detailed trade data of 102 countries from 1996 to 2006 I
provide three main results. First, I find a crowding out effect of China in third markets.
Exports of other countries grow more slowly in destination-product pairs in which China
had a higher market share. The main estimate implies a 0.13 percentage point lower
yearly export growth rate of other countries, on average, in a market in which China
initially had a share of 5% compared to a market in which China captured 16%. Thus,
even the substantial difference of China’s average penetration in 1995 versus 2009 (Figure
2.1) predicts only a small impact. In order to address the potential endogeneity of China’s
market share I use an IV approach which is similar to the one used in Bloom et al. (2011).
Second, countries at different stages of development are differentially affected by
China’s penetration of export markets. I find no effect on high income countries and
a non-negligible negative effect for middle and (some) low income countries. The crowd-
ing out effect of China is strongest for middle income exporters.
One explanation for why economies at the top and the very bottom of the world
income distribution are more insulated from Chinese competition than countries with
middle income is factor-proportions specialization within products proposed in Schott
(2004). Within-product specialization is a reinterpretation of the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O)
model. In the conventional H-O model countries specialize across products, i.e. a labor
abundant country, like China, exports apparel and capital abundant Germany exports
chemicals. Yet, motivated by the fact that countries with very different endowments ex-
port similar baskets of goods but at considerably different prices, Schott (2004) proposes
1The article “China verdrängt Deutschland” by Deutsche Welle was published on April 2, 2013
on http://www.dw.de/china-verdr%C3%A4ngt-deutschland/a-16550078. Furthermore, “The geopolitical
challenge of Chinese textile exports” describes closing down of plants and job losses in Turkey, Marocco,
Bangladesh and Central America due to China’s textile exports. It was published by The Association for
Asian Research, which seeks to provide independent views on Asia for the American public, on June 13,
2013 on http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2603.html.
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to change the perspective from horizontal differentiation (industries) to vertical differ-
entiation (quality).2 Within-product specialization implies that both labor and capital
abundant countries export chemicals but specialize in different quality segments depending
upon their relative endowments. From this perspective, Germany, for instance, produces
capital intensive chemicals which are of a high level of sophistication, whereas China pro-
duces less sophisticated chemicals using labor intensively. If buyers regard goods of low
and high quality as poor substitutes, German chemicals do not compete directly with Chi-
nese chemicals in the within-product specialization model. In other words, the intensity
of competition from China depends on the substitutability of China’s and a country’s own
variety. The substitutability of two varieties is lower the more diverse they are in terms
of sophistication or quality. This line of argument offers an explanation for why Europe,
North America and Africa, which have very different production technologies compared to
China, are less affected by China’s competition at the destination-product level than Asia
and Central & South America which are more similar to China with respect to production
structures.
The third result of this chapter shows that the more a country’s factor intensities
and export unit values differ from those of China, the more insulated are its exports
from Chinese competition in third markets. This evidence is consistent with within-
product specialization as the similarity of factor intensities and unit values of two exporters
measures how close two versions of a good are in terms of sophistication.
Does the finding that China’s opening has lowered other countries’ exports in some
product markets imply that the impact of China is detrimental? No, this finding implies
that China’s integration into the world market has induced reallocation. According to
conventional trade theory, integration leads some industries of a national economy to
contract and some to expand due to the new cross-country distribution of endowments
or technologies. Besides the vivid debates in politics there are at least four reasons why
reallocation effects are an important consequence of globalization. First, reallocation of
production factors towards industries suiting a country’s comparative advantage raises
the profitability of production. Such reallocations give rise to overall welfare gains from
integration. Second, reallocation, however, causes adjustment costs. In the real world
these costs can be substantial due to various frictions. As an example, switching costs for a
former textile worker seeking employment in the pharmaceutical industry can incorporate
unemployment and wage losses. Third, although overall welfare gains are positive in a
standard trade model, there are winners and losers within a country. If, for example, an
economy abundant with unskilled labor enters the world market, unskilled workers are
2Schott (2008) documents the export basket of China and the OECD to be very similar while China’s
export unit values, a proxy for quality, are substantially lower than the OECD’s export unit values.
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expected to lose whereas skilled workers gain.3 Fourth, by studying reallocation effects
empirically, we get a better understanding of how countries specialize. The opening of
China is particularly interesting as it involves an ‘immense global export supply shock’
(according to Hanson (2012)), and hence allows us to study whether reallocations are such
as we expect from theory. It is important to note that this chapter concentrates only on
one side of reallocation by looking at contracting trade flows due to Chinese competition
and not analyzing where freed-up resources are redirected. Thus, by focusing on one
specific consequence of China’s integration this chapter does not provide a comprehensive
assessment of China’s rise or a general equilibrium analysis, respectively, and neither aims
to explore welfare effects.4 Moreover, the analysis is positive and by no means normative.
Many studies have addressed competition effects of China in third markets. This
chapter contributes to the literature mainly in two ways. (i) I consider a wide variety
of countries in order to analyze the differential impact of China on developed and de-
veloping nations. In contrast, most existing articles study the effect of China’s rise on a
particular exporter or a narrow group of countries. Moreover, previous articles predomi-
nantly focus on developing or Asian countries. (ii) Going beyond merely documenting the
impact of China for different groups of countries, I provide evidence that within-product
specialization is a potential mechanism through which the differential effects may arise.
This chapter is related to several strands in the literature. First, there is a body of
research on China’s crowding out effect in third markets. Generally, effects are consid-
erably smaller than suspected in economic policy discussions. Athukorala (2009), Green-
away et al. (2008), Lall and Albaladejo (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2004) find evidence
that China displaces exports of Asian countries. While the first two studies conclude
that effects are more pronounced for rich Asian exporters the latter two find that less
developed Asian economies are more affected. Similarly, the analysis in Eichengreen and
Tong (2006) implies that low-wage exporters of labor intensive consumer goods are most
exposed to China. Hence, these articles also study the differential impact of China on
countries at different stages of development. However, this chapter differs from these
3 The mechanism is changes in prices. If China induces prices of goods which use unskilled la-
bor intensively, e.g. textiles, to fall this leads to shrinking production and employment of unskilled
labor in other countries. Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has raised concerns that the impact of such
mechanisms on the income distribution in rich countries might be ’big and is getting bigger’ (see
http://www.voxeu.org/article/trade-and-inequality-revisited).
4There are at least two important further consequences. First, China itself also offers a new export
destination. Additional demand is predominantly in capital goods and components which probably
benefits rich countries. Second, integrating a new economy into the world market affects countries’ terms
of trade. In the case of China, there was a downward pressure on textile prices and an upward pressure on
commodity prices. This has been unfavorable for the terms of trade of textile exporters and commodity
importers (e.g. Bangladesh, India) and advantageous for importers of clothing and commodity exporters,
(e.g. US, Africa). Furthermore, new trade theory emphasizes welfare gains through the availability of a
wider variety of products to consumers after integration.
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studies as they only consider Asian countries, except Eichengreen and Tong (2006), and
use aggregate trade data or very broad categories for their analysis. Moreover, they reach
unequal results. Hanson and Roberston (2010), Lall and Weiss (2005) and Dos Santos and
Zignago (2011) examine China’s crowding out effect on developing countries, in particular
Latin America, and find only small effects. The results of Jenkins and Barbosa (2012)
indicate, however, that Brazilian exports are substantially affected by China’s penetration
of world markets. The evidence on China’s impact on exports of developed countries to
third markets is scarce. Breinlich and Tucci (2011) find only a marginal impact of Chi-
nese competition on Italian exports which is consistent with my evidence. In contrast to
the results of this chapter, Flückiger and Ludwig (2013) and Abraham and Hove (2010,
2011) find a non-negligible crowding out effect of China on rich European and OECD
countries.5 Second, there is an emerging literature on the impact of China’s exports on
domestic markets. Bernard et al. (2006), Khandelwal (2010), Bloom et al. (2011), Mion
and Zhu (2013), Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2012) find considerable reactions
of domestic firms and labor markets in rich countries like the US and Europe to Chinese
import penetration. While I use a similar approach to analyze effects of Chinese competi-
tion in third markets I conclude that rich countries’ exports change only marginally. The
regularity that firms selling in the domestic market are less productive and supply lower
quality products compared to exporting firms (e.g. Tybout (2003)) might reconcile the
two findings as my results indicate that exports which are produced with less sophisti-
cated technologies or have a lower unit value are more exposed to Chinese competition in
third markets. This differential exposure to China, depending on production techniques
or sophistication of goods, is moreover in line with the result in Bernard et al. (2006),
Mion and Zhu (2013) and Bloom et al. (2011) that Chinese imports have a stronger effect
on less capital intensive, less skill intensive and less high-tech firms. My results indicate,
however, that in addition to the level of sophistication of production technologies also the
disparity in production techniques compared to China insulates producers from Chinese
competition. Furthermore, Khandelwal (2010) documents that low-wage country import
penetration has a weaker effect on industries with greater scope for quality differentiation
as developed economies can insulate themselves from developing countries by specializ-
ing in high qualities. This is consistent with the emerging literature on within-product
specialization initiated by Schott (2004). Schott (2008), Fontagné et al. (2008) and Ed-
wards and Lawrence (2010) show that while China increasingly exports the same basket
of goods as developed countries, there still are large differences in prices. This indicates
that countries specialize within rather than across products and that export goods from
5Fu et al. (2012) and Auer and Fischer (2010) study effects of low-wage country competition on global
and domestic prices.
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developing and developed countries are not close substitutes.6 This literature was moti-
vated by the enormous shift in shares of world wide trade towards middle and low income
countries. The special focus on China is due to its exceptional pace and extent with which
it has penetrated world markets.7 Finally, another strand of research studies endogenous
adjustment of quality in response to international competition. While Bloom et al. (2011)
document that domestic firms engage in innovation activities in response to higher Chinese
import competition Martin and Mejean (2012) show that the quality of French exports
increases with low-wage country competition in third markets. In the latter study quality
increases due to reallocation of output from low- to high-quality firms.8
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data
and the empirical model. The findings are discussed in detail in section 2.3 and section
2.4 concludes.
2.2 Data and Empirical Model
2.2.1 Data
I use the trade database of Gaulier and Zignago (2010) which reports annual bilateral
trade flows at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), from 1995 until 2009.9 The
original data has been collected by UN Comtrade. The compiled dataset of Gaulier and
Zignago (2010), called BACI, has two advantageous features. First, while the Comtrade
database reports two, possibly different, values for the same trade flow if both the importer
and the exporter report their trade statistic, these double observations are reconciled
into a single harmonized value in BACI.10 Second, BACI reports comparable values and
quantities. Values are converted to a Free on Board (FOB) basis and quantities are
reported in tons.11 The data is aggregated from the 6-digit level (5’018 categories) to
6Di Comite et al. (2011) also find that export prices of European cloths are substantially higher than
of Chinese apparel but that this price gap is narrowing which indicates that China is moving up the
quality ladder in clothing.
7A good description of China’s growing exports can be found in Amiti and Freund (2010). The
evolution of Chinese policy towards international trade is summarized in Branstetter and Lardy (2006).
8Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) find that import competition, from all sorts of countries, results in
quality adjustments which are consistent with distance to frontier models.
9The whole dataset is reported in the HS nomenclature of 1992.
10They weight double observations by the reliability of the two reporting countries, where the measure
for reliability is based on a variance analysis.
11Originally imports are reported inclusive of the Cost for Insurance and Freight (CIF) and exports
FOB. The authors estimate transport and insurance rates in order to transform CIF values into FOB
values. Most trade flows are reported in tons originally. The authors estimate rates of conversion into
tons for flows reported in different units of measurement. These rates are estimated, for each product
separately, with trade flows which are reported both in tons and the other unit of measurement.
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the 4-digit level (1’241) for most of the analysis. The unit of observation in the data is:
exporter (n), importer (c), HS 4-digit code (i), year (t). For each observation the value
vncit and quantity xncit are observed.
I screen the data as follows: (i) To avoid that small countries dominate the sample I
drop countries with a population less than five million, in 1995. (ii) I restrict the sample
of HS codes to those belonging to manufacturing (SITC 5-8), moreover I discard HS codes
containing homogeneous goods as classified by Rauch (1999). (iii) I trim the data along
three dimensions. I drop trade flows reporting a trade value of less than $20’000 in 1995
dollars, I drop trade flows reporting a negative or zero quantity and for each HS4 code
and year, I drop observations with a unit value smaller than 10% of the worldwide median
or larger than 10 times the worldwide median. My sample accounts for 86% of the value
of worldwide trade in manufacturing. It covers 102 countries at all stages of development,
see Table A.2, and 864 HS4 product categories.
The dataset reports only positive trade flows. I use exporter-destination-product com-
binations with at least two positive trade flows between 1995 and 2009 and add all re-
maining zero trade flows. My sample includes 1’206’691 such combinations. 42% of
the observations are zero trade flows. The number of zeros decreases over time, from
52% in 1995 to 38% in 2009. The panel is, however, not perfectly balanced as I discard
destination-product-year combinations to which no country exports. These combinations
are excluded as they lack a meaningful measure of Chinese competition. This concerns,
however, only 2% of the observations.
2.2.2 Empirical Model
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on how exposure to Chinese competition in third
markets affects the evolution of exports of other countries. The variable to be explained
is the change of a country’s exports, towards a given destination and in a given product.
I use the growth rate measure of Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), denoted by G.
G(vnci)
t:t+5 =
vnci,t+5 − vnci,t
0.5 · (vnci,t+5 + vnci,t) ∈ [−2, 2] (2.1)
G(vnci)
t:t+5 measures the growth of country n’s exports towards a destination-product
combination ci between t and t + 5. It ranges from -2 to 2 and is symmetric around
zero.12 If exports increase from zero to a positive value (“entry”) G is 2, whereas a
decrease of exports from a positive value to zero (“exit”) implies a G of -2. The advantage
of the growth measure G is exactly that it accounts for zeros in the data, as opposed
12I set G = 0 if vnci,t+5 = vnci,t = 0. It is shown in section 2.3.4 that results are insensitive to this.
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to log differences or conventional growth rates. Moreover, for small growth rates G is
approximately equal to these two commonly used growth measures.13
Exposure to Chinese competition in third markets is measured with the market share.
MSCHNcit =
vCHN,cit∑
m6=n vmcit
∈ [0, 1] (2.2)
China’s market share, MSCHNcit , is measured at the destination-product level (ci). By
definition, it is between 0 and 1. I omit vncit in the denominator to ensure that there is
no mechanical relationship between the dependent variable G and explanatory variable
MSCHN . All exporters selling to a product-destination ci at t are equally exposed to
Chinese competition.14
Figure A.2 depicts the empirical distribution of export growth and Chinese market
share. That the spikes of export growth at -2, 0 and 2 do not drive the results is shown
in section 2.3.4. Summary statistics on all variables are listed in Table A.1.
I examine the effect of exposure to Chinese competition in third markets on exports of
other countries with the below stated regression equation following Bernard et al. (2006).
This specification relates the growth of country n’s exports between t and t+5 to China’s
market share at t as well as controls X and fixed effects α.
G(vnci)
t:t+5 = αnt + αct + αi + βMS
CHN
cit +X
′
ncitγ + ncit (2.3)
Exporter-year fixed effects αnt absorb a fully flexible evolution of country n’s overall
exports.15 Similarly, importer-year fixed effects αct capture destination c’s overall import
growth rate. Product fixed effects αi control for differences across goods. In the baseline
specification the control vector Xncit includes only the export value at t − 1, vnci,t−1, to
control for convergence.16 Standard errors are clustered by destination-product pairs ci
in order to account for the fact that the explanatory variable is observed at a higher
level of aggregation than the dependent variable (see Moulton (1986)) and to address
serial correlation. Bias from few clusters is no risk as there are many clusters in all
specifications.17 The regressions cover two periods, 1996-2001 and 2001-2006.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the relation between market penetration of Chinese products
13G = 2gr/(2 + gr), where gr ≡ (vnci,t+5 − vnci,t)/vnci,t is the conventional growth rate.
14Computing China’s share in imports from all source countries but n creates variation across exporters
n. However, overall this variation is small, the correlation between vCHN,cit∑
m 6=n vmcit
and vCHN,cit∑
m vmcit
is 0.99.
15Strictly speaking αnt is an exporter-period effect, where a period lasts from t to t + 5. For ease of
notation I denote exporter-period effects by αnt instead of αn,t:t+5.
16I use vnci,t−1 instead of vncit to avoid a mechanical relationship with G(v). Yet, results do not depend
on whether it is specified at t or t-1 and neither whether it is in level (vnci) or log (ln(1 + vnci)).
17The number of clusters is around 60’000 in the baseline specification and never below 25’000.
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and another country’s exports. It plots the growth of Thailand’s exports towards the US,
between 2001 and 2006, against China’s market share in the US in 2001. Each datapoint is
a HS 2-digit code and the size of a circle indicates how many HS 4-digit codes belong to it.
To give an example, China had a market share of just 1% in US pharmaceutical imports
(HS2 code 30) and Thailand’s exports in these products increased a lot (G(v) = 1.3).
Whereas, Thai exports to the US decreased slightly in toys (HS2 code 95), an industry in
which China served a large share of US imports.
Figure 2.2: Relation between China’s market share and Thailand’s Exports
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Observations are labeled with HS 2−digit codes. The size of a circle indicates the number of
corresponding HS 4−digit codes.
There are two potential sources of endogeneity of China’s market share, demand and
technology shocks. With demand shocks I mean changes in the import demand of product-
destination ci. Demand shocks which affect all source countries proportionately are un-
related to China’s market share and hence do not pose an endogeneity problem. In the
more subtle case of demand shocks which are concentrated towards China the market
share is endogenous. Demand shocks which China absorbs above (below) average bias
the OLS estimate upwards (downwards). I solve this more subtle problem by using an
instrument that captures the supply driven component of MSCHNcit resulting from China’s
market-oriented reforms and opening up to trade. This instrument is the 5-year lag of
China’s market share in the destination-product pair ci multiplied with the growth of
China’s market share in product i from t− 5 to t, in all destinations but c.
MSCHNci,t−5 ·
(
1 +G(MSCHNi )
t−5:t/2
) ∈ [0, 2] (2.4)
(2.4) is expected to be positively related to China’s market share in ci at t as trade rela-
tions have some persistence. Hence, if China had a large share in US apparel imports in
1996, it is likely that it is also high in 2001. That the first stage is is indeed positive and
strong is shown in column [1] of Table A.4. It documents that China’s past market share
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in a destination-product pair is a good predictor of China’s current market share. The
assumption is that China’s lagged market share in ci is independent of current product
demand shocks. This identification strategy is related to Bloom et al. (2011). Moreover,
such initial conditions instruments are common in studies analyzing the effect of immi-
gration on labor market outcomes (e.g. Card and DiNardo (2000)). As an alternative
strategy to address endogeneity, I attempt to approximate demand shocks with the change
in overall imports going to a destination-product pair ci, G(vci)t:t+5, see section 2.3.4.
The other potential source of endogeneity are global technology shocks as positive
productivity shocks are likely to be reflected in higher export growth, see Amiti and
Khandelwal (2013). With technology shocks I mean changes in country n’s technology to
produce good i. China’s market share is endogenous if industry specific technology shocks
are correlated across source countries, yet not one to one. To give an example, if there is
a global technology shock, within an industry, which disproportionately favors low-tech
production, we expect China’s market share to increase and exports of technologically
advanced (lagging) countries to decrease (increase). In contrast, China’s market share is
invariant to global technology shocks which raise all countries’ exports alike. Moreover,
country specific technology shocks do not pose an endogeneity problem as they are not
systematically related to the dependent variable. Thus, technology shocks can bias the
OLS estimate up- or downwards, or have no influence. If China’s past technology shocks
are not systematically related to other countries’ current technology shocks, the instru-
mental variable approach using initial conditions explained above eliminates the potential
bias due to technology shocks. Another way to address endogeneity is to approximate
technology shocks with the change in country n’s exports in product i to all destinations
but c, G(vni)t:t+5. Alternatively I include for each exporter income group and year a
separate product fixed effect. This captures global technology shocks which affect tech-
nologically advanced and lagging countries differentially if income groups and state of
technology are related. These two alternative strategies to address endogeneity are shown
in section 2.3.4.
Offshoring has contributed to the recent increase of international flows. If firms frag-
ment manufacturing across countries gross trade flows overstate net trade flows (exports
net of intermediate inputs). As China is especially involved in importing intermediates
and assembling them to final goods for exporting (see Hanson (2012)), its market share
in terms of gross trade is likely to overstate its share in terms of net trade. However, as
such international fragmentation involving China will mostly vary across industries and
less across destination-industry combinations, product fixed effects will absorb most of
this bias. Section 2.3.3 will employ countries’ factor intensities in production and export
unit values to approximate the level of sophistication of export goods. If only part of
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a good has been produced in the exporting country this loosens the link between factor
endowments and sophistication of export goods. Yet, it does not affect the connection
between unit values and quality or sophistication.
2.3 Discussion of Results
I first document that higher exposure to Chinese competition in third markets is associ-
ated with lower export growth of other countries. Second, I show that while there is no
impact on high income countries the crowding out effect of China is stronger for middle
than low income exporters. One explanation for this differential effect is within-product
specialization (Schott (2004)). I finally provide evidence which is consistent with this
theory. The more a country’s factor intensities and export unit values differ from those of
China, the more insulated are its exports from Chinese competition in third markets. The
intuition is that dissimilarity in production techniques and quality increase the discrep-
ancy in the degree of sophistication of a country’s own and China’s variety. This makes
the two varieties less substitutable and hence competition between the two suppliers less
intense.
2.3.1 Crowding Out Effect of China on Other Exporters
Table 2.1 presents the first result of this chapter, a higher market share of China is
associated with lower export growth of other countries towards the respective destination-
product pair. The first two columns are estimated with OLS, in column [1] the full sample
from 1996 to 2006 is used and column [2] covers 2001 to 2006, the period for which the
instrument is available. The third column is estimated with IV. While the qualitative
result of a crowding out effect of Chinese exports on other countries’ exports is the same
across sample periods and estimation methods the effect is larger when only the early
2000s are considered. This is unsurprising as China entered the WTO in 2001 which
accelerated its penetration of export markets. However, the magnitude of the crowding
out effect is rather small. Let us compare two destination-product combinations, one in
which China has a market share of 5% and one with 16%, i.e. we contrast a market with
China’s average penetration in 1995 with a market resembling China’s role in 2009 (see
Figure 2.1). The IV coefficient implies that such an 11 percentage point increase in China’s
market share lowers the yearly export growth rate of another country on average by 0.13
percentage points (−0.061 · 0.11/5). This marginal effect is conditional on a rich set of
fixed effects which take out a lot of variation. Estimating the model without fixed effects
quintuples the coefficient. Remember that the analysis is at the destination-product level
and that the crowding out effect is identified with variation across destinations within a
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given product as well as with variation across products within a given destination. For
illustration, on the one hand I compare apparel exports towards the US and Canada and
on the other hand I contrast exports towards the US in apparel and pharmaceuticals.
Comparing the point estimate of OLS and IV in columns [2] and [3] suggests that there
is hardly a bias stemming from demand and technology shocks if these two sources of
potential endogeneity are resolved with the initial conditions instrument.
Table 2.1: Crowding out effect of China
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Method OLS IV
Mean 0.190 0.348 0.348
Standard deviation 1.228 1.229 1.229
[1] [2] [3]
MSCHNcit -0.044??? -0.059??? -0.061??
(0.008) (0.012) (0.027)
Sample period 96-06 01-06 01-06
# observations 2373554 1166863 1166863
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.061 0.061
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
(clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in
parentheses. The dependent variable, explanatory vari-
able and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.4), respectively. The F-statistic of the first stage
is 1037. All columns include exporter-year, importer-year
and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
Robustness Checks
I carried out a number of checks to see if the above crowding out effect is robust to alter-
native versions of the market share, alternative definitions of the instrument, weighting
observations and including additional covariates.
In Table A.3 the OLS specification is estimated with lagged market share. In panel
(a1) I use the full sample from 1996-2006 and panel (a2) covers 2001-2006, the period
for which the instrument is available. The first column repeats the baseline model with
lag 0. Columns two to six show the coefficient for lagged Chinese market share, lag
∈ {1, . . . , 5}. The last column uses the average of China’s market share between t − 5
and t − 1. Although the magnitude of the effect is reduced when China’s market share
is lagged, the qualitative result of a crowding out effect is unchanged. To demonstrate
that the variation in the market share is driven by China (nominator) and not by other
countries (denominator) the denominator of the market share is averaged over the whole
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time period, see also Auer and Fischer (2010).18 The findings for this alternative Chinese
market share at t, t − 1, . . ., t − 5 as well as the average from lag 1 to 5 are similar to
baseline findings, see panel (b1) for the full sample and panel (b2) for the sample using
only 2001 to 2006.
In Table A.4 I document robustness of the functional form of the initial conditions
instrument. In column [5] China’s market share is instrumented with its 5-year lag,
MSCHNci,t−5 ∈ [0, 1]. Whereas, in column [6] the 5-year lag is extrapolated with China’s over-
all change (instead of growth) of the market share in product i,MSCHNci,t−5+∆(MSCHNi )t−5:t ∈
[−1, 2]. These IV effects are very similar to the baseline which is repeated in column [4]
for comparison. Also these alternative initial conditions instruments have a powerful and
positive first stage, see columns [2] and [3].
One might want to give more weight to observations of large countries than small
countries as data of large economies is usually more precise and because large countries
might be more important in the sense that they should get a higher weight when com-
puting an average effect. Similarly, one might want to give more weight to observations
of large markets. In Table A.5 observations are weighted with total GDP of the ex- and
importing country and total imports of a destination-product combination, respectively.
Yet, this does not change the qualitative results.
Additionally controlling for China’s and the exporting country’s revealed comparative
advantage in product i and year t − 1, hardly changes the findings, see columns [1] and
[2] of Table A.6. In contrast, including concentration of exports in a destination-product
pair raises both the OLS and IV effect, see [3] and [4].19 Adding trade costs in addition
has almost no effect on the magnitude of the coefficients, see [5] and [6].
2.3.2 Which Exporters are Affected Most?
So far, I have documented that China’s penetration of international goods markets, in-
duced by its market reforms and opening up to trade, has lowered export paths of other
countries. This crowding out effect of China is an average effect. In what follows I outline
that Chinese competition influences other countries differentially.
To shed light on the question about which countries are most affected by China’s rise
I divide the world into income groups and estimate the effect of China’s market share on
subsequent export growth for each group separately. The groups are high income countries
(HICs), upper middle income countries (UMICs), lower middle income countries (LMICs)
18M˜S
CHN
cit = vCHN,cit/(
1
12
∑2006
p=1995 vcip)
19The index for revealed comparative advantage of exporter n in product i and year t is defined as
RSCAnit =
RCAnit−1
RCAnit+1
∈ (−1, 1), where RCAnit =
(
vnit
vnt
)
/
(∑
m6=n vmit∑
m6=n vmt
)
. Concentration of country c’s
imports in product i and year t is measured with the Herfindahl index HHIcit =
∑
m (vmcit/vcit)
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and low income countries (LICs), see Table A.2. In Table 2.2 the market share is interacted
with income group dummies. The IV results in column [3] imply first that export paths
of HICs are not affected by China’s rise, second that China crowds out both middle and
low income countries’ exports and third that the effect of China is strongest for middle
income countries. While the effect is very small and far from significant for HICs, it is
-0.188 for UMICs, -0.109 for LMICs and -0.088 for LICs, compared to the average effect
of -0.061 (Table 2.1). Upper and lower middle income countries have on average a 0.41
and 0.24 percentage point lower yearly export growth rate in a product-destination with a
Chinese market share of 16%, compared to a market in which China accounts for 5% of all
imports. For LICs this effect is minus 0.19 percentage points. Thus, the magnitude of the
crowding out effect for middle and low income countries is intermediate. While the OLS
estimate is upward biased for middle and low income countries, it is downward biased for
HICs.20 Yet, note that the IV effect for HICs is imprecisely estimated. Although there
is no prediction of the sign of the bias, this is the intuitive direction. The bias suggests
that if demand shocks are concentrated towards China low and middle income countries
can capture a considerable fraction of additional demand. Moreover, global technology
shocks are positively correlated among China and low and middle income countries. As
market share is treated as endogenous and income groups as exogenous, no additional
instruments are needed for the interaction terms.21 Alternatively, the sample is split
along income groups in Table 2.3 yielding similar results. Using the IV approach implies
no effect on HICs and a substantial negative effect for middle and low income countries.
With OLS all groups are negatively affected, HICs least and MICs most.
A considerable part of the literature on China’s crowding out effect has concentrated
on countries’ geographic location instead of income groups. These two dimensions are
closely related. Estimating a separate effect of China’s market share for geographic regions
provides a picture which is consistent with the differing effects for income groups, see Table
2.4.22 China’s penetration of export markets does not, or even positively, affect North
America and Europe, where most high income countries are located.23 Also exports
of Africa are on average unrelated to Chinese competition.24 In contrast, Middle East
20The positive OLS effect for LICs is driven by Africa, see below.
21MSCHNcit is instrumented with MSCHNci,t−5
(
1 +G(MSCHNi−c )
t−5:t/2
)
and MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ UMICs) is
instrumented with
[
MSCHNci,t−5
(
1 +G(MSCHNi−c )
t−5:t/2
)]
× 1(n ∈ UMICs). Note that main effects, e.g.
1(n ∈ UMICs), are absorbed in exporter-year dummies.
22Australia is excluded from the analysis by regions as no other country belongs to Australia-Oceania.
23Mexico belongs to North America. While the effect of China is zero for both Canada and the United
States it is substantially negative for Mexico. Moreover, China has a more negative effect on Central &
Eastern Europe than on Northern, Southern & Western Europe.
24The effect of China is stronger on the richer North and South than on Central, West and East Africa.
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Table 2.2: Competition from China is strongest for middle income countries I
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Method OLS IV
Mean 0.190 0.348 0.348
Standard deviation 1.228 1.229 1.229
[1] [2] [3]
MSCHNcit -0.034??? -0.048??? -0.015
(0.009) (0.013) (0.029)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ UMICs) -0.045??? -0.055?? -0.173???
(0.015) (0.023) (0.034)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ LMICs) -0.078??? -0.043?? -0.094???
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ LICs) 0.085??? 0.032 -0.073?
(0.017) (0.025) (0.039)
Sample period 96-06 01-06 01-06
# observations 2373554 1166863 1166863
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.061 0.061
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by
destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined
in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respectively. 1(n ∈ UMICs)
is one if exporter n is an upper middle income country. 1(n ∈
HICs) is the base category. MSCHNcit is instrumented with (2.4) and
MSCHNcit ×1(n ∈ UMICs) with (2.4)×1(n ∈ UMICs). F-statistics of
first stages are 523, 1671, 1663, 1241. All columns include exporter-
year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
& South Asia as well as East & Southeast Asia experienced substantially lower export
growth paths in markets where China sells a lot. Countries of these Asian regions are
very heterogeneous regarding their income. Finally, exports of Central & South America,
with its predominantly (lower) middle income countries are negatively affected by China’s
penetration of global markets.
Robustness Checks
Figure A.3 illustrates the distribution of country specific effects, obtained from estimating
equation (2.3) for each exporter separately, by income groups and regions. The averages
of these country effects are consistent with the group effects reported in Table 2.3 and 2.4.
Country specific estimates are very heterogeneous for LMICs and LICs as well as for Africa
and Middle East & South Asia. Moreover, Table A.7 shows that results are insensitive to
weighting observations with size of trading partners or size of import markets.
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Table 2.3: Competition from China is strongest for middle income countries II
Dep. Var.† G(vnci)t:t+5
Exporter n ∈ HICs UMICs LMICs LICs
Method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.113 0.280 0.286 0.418 0.297 0.439 0.348 0.513
St. dev.‡ 1.202 1.188 1.274 1.286 1.260 1.280 1.214 1.258
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
MSCHNcit -0.024?? 0.015 -0.068??? -0.250??? -0.111??? -0.107?? -0.031 -0.155??
[-0.003] [0.002] [-0.008] [-0.030] [-0.014] [-0.014] [-0.005] [-0.024]
(0.010) (0.032) (0.020) (0.060) (0.017) (0.049) (0.020) (0.072)
Sample period 96-06 01-06 96-06 01-06 96-06 01-06 96-06 01-06
# observations 1402974 689151 319311 157441 473784 233614 177485 86657
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.063 0.062 0.059 0.058 0.062 0.077 0.088
† Dep. Var. stands for Dependent Variable, ‡ St. dev. stands for Standard Deviation. Notes:
???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in round parentheses. Standardized beta
coefficients are given in square brackets. Equation (2.3) is estimated for each exporter income group
separately. There are 21 high, 10 upper middle, 30 lower middle and 40 low income exporters. The
dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4),
respectively. F-statistics of the first stages are 1015 (HICs), 768 (UMICs), 811 (LMICs) and 496 (LICs).
All columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
2.3.3 Why are High and Low Income Exporters Somewhat
Insulated from China?
The findings suggest that while China’s penetration of world markets has lowered export
growth rates of other countries on average, countries at different stages of development are
differentially affected. I find no effect on high income countries and a negative effect for
middle and (some) low income countries. Consistently, rich Europe and North America
are unrelated to China’s market share, whereas economies in Asia and Central & South
America, which are mostly middle income countries, experienced lower export growth.
Moreover, African countries are unaffected by Chinese competition.
One explanation for why economies at the top and very bottom of the world income
distribution are more insulated from Chinese competition than countries with middle in-
come is factor-proportions specialization within products proposed in Schott (2004).25
Within-product specialization is a reinterpretation of the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model.
The conventional H-O model features across-product specialization. Hence, a labor abun-
dant country like China exports labor-intensive goods, such as apparel, and capital abun-
25Other explanations are, among others, differential tariff structures or differences in specialization
across products. The latter is possible even though the analysis is at the product-destination level as the
panel is unbalanced.
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dant Germany exports capital-intensive goods, such as chemicals. Motivated by the fact
that countries with very different endowments export similar baskets of goods but at
considerably different prices, the perspective was changed from horizontal differentiation
(industries) to vertical differentiation (quality).26 Within-product specialization implies
that both labor and capital abundant countries export chemicals but specialize in different
quality segments depending upon their relative endowments. Capital abundant economies
use their endowment advantage to produce vertically superior varieties. Hence, Germany
produces capital intensive chemicals which are of a high level of sophistication, whereas
China produces less sophisticated chemicals using labor intensively. If buyers regard goods
of low and high quality as poor substitutes, German chemicals do not compete directly
with Chinese chemicals in the within-product specialization model.27
In other words, the intensity of competition from China depends on the substitutabil-
ity of China’s and a country’s own variety. Two varieties are poorer substitutes the more
diverse they are in terms of sophistication or quality. Therefore disparity in factor endow-
ments and production techniques as well as dissimilarity of quality, compared to China,
insulate countries from Chinese competition as they increase the discrepancy in the degree
of sophistication of a country’s own and China’s variety. This line of argument offers an
explanation for why Europe, North America and Africa, which have very different pro-
duction techniques compared to China, are less affected by China’s competition at the
destination-product level than Asia and Central & South America which are more similar
to China with respect to production technologies.
In what follows, I provide evidence consistent with within-product specialization.
First, the less similar a country’s factor intensities in production are compared to China’s,
the more insulated are its exports from Chinese competition. Second, the more diverse a
country’s export unit values are compared to China’s, the more shielded are its exports
from China.
A. Factor Intensity
Factor intensity in country n’s production of good i in year t is denoted by FInit. I define
factor intensity of a production process to be high if it is capital or skill intensive and
low if it is labor intensive. I interact the market share of China with disparity of country
n’s and China’s factor intensity |FInit − FICHNit| to study the shielding effect according
to within-product specialization. Factor intensity is treated as exogenous as it is used in
lags. Therefore no additional instrument is needed for the interaction term.28 Clearly, a
26Schott (2008) documents that the export basket of China and the OECD is very similar while China’s
export unit values, a proxy for quality, are substantially lower than the OECD’s export unit values.
27The argumentation of within-product specialization can be applied to both consumers and firms.
Consumers care about quality of final goods, whereas firms care about quality of intermediates.
28 G(vnci)
t:t+5 = αnt+αct+αi+β1MS
CHN
cit +β2
(
MSCHNcit × |FIni,t−l − FICHNi,t−l|
)
+β3|FIni,t−l−
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country’s average factor intensity is related to its income group. I show in the robustness
section that the insulation effect is not solely driven by this correlation but remains if
disparity in factor intensity is orthogonalized with respect to all other regressors, which
include exporter-year fixed effects.
Ideally, factor intensity is measured with the capital-labor ratio and the ratio of high
to low skilled workers used in production of a narrowly defined industry. As such data
is not available for many countries, I use a measure of labor productivity to approximate
factor intensity. Labor productivity is highly correlated with capital and skill intensity,
see Hall and Jones (1999). The specific measure for labor productivity is value added
per employee, which is reported in the INDSTAT4 database from UNIDO (2013) at the
country-industry level.29 Details are in Appendix 2.A.1 and alternative measures of capital
and skill intensity are discussed in the robustness section. For illustration, Table 2.5
compares factor intensity of the pharmaceutical industry across countries. As expected,
rich countries like the US produce most capital and skill intensive, poor countries like
Nepal or Azerbaijan produce very labor intensive and China has a lower to intermediate
factor intensity, see third column. Dissimilarity in factor intensity to China is high for
countries at the top and bottom of the of the list (e.g. USA and Azerbaijan) and low for
economies which are close to China, for example India or Ecuador, see column four. Panel
(a) of Figure A.4 shows China’s position regarding factor intensity for all industries.
Two features support the proposition that China has a lower to intermediate, instead
of very low, factor intensity. First, China as a whole is extremely labor abundant but
exhibits distinct heterogeneity in factor abundance across regions. Especially the more
developed coastal regions, which account for a disproportionately large share of China’s
exports, produce goods of a much higher degree of sophistication than would be expected
from China’s overall capital and skill intensity, see Xu (2010).30 Second, the World Bank
List of Economies classifies China as low income until 1998 and middle income thereafter.
In Table 2.6 China’s market share is interacted with disparity in factor intensity ap-
proximated by dissimilarity in labor productivity. Again, the first two columns are es-
timated with OLS, [1] uses the whole period from 1996 to 2006 and [2] only the second
period in order to compare with IV results in column [3]. All three models provide evidence
FICHNi,t−l| + X ′ncitγ + ncit is the regression equation with interaction terms. I use the average across
lag 1 to 5 for factor intensity. However, I show in the robustness section that results are similar for lag 5
(l = 5) which makes the assumption that factor intensity is exogenous, and hence unrelated to demand
and technology shocks between t and t+ 5, less strong.
29The measure of factor intensity only considers factors used directly in an industry x. Hence, factors
used in industries producing intermediate inputs which are utilized in the production process of industry
x are not incorporated. This mostly affects industries producing final goods.
30Rodrik (2006) argues that China’s export basket is more sophisticated than would be expected of a
country at this income level due to government policies.
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Table 2.5: Factor intensity in pharmaceuticals
Rank Country FInit |FInit − FICHNit|
1 USA 13.22 2.53
2 Japan 12.90 2.21
3 South Korea 12.47 1.77
...
...
...
...
29 Philippines 10.80 0.11
30 Pakistan 10.74 0.05
31 India 10.72 0.03
32 China 10.69 0.00
33 Ecuador 10.64 0.06
34 Romania 10.58 0.11
35 Egypt 10.58 0.12
...
...
...
...
45 Nepal 9.43 1.27
46 Georgia 9.38 1.32
47 Azerbaijan 8.15 2.54
Notes: Factor intensity is measured with log value
added per employee, averaged between 2003 and 2007,
see 2.A.1. Pharmaceuticals consists of HS2 code 30.
for a shielding effect according to within-product specialization. The more dissimilar a
country’s factor intensities are compared to China, within industries, the less affected are
its exports from Chinese competition in third markets. The intuition is that disparity in
factor intensity translates into dissimilarity in the level of sophistication of goods which
in turn lowers the degree of substitutability between a country’s own and China’s variety.
This suggests that a higher market share of China in the pharmaceutical industry has a
smaller effect on US and Azerbaijan’s exports in pharmaceuticals than on Indian phar-
maceutical exports. The magnitude of the shielding effect is substantial. A one standard
deviation increase in disparity of factor intensity (0.74) lowers the effect from Chinese
competition by 0.062. The effect of China’s market share at the mean is -0.03.
Robustness Checks (A)
As described in Appendix 2.A.1 the original INDSTAT4 database is extended in order
to increase coverage for value added per employee. I extrapolate data over time within
exporter-industry pairs and I add data for countries which are not included in INDSTAT4
by using the average of their neighbors. Table A.8 shows that the findings are qualitatively
the same when the original coverage of INDSTAT4 is used. Because for China value
added per employee is only observed between 2003 and 2007 columns [1]-[6] use the level
of factor intensity and not dissimilarity to China. Moreover, it is shown that removing
level differences across industries, i.e. normalizing FInit with the mean within an industry
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Table 2.6: Disparity in factor intensity insulates from Chinese competition
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Method OLS IV
Mean 0.196 0.353 0.353
Standard deviation 1.222 1.219 1.219
[1] [2] [3]
MSCHNcit -0.067??? -0.079??? -0.148???
(0.016) (0.022) (0.039)
MSCHNcit × |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.028??? 0.030?? 0.084???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.019)
|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.011??? 0.016??? 0.012???
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Sample period 96-06 01-06 01-06
# observations 1917877 955,540 955,540
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.063 0.063
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by destination-
product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The dependent variable, ex-
planatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.4), respectively. FInit is measured with ln(V AL )nit (2.A.1).
ln(V AL )niτ=1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 ln(
V A
L )nip. MS
CHN
cit is instrumented with
(2.4) andMSCHNcit ×|FIniτ−FICHNiτ | with (2.4)×|FIniτ−FICHNiτ |.
F-statistics of first stages are 745, 1047. All columns include exporter-
year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
and year, does not alter the findings, see columns [2], [4] and [6]. In columns [7]-[12] I
use average value added per employee between 2003 and 2007 such that the exporting
country’s factor intensity can be expressed relative to China. Also these results show that
both the level as well as disparity in factor intensity compared to China insulate from
Chinese competition in third markets.
Next, alternative measures of capital and skill intensity are discussed. Following Nunn
(2007), US industry data is combined with countries’ overall capital and skill intensity,
FInit = FIUSAit · FInt. Details are in Appendix 2.A.1. While these alternative measures
employ closer approximations of capital and skill intensity – US industry data includes
capital-labor ratios and the share of non-production labor – and cover a larger part of
the sample, they can only be used in levels, and not relative to China, due to their
construction. In Table A.9 I document that also the level of an exporter’s factor intensity
insulates from Chinese competition. In columns [1]-[6] I first show that this holds when
factor intensity is measured with labor productivity.31 In columns [7]-[12] I then document
31In columns [4]-[6] level differences in value added per employee across industries are removed, this
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that using the alternative measures of factor intensity yields similar results.32 Thus, results
measuring factor intensity with labor productivity are in line with those using intensity
of physical or human capital.
One might worry that disparity to China’s factor intensity has a different effect for
countries above compared to countries below China’s factor intensity. In Table A.10 the
sample is therefore split accordingly. The first sample includes observations where the
exporter produces more factor intensive than China, it comprises for example US exports
in pharmaceuticals. The other sample covers observations where China has a higher factor
intensity, e.g. Azerbaijan’s pharmaceutical exports. In both samples disparity to China’s
factor intensity shields exporters from Chinese competition.
I report two checks for spurious interaction terms in Table A.11 which are discussed
in detail in Ozer-Balli and Sorensen (2013). First, in columns [1]-[3] China’s market share
is interacted with the Frisch-Waugh residual of disparity in factor intensity.33 Hence, I
use factor intensity orthogonalized with respect to all other regressors in order to make
sure that the interaction term does not pick up any other interactions between China’s
market share and other independent variables included in equation (2.3), such as ex-
porter’s stage of development. Second, I include squared main effects in columns [4]-[6]
to demonstrate that the interaction term does not mistakingly capture left-out squared
terms.34 This shows, in addition, that the effect of Chinese competition is stronger for
destination-product pairs in which China has a small market share. Although this might
be counterintuitive at first sight, it is in line with Mandel (2013). He finds that Chinese
exporters entering a new market charge disproportionately low prices. If China’s entry
is associated with relatively low market shares and low prices are especially threatening
for other exporters the two findings are compatible. Both checks give qualitatively the
same result as the baseline specification in Table 2.6. That the interaction term remains
positive and significant if factor intensity is orthogonalized is quite a strong result and
shows that the interaction with factor intensity is not simply picking up the already shown
interaction with income groups.
All results on the shielding effect use the average of lag 1 to lag 5 of factor intensity.
Table A.12 shows that using such an average is not crucial. In columns [1]-[4] ([5]-[8])
factor intensity is included with a 1-year lag (5-year lag). Even the magnitudes are similar.
leaves the (IV) results unchanged. Note that differences across industries cannot be removed for the
alternative measures due to the way they are constructed.
32Results for the alternative measures are the same for the sample which is originally covered in
INDSTAT4. This indicates that results from the original INDSTAT4 sample generalize to a wider sample.
33The Frisch-Waugh residual of x is the residual from regressing x on all other regressors. This is
closely related to the regression anatomy formula, see e.g. Angrist and Pischke (2008).
34If the true model includes one of the squared main effects and the correlation between China’s market
share and disparity in factor intensity is non-zero, the interaction term may be spuriously significant.
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Finally, weighting observations with size of trading partners or size of import markets
leaves the baseline result unchanged, see Table A.13.
B. Unit Value
The aim is to study whether dissimilarity in attributes or quality insulates from Chi-
nese competition in third markets. The intuition is that the intensity of competition
depends on the substitutability of a country’s own variety with China’s variety. To the
extent that attributes or the sophistication of a good depend on factor intensity the
above results provide evidence for this mechanism. Next, I use a more direct measure
for non-substitutability, the dissimilarity in the unit value compared to China, which
approximates dissimilarity in quality of two versions of the same good.
The unit value of a trade flow from exporter n to destination-product pair ci in year
t is denoted by uvncit, it is the ratio of the corresponding value and quantity, vncit/xncit.
China’s market share is interacted with disparity of country n’s and China’s unit value
within a destination and product |UVncit −UVCHNcit|, where UVncit = ln(uv)ncit.35 Panel
(b) of Figure A.4 illustrates China’s relative position regarding its export unit value across
industries. It is typically low to intermediate compared to other countries.
It is widely accepted that unit values are related to the quality of goods, e.g. Hum-
mels and Klenow (2005) or Schott (2004). However, besides quality, unit values also
depend on production costs and markups. Arguably most of the markup is factored out
in dissimilarity in unit values as the latter partials out everything which is specific to a
destination-product pair, for example the number of sellers or the willingness to pay of
consumers in this market. In contrast, differences in production costs are not filtered out
and will hence be reflected in disparity of unit values of an exporter relative to China.
There is no clear prediction about the relation between production costs and insulation
from China’s competition. Thus, it is not evident how a higher unit value, driven by
higher production costs and not by better quality, affects susceptibility to Chinese com-
petition. However, it is more intuitive that production costs go against the shielding
effect, i.e. that conditional on quality, more expensive goods are more exposed to China’s
competition, for instance due to price competition. Furthermore, in the robustness sec-
tion I show that orthogonalizing the unit value with respect to all other regressors, which
filters out production costs at least partly, does not change the results.
Table 2.7 is the counterpart of Table 2.6. This table documents that the more dissim-
ilar a country’s unit value is compared to China’s, within a destination and product, the
less susceptible is a trade flow to Chinese competition. The shielding effect is substantial
for both OLS and IV. To the extent that dissimilarity in unit values represents differ-
35Treating the unit value as exogenous requires no additional instrument for the interaction term.
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ences in quality segments this result is consistent with the prediction of within-product
specialization.
Table 2.7: Disparity in unit value insulates from Chinese competition
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Method OLS IV
Mean 0.073 0.226 0.226
Standard deviation 1.177 1.173 1.173
[1] [2] [3]
MSCHNcit -0.191??? -0.226??? -0.228???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.035)
MSCHNcit × |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.111??? 0.156??? 0.216???
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.024??? 0.019??? 0.012???
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Sample period 96-06 01-06 01-06
# observations 1036004 682,548 682,548
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.069 0.069
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by destination-
product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The dependent variable, ex-
planatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.4), respectively. Unit values are in logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ .
UVniτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 UVnip. MS
CHN
cit is instrumented with (2.4) and
MSCHNcit × |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | with (2.4)×|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ |. F-
statistics of the first stages are 866, 835. All columns include exporter-
year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
Robustness Checks (B)
Table A.14 shows that also the level of the unit value shields from China’s competition.
Results are reported for three different versions. Columns [1]-[3] show that the unit value
shields from Chinese competition. Findings are similar if differences in unit values across
destination-product-year combinations are removed, see columns [4]-[6].36 In order to
obtain a closer approximation for quality I interact China’s market share with the Frisch-
Waugh residual of the unit value in columns [7]-[9]. By cleaning unit values, amongst
others, of exporter-year and product fixed effects, part of the variation in unit values
stemming from variation in production costs is filtered out.
I split the sample into a part where the unit value of the exporter is above China’s
and into a part where it is below China’s unit value, see Table A.15. That the interaction
36The normalized unit value is trimmed because there are some extreme outliers. Observations above
the 99.5th percentile and below the 0.5th percentile are dropped.
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term of China’s market share and dissimilarity in unit values is positive in both samples
supports the idea that it is disparity in the unit value compared to China which insulates
from Chinese competition.
The shielding effect of dissimilarity in unit values is preserved if the checks for spurious
interaction terms are applied as above, as shown in Table A.16. Interacting the market
share with the Frisch-Waugh residual of disparity in unit values and including squared
main effects does not change the qualitative finding of a positive and significant interaction
term. It is reassuring that the interaction term remains positive if disparity in unit
values is orthogonalized as this shows that the above results are not picking up any other
interaction terms, e.g. between the market share and stage of development of the exporter.
The results about the insulation from Chinese competition apply the average of lag 1
to lag 5 of disparity in unit values. In Table A.17 it is shown that using such an average
is not crucial. In columns [1] and [2] ([3] and [4]) the unit value is included with a 1-year
lag (5-year lag).
Lastly, giving more weight to observations of large countries or large import markets
does not alter the findings, see Table A.18.
2.3.4 Extensions
A. Magnitude of the Effect
In this paragraph, I focus on the magnitude of China’s crowding out effect. The IV
estimate in Table 2.1 implies that the yearly export growth rate towards a market, in
which China’s share is 16%, is 0.13 percentage points lower than towards a market in
which China captures 5%, where 5% and 16% correspond to China’s average market
share in 1995 and 2009, respectively. The corresponding income group specific estimates,
in Table 2.2, imply a 0.033 percentage point lower yearly export growth rate for high
income countries, 0.41 (0.24) percentage points for upper (lower) middle income countries
and 0.19 for low income countries. While the magnitude of the effect is small for the
overall crowding out effect it is intermediate for middle income countries and virtually
inexistent for rich exporters.
Next, I illustrate what this reduced export growth rate means in terms of GDP in
order to gauge how much resources are reallocated across industries in response to China’s
integration. From a measure about the extent of reallocation we can learn something on
how much specialization is induced by China. Moreover, it helps to assess what fraction
of an economy is concerned with adjustment costs and involves winners and losers. I use
the regression coefficient to predict how much faster exports would have grown from 2001
to 2006 if China’s market share in 2001 were 0% instead of the actual market share an
exporter faces. Hence, the thought experiment is autarky of China. The difference of
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predicted and actual exports in 2006 is ’displaced exports’ due to Chinese competition
and is expressed as a share of GDP in 2001. This share is a very crude measure of how
much resources are freed up in some industries in response to China’s integration and
can be reallocated to other industries. Table 2.8 lists the ratio of ’displaced exports’
to initial GDP for each country. Column [1] applies the regression coefficients, which
are allowed to differ across income groups (Table 2.2), to compute predicted exports in
2006. In column [2] the general crowding out effect from Table 2.1 is employed. The
reduction in exports relative to GDP is driven by (i) the coefficient, (ii) the magnitude of
the thought experiment, and (iii) the export dependence of a country. The magnitude of
the thought experiment is the market share of China with which an exporter is confronted,
see column [3]. This differs across countries due to specialization across destinations and
industries. The weighted average of China’s market share for Vietnamese exports is as high
as 0.27 and only 0.01 for Cuba. The average across all countries is 0.07 (see also Figure
2.1). The share of manufacturing exports in GDP is shown in column [4]. Consequently,
the magnitudes are largest for export oriented upper middle income countries which are
relatively specialized in markets where China is important. The calculation implies that
Malaysia’s ’displaced exports’ between 2001 and 2006, due to China’s rise, amount to 0.9%
of its GDP in 2001. China’s rise is measured by comparing export growth of Malaysia
when China’s market share is 15% as opposed to 0%, as implied by the coefficient. Even
though for Iraq (a LMIC) the regression estimates suggest a non-marginal reduction of
exports, this is very small compared to GDP as Iraq sells only a tiny fraction of its output
abroad. Figure A.5 illustrates the distribution of the magnitudes in columns [1] and
[2] and contrasts it with the distribution when China’s overall market share of 7%, in
2001, is used. Thus, the reduction in exports relative to GDP implied by the regression
coefficient is on average small. This is of course consistent with the finding that export
growth rates shrink only by little discussed above. However, for a small group of countries
the magnitudes are substantial. This group consists typically of export oriented middle
income countries which are specialized in markets where China has an important role.
When gauging these magnitudes several caveats should be kept in mind. The mag-
nitudes only consider reductions in exports due to China’s rise. Increasing exports due
to reallocated factors as well as additional exports to the new destination China are not
incorporated in these computations. Furthermore, spillovers and potential gains in effi-
ciency due to reallocations are not accounted for.37 Thus, the calculations do not take
into account general equilibrium effects. Moreover, effects are based on a coefficient con-
ditional on many fixed effects. The latter absorb a lot of variation which might want to
37Just as a reduction in exports to one country might make production for other destinations or the
domestic market unprofitable due to fixed costs, higher sales in China might induce firms to sell in
additional destinations due to economies of scale.
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Table 2.8: Magnitude of the crowding out effect in terms of GDP
Rank Exporter
Vˆn,2006(βˆ)− Vn,2006
GDPn,2001
, in % MSCHNn,2001
Vn,2001
GDPn,2001
βˆ from Table 2.2 βˆ from Table 2.1
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1 Malaysia 0.909 0.295 0.15 0.333
2 Philippines 0.252 0.141 0.13 0.177
3 Thailand 0.236 0.132 0.16 0.136
4 Hungary 0.207 0.067 0.05 0.212
5 Mexico 0.182 0.059 0.07 0.137
...
...
...
...
...
...
97 Sudan 0.000 0.000 0.04 0.001
98 Yemen 0.000 0.000 0.04 0.001
99 Chad 0.000 0.000 0.04 0.001
100 Angola 0.000 0.000 0.03 0.001
101 Iraq 0.000 0.000 0.06 0.000
average 0.042 0.031 0.07 0.072
Notes: Vnt is country n’s total manufacturing exports in t. Vˆn,2006(βˆ) are predicted
exports based on the higher growth rate as implied by coefficient βˆ, Vˆn,2006(βˆ) =
Vn,2001 ·
[
1 + g(Vn)
2001:2006 + (βˆ ·
(
0−MSCHNn,2001
)]
. g(·) is the growth rate. MSCHNn,2001 =∑
c
∑
iMS
CHN
ci,2001 ·(vnci,2001/vn,2001) is the weighted average of China’s market share faced
by exporter n in 2001. Note that
(
Vˆn,2006(βˆ)− Vn,2006
)
/GDPn,2001 = (V/GDP )n,2001 ·
βˆ · (0−MSCHNn,01 ). Countries are ranked by the magnitude in [1].
be considered, for example China’s currency or generally lower export growth rates in
textiles. The marginal effect quintuples if fixed effects are excluded. While it is clearly
inaccurate to use the unconditional effect it can help to get a sense of the range in which
the magnitudes might lie.
B. Alternative Strategy to Address Endogeneity
As an alternative strategy to address potential endogeneity stemming from demand and
technology shocks I attempt to approximate the shocks, see section 2.2.2. Demand shocks
are approximated with the change in overall imports going to a destination-product pair,
G(vci)
t:t+5. Similarly, technology shocks are approximated with the total change of a
country’s exports in a product, G(vni)t:t+5, as positive technology shocks are likely to
result in higher exports.38 Columns [1]-[7] of Table A.19 show the results when equation
(2.3) is estimated with OLS and G(vci)t:t+5 and G(vni)t:t+5 are additionally included to
38To avoid a mechanical relationship with the dependent variable vci measures country c’s imports of
product i stemming from all exporters but n and China and vni is country n’s exports in good i to all
destinations but c. I.e. vci is here
∑
m6⊂{n,CHN} vmci and vni is
∑
k 6=c vnki.
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approximate demand and technology shocks. These findings are qualitatively the same
as the IV results discussed above. I find a crowding out effect of China and this effect
is strongest for middle income countries. While there is a shielding effect of disparity in
unit values I find no insulation effect of dissimilarity in factor intensity. This last result
is the only exception where the alternative strategy differs from the IV approach.39
Alternatively, I include for each exporter income group and year a separate product
fixed effect. This captures global technology shocks which affect technologically advanced
and lagging countries differentially if income groups and state of technology are related.
The corresponding results in columns [8]-[14] are qualitatively equivalent to the findings
when approximating demand and technology shocks with the overall change in imports
and exports as shown in columns [1]-[7].
C. Industries and Transformation Level of Goods
I split the data in three broad industries, chemicals (SITC5), manufactured goods (SITC6
&8) and machinery & transport equipment (SITC7), and repeat the analysis, see panel (a)
of Table A.20. While there is a crowding out effect of China in chemicals and machinery
there is no average effect in manufacturing. The differential impact on the income groups is
however very pronounced for manufactures resulting in a non-negligible negative effect for
both middle and low income countries. In contrast, there is only a slight differential impact
of China for exports in machinery. The shielding effect of both disparity in factor intensity
and unit values is found in all industries, yet it is most pronounced for manufacturing,
where also the differential impact on the income groups is most distinct.
The shielding effect according to within-product specialization applies to both con-
sumers and firms. Consumers care about attributes and quality of final goods, such as
televisions, whereas firms care about attributes and quality of intermediate goods, such
as car doors. In panel (b) it is shown that the results hold for both final goods and
intermediates. There is no average effect for consumer goods, which is consistent with the
zero effect for manufactures. For both consumer goods and intermediates the differen-
tial impact on income groups is pronounced, yet the differences are larger for final goods.
China’s rise has a stronger effect on middle and low income countries than on high income
countries. The insulation effect of disparity in factor intensity and unit values is substan-
tial and pronounced for both consumer goods and intermediates. For investment goods
results are weak and mostly close to zero. There is no overall crowding out effect and
there is not much of a differential impact on income groups. Consistently, the shielding
effect of factor intensity is weak. Only the insulation of disparity in unit values is strong.
39All models are estimated with OLS, however with the sample for which the instrument is available
to make the findings comparable to above IV results. Yet, Table A.19 is very similar if the full sample
from 1996 to 2006 is used.
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D. Zero Trade Flows
As discussed in section 2.2.1 I add zero trade flows for all exporter-destination-product
combinations which have at least two positive trade flows between 1995 and 2009. The
sample includes 42% of such zero trade flows. The dependent variable describes how
exports change from t to t+ 5. Whenever one, or both, of these export values is zero, the
growth measure G(v) is equal to -2, 0 or 2.40 That there are many observations based
on zero trade flows can be seen in panel (a) of Figure A.2. In Table A.21 I exclude these
observations step by step to show that results are not driven by zero trade flows. Panel
(a) excludes observations where export growth is 0, in panel (b) moreover observations
with export growth equal to -2 (“exit”) and 2 (“entry”) are omitted and in panel (c) I
additionally eliminate, for consistency, observations with a Chinese market share of 0.41
Excluding these zero observations step by step confirms the above findings. First, there
is a crowding out effect of China on exports of other countries, see columns [1] and [2].
Second, China’s participation in world markets has no, or only a very little, effect on
export paths of high income countries, whereas export growth rates of middle and low
income countries are substantially reduced, see columns [3] and [4]. However, when zero
trade flows are excluded low income countries are at least as strongly affected by China’s
penetration of third markets as middle income countries. Third, competition effects from
China are weaker the more dissimilar a country’s factor intensity and unit value is in
comparison to China, see columns [5]-[8]. Hence, both shielding effects providing evidence
which is consistent with within-product specialization do not rely on zero trade flows.
E. A Finer Level of Disaggregation
Next, I shortly present that results are similar if the analysis is done at the HS 6-digit
level. This inflates the number of zero trade flows involved, however allows to measure
competition from China at the destination-HS6-product level. The findings are unchanged
when using more disaggregated data as shown in Table A.22. There is an overall crowding
out effect of China and it is exports of middle income countries which are most displaced.
Finally, I find a shielding effect of both disparity in factor intensity as well as unit val-
ues. Hence, the more dissimilar a country’s production techniques or export qualities are
compared to China, the less intense is competition of Chinese exports.42
40G(vnci)
t:t+5 =
vnci,t+5−vnci,t
0.5·(vnci,t+5+vnci,t) =

−2 if vnci,t > 0, vnci,t+5 = 0
0 if vnci,t = 0, vnci,t+5 = 0
2 if vnci,t = 0, vnci,t+5 > 0
41With the sample of panel (c) one can use the log difference of exports, ∆(ln(vnci))t:t+5, as dependent
variable for comparison. This yields qualitatively the same results as those shown in panel (c).
42As IV estimations including many fixed effects are computationally very involved with large samples
I report reduced form results. As the first stage is positive and strong and similar for all income groups
reduced form estimates are sufficient to conclude that qualitatively results based on HS 6-digit data are
similar.
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F. Competition from Other Low Income Countries
China is one out of many labor abundant low income countries, e.g. India or Vietnam.
Estimating export competition effects of all LICs, except China, yields similar but not
equivalent results, see Table A.23. I find a crowding out effect of LIC penetration of world
markets on exports of other countries, the magnitude is even larger than for China. Thus,
while China is an interesting country, because of its dramatic development and economic
policy discussions, it is not inherently different compared to other LICs regarding its
competition effects in third markets. I find a crowding out effect of LICs on exports of
high and middle income countries which is strongest for MICs. The effect on exports of
LICs is however positive which suggests that exports of LICs evolve similarly. This is not
a mechanical relationship as the market share of LICs is computed without the exporter
in question. Moreover, the results indicate a shielding effect of factor intensity but not of
the unit value. Note that factor intensity and unit value are used in levels as it is difficult
to compute disparity compared to a group of countries.
2.4 Conclusion
Since the onset of its process of economic liberalization China has penetrated world export
markets with a pace and to an extent which is exceptional. In this chapter, I examine
how Chinese competition in third markets has affected export paths of other countries.
Hence, more generally, this chapter deals with reallocation effects due to integration. By
looking at contracting trade flows due to Chinese competition and not analyzing where
freed up resources go to I consider, however, only one side of reallocation.
I use disaggregated trade data of 102 countries between 1996 and 2006 to study the
effect of Chinese competition at the destination-product level on export growth of other
countries. First, I find a crowding out effect of China. Exports of other countries grow
more slowly in product-destinations in which China had a higher market share. The mag-
nitude of this effect is however rather small. Second, my evidence suggests that countries
at different stages of development are differentially affected by China’s penetration of
export markets. I find no effect on high income countries and a negative effect for middle
and (some) low income countries. The crowding out effect of China is strongest for middle
income exporters and of an intermediate magnitude. In order to provide a mechanism
for the differential impact China has on more and less developed countries I analyze the
role of within-product specialization. The latter predicts that countries with different en-
dowments export the same products but specialize in different quality segments. As the
intensity of competition between two producers increases in the substitutability of their
goods, diversity in terms of quality or sophistication may insulate one producer from the
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other. The third result of this chapter provides evidence which is consistent with this
line of argument. I find that the less similar a country’s factor intensities and export
unit values are compared to China, the more insulated are its exports from Chinese com-
petition in third markets. This offers an explanation for why Europe, North America
and Africa, which have very different production techniques compared to China, are less
affected by China’s competition at the destination-product level than Asia and Central &
South America which are more similar to China with respect to production technologies.
Thus, this chapter provides evidence for within-product specialization on international
goods markets. Looking ahead, this suggests that competition from China might become
more intense for the developed world in the future if China continues its rapid upgrading
in skills and technology. However, the relevant measure will be China’s upgrading relative
to developed countries.
This chapter could be extended in several directions. First, it is important to learn
more about adjustments of the quality of export goods in response to Chinese competition.
Martin and Mejean (2012) show that the quality of French exports increases in destinations
where China is important due to reallocation from low to high quality firms. It would
be interesting to see whether such quality adjustments are differential for developed and
developing countries and what the relative importance of within versus between firm
effects is. Second, one would like to translate the crowding out effects in terms of output
into effects on employment to get a sense of how many workers are reallocated across
industries in response to further international specialization. Third, a complementary
analysis could deal with the question of where freed up resources are redirected and how
this is related to the sophistication of overall exports of a country.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Measuring Factor Intensity
Labor Productivity
UNIDO developed INDSTAT4 (2013 edition) in order to provide a cross-country database
at the industry-level which is comparable and consistent across countries and over time. It
reports country’s value added V A and the number of employees L at 3- and 4-digit levels
of ISIC (Revision 3), from 1991 to 2009. When matched to my sample INDSTAT4 covers
68 countries and 123 industries.43 Yet the data coverage is far from complete. All of these
68 countries do not report in at least some of these 123 industries, and for many countries
the data starts in the mid 1990s or even in the 2000s. In order to increase coverage I
(a) extrapolate data over time, within exporter-industry pairs, and (b) construct data for
countries which are not included in INDSTAT4 with the average of their neighbors. These
two procedures are related to the approach of Sala-i-Martin (2006). In the main table of
the chapter, I use the extended dataset (Table 2.6). However, I show in the robustness
section that results are similar if I use the data with its original coverage (Table A.8).
For notational simplicity, labor productivity is indexed as goods-specific, ln(V A/L)nit,
although it is observed at the industry level.
(a) Extrapolation of data over time within exporter-industry pairs
Whenever value added per employee is observed for a country-industry pair in some
but not all years I use the average yearly growth rate to fill up missing observations,
within country-industry pairs. The extrapolated dataset is trimmed, I drop observa-
tions above the 99.5th percentile and below the 0.5th percentile. This procedure does
not generate a complete exporter-industry-year coverage as I can only extrapolate those
exporter-industry pairs over time which are ever observed.
Data for China is almost complete regarding industries, however it is only reported
between 2003 and 2007. Therefore I can only use the level of an exporters’ labor pro-
ductivity and not its disparity to China in the robustness check where I use the original
coverage. However, I additionally show results where I use average labor productivity be-
tween 2003 and 2007, instead of time varying labor productivity, which can be expressed
relative to China.
(b) Construction of data for exporters which are never in INDSTAT4 database
34 countries of my sample are not included in INDSTAT4. For these countries I construct
yearly industry-level labor productivity with the average productivity of their geographic
43I match the HS and ISIC codes with a correspondence provided by CEPII, see
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/non_restrict/sector.asp.
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neighbors, V A
L nit
= 1
NB(n)
∑
m∈B(n)
V A
L mit
, where B(n) is the set of country n’s neighbors44,
NB(n) is the number of border countries and V AL mit is data with original coverage (no ex-
trapolated data). I can gauge the accuracy of this procedure by applying it to exporters
for which labor productivity is observed. The regression coefficient when regressing pre-
dicted on actual productivity is 0.7. 12 countries are not covered by the extended database
as there is neither data for their neighbor countries.45
Alternative Measures
I combine US industry data with countries’ overall physical and human capital to construct
a measure for capital and skill intensity at the country-industry level, FInit = FIUSAit ·
FInt. This approach has been used in several studies, e.g. Nunn (2007), Romalis (2004) or
Rajan and Zingales (1998). Note that it is based on the assumption that there are no factor
intensity reversals. The NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database (Becker et al.
(2013)) provides annual data about capital stock, production and non-production labor
for US manufacturing industries. When matched to my sample it covers 99 industries.46
Capital Intensity
Industry level capital intensity is measured with the capital stock per production labor
ln(K/Lprod)USit in the US and countries’ overall capital intensity with capital stock per
capita ln(K/L)nt. National capital stocks are from Berlemann and Wesselhoeft (2012)
which cover 71 countries of my sample.47
Skill Intensity
Skill intensity in US industries is defined as the share of non-production labor, skillUSAit
= (Lnon−prod/L)USAit. I use the population share attaining secondary or higher education
to measure overall human capital, skillnt. These data are from Barro and Lee (2013) and
cover 89 countries of my sample.48
44For islands I use the three closest countries (median number of neighbors), according to distance
between capitals.
45For the following countries labor productivity is constructed with the average of their neighbors:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep., Cote d’ivoire, Guatemala,
Guinea, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Serbia, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. For the following countries I cannot construct data on labor produc-
tivity as there is no data for neighbors either: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, Uzbekistan.
46The 473 NAICS industries in the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database are converted into
130 4-digit ISIC Revision 3 codes with the concordance posted on the website of the United Nations
Statistics Division, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regdnld.asp?Lg=1. 99 of these 130 ISIC codes
can be matched to my sample of HS codes with the correspondence provided by CEPII, see above.
47There is no information on capital stock for the following 31 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Taiwan,
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep., Cote d’ivoire, Geor-
gia, Ghana, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Malawi, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia,
Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
48The data is reported in 5-year intervals. I use the data of 1990 for all years between 1990 and 1994,
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2.A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: Distribution of China’s Market Share in Products
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Notes: The figure displays the distribution of China’s market share in world wide
exports of HS 4-digit products, MSCHNit = vCHN,it/vit, by industries and over
time. Industries are SITC 1-digit codes. Boxes illustrate the interquartile range,
while lines within each box report the median. The graph documents that while
apparel and toys, which belong to ’miscellaneous manufacturing goods’, are im-
portant for both the level and evolution of China’s market share they are not
the only drivers. China’s market share has increased to a substantial level in all
industries, i.e. also in capital intensive industries like chemicals and machinery.
the data of 1995 for all years between 1995 and 1999 etc. The following 13 countries of my sample are
not covered: Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea, Madagascar,
Nigeria, Serbia, Somalia, Uzbekistan.
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Figure A.3: Country specific estimates
(a) βˆn by income groups
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(b) βˆn by regions
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The figure displays the distribution of country specific estimates, βˆn, by income
groups in panel (a) and by regions in panel (b). βˆn is obtained from estimating
the following equation for each exporter n separately with OLS, G(vnci)t:t+5 =
αct +αi + βMS
CHN
cit + γvnci,t−1 + ncit. Table A.2 lists for each country to which
income group and region it belongs. Boxes illustrate the interquartile range, while
lines within each box report the median.
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Figure A.4: China’s factor intensity and export unit value compared to other exporters
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The graph depicts the average log value added per employee between 2003 and 2007
(original coverage in INDSTAT4), per HS2 code and exporter. China is illustrated with red dots.
In 93% (37%) of all HS2 codes China is in the lower half (third) of all countries factor intensity.
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The graph depicts the average unit value between 1996 and 2000, per HS2 code and exporter
(averaged across destinations). China is illustrated with red dots.
In 78% (45%) of all HS2 codes China is in the lower half (third) of all countries export unit value.
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Figure A.5: Distribution of magnitudes of crowding out effect in terms of GDP
country specific Chinese market share, MSCHNn,01
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Notes: The figure displays the distribution of
(
Vˆn,2006(βˆ)− Vn,2006
)
/
GDPn,2001, in %. See section 2.3.4 (A. Magnitude of the effect). Distribution
in black (grey) uses the coefficient from Table 2.2 (Table 2.1). The upper
panel uses the weighted average of China’s market share faced by exporter n
and the lower panel applies overall Chinese market share in 2001.
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2.A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Summary statistics
(a) full sample from 1996 to 2006
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. # observations
G(vnci)
t:t+5 0.19 1.228 -2 2 2373554
MSCHNcit 0.074 0.16 0 1 2373554
|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 1.718 0.866 0.001 7.298 1917877
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 1.044 0.747 0 4.594 1036004
FIniτ 10.603 0.894 4.357 13.918 1937267
UVnciτ 2.126 1.6 -4.333 11.477 1510199
skillniτ 0.111 0.07 0.001 0.447 2321568
(K/L)niτ 47.706 10.372 14.535 77.06 2105959
(b) sample from 2001 to 2006, where instrument is observed
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. # observations
G(vnci)
t:t+5 0.348 1.229 -2 2 1166863
MSCHNcit 0.089 0.169 0 1 1166863
MSCHNci,t−5 ·
(
1 +G(MSCHNi )
t−5:t/2
)
0.064 0.155 0 2 1166863
|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 1.458 0.738 0.001 6.467 955540
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 1.042 0.71 0 4.584 682548
FIniτ 10.668 0.876 4.357 13.918 965166
UVnciτ 2.032 1.593 -4.333 11.477 918770
(K/L)niτ 48.57 10.35 17.83 77.06 1035658
skillniτ 0.117 0.071 0.002 0.447 1141643
Notes: vncit denotes the value of a trade flow going from exporter n to importer c in product i
and year t. G(vnci)t:t+5 measures the growth of country n’s exports towards the destination-product
combination ci between t and t + 5, see equation (2.1). MSCHNcit denotes China’s market share in
destination c and product i at t, see equation (2.2). Factor intensity FInit is approximated with value
added per employee ln(V AL )nit, a measure for labor productivity, see Appendix 2.A.1 for details. Time
index τ denotes the average from lag 1 to lag 5, ln(V AL )niτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 ln(
V A
L )nip. Unit values are
in logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ . The alternative measures for capital and skill intensity, (K/L)niτ
and skillniτ , are described in Appendix 2.A.1.
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Table A.2: List of countries
Country Group Region† Country Group Region
Afghanistan LIC ME & South Asia Japan HIC East & SE Asia
Algeria LMIC Africa Kazakhstan LMIC ME & South Asia
Angola LIC Africa Kenya LIC Africa
Argentina UMIC C & S America Madagascar LIC Africa
Australia HIC Malawi LIC Africa
Austria HIC Europe Malaysia UMIC East & SE Asia
Azerbaijan LIC ME & South Asia Mali LIC Africa
Bangladesh LIC ME & South Asia Mexico UMIC North America
Belarus LMIC Europe Morocco LMIC Africa
Belgium HIC Europe Mozambique LIC Africa
Benin LIC Africa Nepal LIC ME & South Asia
Bolivia LMIC C & S America Netherlands HIC Europe
Brazil UMIC C & S America Niger LIC Africa
Bulgaria LMIC Europe Nigeria LIC Africa
Burkina Faso LIC Africa Pakistan LIC ME & South Asia
Burundi LIC Africa Peru LMIC C & S America
Cambodia LIC East & SE Asia Philippines LMIC East & SE Asia
Cameroon LIC Africa Poland LMIC Europe
Canada HIC North America Portugal HIC Europe
Chad LIC Africa Romania LMIC Europe
Chile UMIC C & S America Russia LMIC ME & South Asia
China LIC East & SE Asia Rwanda LIC Africa
Colombia LMIC C & S America Saudi Arabia UMIC ME & South Asia
Congo, Dem. Rep. LIC Africa Senegal LIC Africa
Cote D’Ivoire LIC Africa Serbia LMIC Europe
Cuba LMIC C & S America Slovakia LMIC Europe
Czech Republic UMIC Europe Somalia LIC Africa
Denmark HIC Europe South Korea HIC East & SE Asia
Dominican Republic LMIC C & S America South Africa UMIC Africa
Ecuador LMIC C & S America Spain HIC Europe
Egypt LMIC Africa Sri Lanka LIC ME & South Asia
El Salvador LMIC C & S America Sudan LIC Africa
Ethiopia LIC Africa Sweden HIC Europe
Finland HIC Europe Switzerland HIC Europe
France HIC Europe Syria LMIC ME & South Asia
Georgia LIC ME & South Asia Taiwan HIC East & SE Asia
Germany HIC Europe Tajikistan LIC ME & South Asia
Ghana LIC Africa Tanzania LIC Africa
Greece UMIC Europe Thailand LMIC East & SE Asia
Guatemala LMIC C & S America Tunisia LMIC Africa
Guinea LIC Africa Turkey LMIC ME & South Asia
Haiti LIC C & S America Uganda LIC Africa
Honduras LIC C & S America Ukraine LMIC Europe
Hong Kong HIC East & SE Asia United Kingdom HIC Europe
Hungary UMIC Europe USA HIC North America
India LIC ME & South Asia Uzbekistan LMIC ME & South Asia
Indonesia LMIC East & SE Asia Venezuela LMIC C & S America
Iran LMIC ME & South Asia Viet Nam LIC East & SE Asia
Iraq LMIC ME & South Asia Yemen LIC ME & South Asia
Israel HIC ME & South Asia Zambia LIC Africa
Italy HIC Europe Zimbabwe LIC Africa
† ’ME & South Asia’ stands for ’Middle East & South Asia’, ’C & S America’ stands for ’Central &
South America’, ’East & SE Asia’.
Notes: Nations are classified into high, upper middle, lower middle and low income countries (abbre-
viated by HICs, UMICs, LMICs and LICs) according to the World Bank List of Economies in 1995.
The sample consists of 102 countries, thereof 21 are HICs, 10 are UMICs, 30 are LMICs and 40 are
LICs. Regions are from CIA World Factbook. 3 countries belong to North America (incl. Mexico), 14
to Central & South America, 23 to Europe, 19 to Middle East & South Asia, 10 to East & Southeast
Asia and 31 to Africa. Note that Australia will be excluded from the analysis by regions as Australia
is the only country in my sample which belongs to Australia-Oceania.
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Table A.3: China’s market share – lags and time invariant denominator
Dep. Var. G(vnci)t:t+5
Lag l l = 0 l = 1 l = 2 l = 3 l = 4 l = 5
(a1) baseline definition of market share, sample period: 1996 - 2006
MSCHNci,t−l -0.044
??? -0.040??? -0.038??? -0.030?? -0.038??? -0.035??
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
MSCHNciτ -0.043???
(0.010)
# observations 2373554 2336418 1172634 1171779 1170144 1166863 2346183
(a2) baseline definition of market share, sample period: 2001 - 2006
MSCHNci,t−l -0.059
??? -0.032??? -0.040??? -0.035??? -0.041??? -0.035??
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
MSCHNciτ -0.051???
(0.016)
# observations 1166863 1160072 1159562 1159968 1160058 1166863 1166863
(b1) market share with time invariant denominator, sample period: 1996 - 2006
M˜S
CHN
ci,t−l -0.110??? -0.082??? -0.079??? -0.060??? -0.057??? -0.068???
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
M˜S
CHN
ciτ -0.111???
(0.009)
# observations 2373554 2373554 1195971 1195971 1195971 1195971 2373554
(b2) market share with time invariant denominator, sample period: 2001 - 2006
M˜S
CHN
ci,t−l -0.099??? -0.068??? -0.085??? -0.064??? -0.058??? -0.070???
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
M˜S
CHN
ciτ -0.126???
(0.015)
# observations 1166863 1166863 1166863 1166863 1166863 1166863 1166863
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The dependent
and explanatory variable are defined in equation (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. τ denotes the average
from lag 1 to 5, MSCHNciτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5MS
CHN
cip . M˜S
CHN
ci,t−l = vCHNci,t−l/(
1
12
∑2006
p=1995 vcip). All
columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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N
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5
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Table A.5: Weighting observations with the size of trading partners or the size of a market
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Weights ln(GDPnt +GDPct) ln(vcit)
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.188 0.345 0.345 0.189 0.350 0.350
Standard deviation 1.226 1.227 1.227 1.219 1.219 1.219
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.042??? -0.055??? -0.054?? -0.059??? -0.053??? -0.041
(0.008) (0.012) (0.026) (0.009) (0.013) (0.026)
# observations 2373554 1166863 1166863 2373554 1166863 1166863
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.061 0.061 0.071 0.062 0.062
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Robust standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parenthe-
ses. Observations are weighted with total GDP of trading partners and total imports of a
destination-product combination, respectively. The dependent variable, explanatory variable
and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respectively. F-statistics of the
first stages are 1052 and 1035. All columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed
effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table A.6: Additional control variables
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Method OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.185 0.344 0.186 0.344 0.186 0.344
Standard deviation 1.230 1.229 1.230 1.228 1.230 1.228
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.048??? -0.054?? -0.083??? -0.111??? -0.085??? -0.118???
(0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) (0.027)
vnci,t−1 -0.003?? -0.002? -0.003?? -0.002?? -0.003?? -0.003??
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RSCACHNi,t−1 0.053??? 0.058??? 0.058???
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
RSCAni,t−1 -0.048??? -0.049??? -0.048??? -0.049??? -0.044??? -0.040???
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
HHIci,t−1 0.188??? 0.185??? 0.186??? 0.181???
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009)
ln(distance)nc -0.027??? -0.037???
(0.001) (0.002)
1(common border)nc -0.025??? 0.033???
(0.003) (0.005)
1(common language)nc -0.003 0.020???
(0.002) (0.004)
# observations 2285701 1137537 2252818 1131295 2252818 1131295
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.062 0.071 0.063 0.072 0.063
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The
dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and
(2.4), respectively. RSCAnit measures revealed comparative advantage of exporter n in prod-
uct i and year t, RSCAnit = RCAnit−1RCAnit+1 , where RCAnit =
(
vnit
vnt
)
/
(∑
m 6=n vmit∑
m6=n vmt
)
. HHIcit rep-
resents how concentrated country c’s imports in product i and year t are regarding exporters,
HHIcit =
∑
m (vmcit/vcit)
2. F-statistics of the first stages are 1048, 1051 and 1050. All columns
include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects.
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Table A.7: Differential effect of Chinese competition – weighted observations
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Weights ln(GDPnt +GDPct) ln(vcit)
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.188 0.345 0.345 0.189 0.350 0.350
Standard deviation 1.226 1.227 1.227 1.219 1.219 1.219
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.030??? -0.043??? -0.006 -0.051??? -0.043??? -0.001
(0.009) (0.013) (0.029) (0.010) (0.014) (0.028)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ UMICs) -0.049??? -0.058?? -0.174??? -0.044??? -0.060?? -0.163???
(0.015) (0.023) (0.034) (0.016) (0.024) (0.034)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ LMICs) -0.082??? -0.046?? -0.099??? -0.067??? -0.040?? -0.086???
(0.014) (0.019) (0.028) (0.014) (0.020) (0.027)
MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈ LICs) 0.076??? 0.020 -0.086?? 0.100??? 0.047? -0.028
(0.017) (0.025) (0.039) (0.017) (0.026) (0.037)
# observations 2373554 1166863 1166863 2373554 1166863 1166863
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.061 0.061 0.071 0.062 0.062
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. Observations are
weighted with total GDP of trading partners and total imports of a destination-product combination,
respectively. The dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respectively. 1(n ∈ UMICs) is one if exporter n is an upper middle income
country. 1(n ∈ HICs) is the base category. MSCHNcit is instrumented with (2.4) and MSCHNcit × 1(n ∈
UMICs) with (2.4)×1(n ∈ UMICs). F-statistics of the first stages are 531, 1703, 1679 and 1275. All
columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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[4]
[5]
[6]
M
S
C
H
N
cit
-0.082
?
?
?
-0.092
?
?
?
-0.149
?
?
?
-0.089
?
?
-0.124
?
?
?
-0.348
?
?
?
(0.017)
(0.024)
(0.043)
(0.035)
(0.047)
(0.088)
M
S
C
H
N
cit
×
|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |
0.037
?
?
?
0.037
?
?
?
0.092
?
?
?
0.039
0.109
?
?
0.131
?
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.033)
(0.046)
(0.072)
|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |
0.013
?
?
?
0.014
?
?
?
0.009
?
-0.005
-0.006
-0.007
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.011)
#
observations
1758147
863,621
863,621
159,730
91,919
91,919
A
djusted
R
2
0.071
0.062
0.062
0.089
0.085
0.085
N
otes:
?
?
?, ?
?
, ?
denote
statisticalsignificance
on
the
1%
,5%
,and
10%
level,respectively.
R
obust
standard
errors
(clustered
by
destination-product
pairs
ci)
are
given
in
parentheses.
T
he
dependent
variable,
ex-
planatory
variable
and
instrum
ent
are
defined
in
equation
(2.1),(2.2)
and
(2.4),respectively.
F
I
n
it
is
m
ea-
sured
w
ith
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
it
(2.A
.1).
τ
denotes
the
average
from
lag
1
to
5,
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
iτ
=
1
/5 ∑
p
=
t−
1
p
=
t−
5
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
ip .
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
is
instrum
ented
w
ith
(2.4)
and
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
×
|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |
w
ith
(2.4)×|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |.
F
-statistics
of
the
first
stages
are
724
and
946
([3])
as
w
ell
as
239
and
97
([6]).
A
ll
colum
ns
include
exporter-year,im
porter-year
and
H
S4
fixed
effects
and
controlfor
v
n
c
i,t−
1 .
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Table A.11: Disparity in factor intensity – checks for spurious interaction terms
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Check Orthogonalizing Regressors Squared Terms
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.196 0.353 0.353 0.196 0.353 0.353
Standard deviation 1.222 1.219 1.219 1.222 1.219 1.219
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.020?? -0.039??? -0.036 -0.335??? -0.317??? -0.581???
(0.009) (0.013) (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.081)
× ˜|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.092??? 0.036??? 0.094???
(0.015) (0.012) (0.019)
× |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.033??? 0.030??? 0.089???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.019)
|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.007??? 0.016??? 0.011??? -0.016??? 0.019?? 0.012
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)(
MSCHNcit
)2 0.363??? 0.332??? 0.545???
(0.028) (0.038) (0.098)
(|FIniτ − FICHNiτ |)2 0.007??? -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
# observations 1917877 955,540 955,540 1917877 955,540 955,540
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.063 0.063 0.072 0.063 0.063
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The
dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2)
and (2.4), respectively. FInit is measured with ln(V AL )nit (2.A.1). τ denotes the average from
lag 1 to 5, ln(V AL )niτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 ln(
V A
L )nip.
˜|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | denotes the Frisch-Waugh
residual of |FIniτ − FICHNiτ |. I.e. it is |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | orthogonalized with respect to
all other regressors. MSCHNcit is instrumented with (2.4), MS
CHN
cit × |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | with
(2.4)×|FIniτ −FICHNiτ | and
(
MSCHNcit
)2
with (2.4)2. F-statistics of the first stages are 805 and
1756 ([3]) as well as 837, 1086 and 483 ([6]). All columns include exporter-year, importer-year
and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table
A
.12:
D
isparity
in
factor
intensity
–
lags
D
ependent
V
ariable
G
(v
n
c
i )
t:t+
5
Lag
l
of
factor
intensity
l
=
1
l
=
5
M
ean
0.351
0.350
0.342
0.350
0.349
0.348
0.342
0.350
Standard
deviation
1.218
1.218
1.221
1.228
1.216
1.216
1.221
1.228
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
-0.141
?
?
?
-0.413
?
?
-0.250
?
?
?
-0.196
?
?
?
-0.162
?
?
?
-0.499
?
?
?
-0.217
?
?
?
-0.189
?
?
?
(0.038)
(0.166)
(0.070)
(0.033)
(0.042)
(0.169)
(0.067)
(0.032)
×
|F
I
n
i,t−
l −
F
I
C
H
N
i,t−
l |
0.099
?
?
?
0.079
?
?
?
(0.020)
(0.018)
×
F
I
n
i,t−
l
0.038
?
?
0.045
?
?
?
(0.016)
(0.016)
×
(K
/L
)
n
i,t−
l
0.004
?
?
?
0.004
?
?
(0.001)
(0.001)
×
(sk
ill)
n
i,t−
l
1.274
?
?
?
1.398
?
?
?
(0.195)
(0.213)
|F
I
n
i,t−
l −
F
I
C
H
N
i,t−
l |
0.015
?
?
?
0.012
?
?
?
(0.004)
(0.003)
F
I
n
i,t−
l
0.011
?
?
?
0.007
?
?
(0.004)
(0.003)
(K
/
L
)
n
i,t−
l
0.004
?
?
?
0.002
?
(0.001)
(0.001)
(sk
ill)
n
i,t−
l
0.807
?
?
?
0.817
?
?
?
(0.067)
(0.069)
#
observations
937,741
947,144
1035658
1141643
936,855
946,187
1035658
1141643
A
djusted
R
2
0.063
0.063
0.060
0.061
0.062
0.061
0.060
0.061
N
otes:
?
?
?, ?
?
, ?
denote
statistical
significance
on
the
1%
,
5%
,
and
10%
level,
respectively.
R
obust
standard
errors
(clustered
by
destination-product
pairs
ci)
are
given
in
parentheses.
A
llm
odels
are
estim
ated
w
ith
IV
.T
he
dependent
variable,
explanatory
variable
and
instrum
ent
are
defined
in
equation
(2.1),
(2.2)
and
(2.4),
respectively.
F
I
n
it
is
m
easured
w
ith
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
it
(2.A
.1).
(K
/
L
)
n
it
and
sk
illn
it
are
alternative
m
easures
for
capital
and
skill
intensity,
see
A
ppendix
2.A
.1.
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
is
instrum
ented
w
ith
(2.4)
and
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
×
|F
I
n
i,t−
l −
F
I
C
H
N
i,t−
l |
w
ith
(2.4)×|F
I
n
i,t−
l −
F
I
C
H
N
i,t−
l |.
F
-statistics
ofthe
first
stages
are
743
and
1218
([1]),746
and
743
([2]),778
and
768
([3]),779
and
677
([4]),
737
and
927
([5]),741
and
741
([6]),778
and
758
([7])
as
w
ellas
780
and
663
([8]).
A
llcolum
ns
include
exporter-year,
im
porter-year
and
H
S4
fixed
effects
and
controlfor
v
n
c
i,t−
1 .
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Table A.13: Disparity in factor intensity – weighted observations
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Weights ln(GDPnt +GDPct) ln(vcit)
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.193 0.350 0.350 0.196 0.357 0.357
Standard deviation 1.221 1.216 1.216 1.212 1.207 1.207
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.067??? -0.079??? -0.147??? -0.071??? -0.065??? -0.113???
(0.016) (0.022) (0.039) (0.017) (0.023) (0.038)
× |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.029??? 0.032??? 0.087??? 0.024??? 0.026?? 0.074???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.019) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018)
|FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.011??? 0.016??? 0.011??? 0.011??? 0.019??? 0.014???
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
# observations 1917877 955,540 955,540 1917877 955,540 955,540
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.064 0.064 0.074 0.065 0.065
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. Observations
are weighted with total GDP of trading partners and total imports of a destination-product com-
bination, respectively. The dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in
equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respectively. FInit is measured with ln(V AL )nit (2.A.1). τ denotes
the average from lag 1 to 5, ln(V AL )niτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 ln(
V A
L )nip. MS
CHN
cit is instrumented with
(2.4) and MSCHNcit × |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | with (2.4)×|FIniτ − FICHNiτ |. F-statistics of the first
stages are 753 and 1046 ([3]) as well as 742 and 1035 ([6]). All columns include exporter-year,
importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table
A
.14:
U
nit
value
in
levels
D
ependent
V
ariable
G
(v
n
ci )
t:t+
5
M
ethod
O
LS
IV
O
LS
IV
O
LS
IV
M
ean
0.061
0.235
0.235
0.061
0.235
0.235
0.061
0.235
0.235
Standard
deviation
1.202
1.195
1.195
1.202
1.195
1.195
1.202
1.195
1.195
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
M
S
C
H
N
cit
-0.187
?
?
?
-0.252
?
?
?
-0.377
?
?
?
-0.113
?
?
?
-0.120
?
?
?
-0.131
?
?
?
-0.055
?
?
?
-0.024
?
0.010
(0.016)
(0.019)
(0.037)
(0.013)
(0.017)
(0.032)
(0.010)
(0.013)
(0.027)
M
S
C
H
N
cit
×
U
V
n
ciτ
0.060
?
?
?
0.095
?
?
?
0.158
?
?
?
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.011)
M
S
C
H
N
cit
×
(U
V
n
ciτ / U
V
ciτ )
0.056
?
?
?
0.068
?
?
?
0.094
?
?
?
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.017)
M
S
C
H
N
cit
×
U˜
V
n
ciτ
0.080
?
?
?
0.088
?
?
?
0.149
?
?
?
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.012)
U
V
n
ciτ
0.031
?
?
?
0.029
?
?
?
0.023
?
?
?
0.030
?
?
?
0.030
?
?
?
0.024
?
?
?
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
U
V
n
ciτ /U
V
ciτ
0.006
?
?
?
0.002
0.000
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
#
observations
1510199
918,770
918,770
1502916
916,097
916,097
1510199
918,770
918,770
A
djusted
R
2
0.091
0.065
0.065
0.090
0.064
0.064
0.091
0.065
0.065
N
otes:
?
?
?, ?
?
, ?
denote
statisticalsignificance
on
the
1%
,5%
,and
10%
level,respectively.
R
obust
standard
errors
(clustered
by
destination-
product
pairs
ci)
are
given
in
parentheses.
T
he
dependent
variable,
explanatory
variable
and
instrum
ent
are
defined
in
equation
(2.1),
(2.2)
and
(2.4),
respectively.
U
nit
values
are
in
logs,
i.e.
U
V
n
c
iτ
=
ln
(u
v
)
n
c
iτ .
U
V
n
iτ
=
1/5 ∑
p
=
t−
1
p
=
t−
5
U
V
n
ip .
N
orm
alizing
U
V
n
c
iτ
w
ith
U
V
c
iτ
rem
oves
level
differences
across
destinations
and
products.
U˜
V
n
c
iτ
denotes
the
Frisch-W
augh
residual
of
U
V
n
c
iτ .
I.e.
it
is
U
V
n
c
iτ
orthogonalized
w
ith
respect
to
all
other
regressors.
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
is
instrum
ented
w
ith
(2.4)
and
M
S
C
H
N
c
it
×
U
V
n
c
iτ
w
ith
(2.4)×
U
V
n
c
iτ .
F
-
statistics
of
the
first
stages
are
883
and
616
([3]),
876
and
920
([6])
as
w
ell
as
969
and
963
([9]).
A
ll
colum
ns
include
exporter-year,
im
porter-year
and
H
S4
fixed
effects
and
controlfor
v
n
c
i,t−
1 .
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Table A.15: Disparity in unit values – exporters above & below China
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Sample UVnciτ > UVCHNciτ UVnciτ < UVCHNciτ
OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.071 0.231 0.231 0.079 0.213 0.213
Standard deviation 1.163 1.159 1.159 1.214 1.208 1.208
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.196??? -0.239??? -0.230??? -0.140??? -0.132??? -0.133??
(0.018) (0.022) (0.038) (0.027) (0.033) (0.065)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.113??? 0.162??? 0.217??? 0.044? 0.041 0.044
(0.011) (0.014) (0.020) (0.024) (0.029) (0.055)
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.028??? 0.023??? 0.016??? 0.015??? 0.016??? 0.016??
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
# observations 753,054 489,299 489,299 282,950 193,249 193,249
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.069 0.069 0.091 0.075 0.075
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The dependent
variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respec-
tively. Unit values are in logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ . UVniτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 UVnip. MS
CHN
cit is
instrumented with (2.4) and MSCHNcit × |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | with (2.4)×|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ |.
F-statistics of the first stages are 845 and 708 ([3]) as well as 432 and 185 ([6]). All columns include
exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table A.16: Disparity in unit values – checks for spurious interaction terms
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Check Orthogonalizing Regressors Squared Terms
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.073 0.226 0.226 0.073 0.226 0.226
Standard deviation 1.177 1.173 1.173 1.177 1.173 1.173
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.072??? -0.059??? 0.003 -0.404??? -0.416??? -0.455???
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.028) (0.035) (0.077)
× ˜|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.064??? 0.155??? 0.215???
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.107??? 0.153??? 0.210???
(0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.029??? 0.019??? 0.012??? 0.011?? 0.000 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)(
MSCHNcit
)2 0.301??? 0.267??? 0.288???
(0.033) (0.041) (0.092)
(|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ |)2 0.005??? 0.007??? 0.007???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
# observations 1036004 682548 682548 1036004 682548 682548
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.069 0.069 0.094 0.069 0.069
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4),
respectively. Unit values are in logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ . UVniτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 UVnip.
˜|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | denotes the Frisch-Waugh residual of |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ |. I.e. it
is|UVnciτ−UVCHNciτ | orthogonalized with respect to all other regressors. MSCHNcit is instrumented
with (2.4),MSCHNcit ×|UVnciτ −UVCHNciτ | with (2.4)×|UVnciτ −UVCHNciτ | and
(
MSCHNcit
)2
with
(2.4)2. F-statistics of the first stages are 871 and 1637 ([3]) as well as 822, 793 and 517 ([6]). All
columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table A.17: Disparity in unit values – lags
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Lag l of factor intensity l = 1 l = 5
Mean 0.154 0.157 0.213 0.228
Standard deviation 1.133 1.158 1.095 1.120
[1] [2] [3] [4]
MSCHNcit -0.145??? -0.364??? -0.170??? -0.362???
(0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041)
× |UVnci,t−l − UVCHNci,t−l| 0.123??? 0.168???
(0.020) (0.018)
× UVnci,t−l 0.160??? 0.151???
(0.012) (0.012)
|UVnci,t−l − UVCHNci,t−l| 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
UVnci,t−l -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
# observations 459,745 645,691 380,830 620,777
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.084 0.078 0.076
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs
ci) are given in parentheses. All models are estimated with IV. The dependent
variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1),
(2.2) and (2.4), respectively. Unit values are in logs, i.e. UVncit = ln(uv)ncit.
MSCHNcit is instrumented with (2.4) and MS
CHN
cit × |UVnci,t−l − UVCHNci,t−l|
with (2.4)×|UVnci,t−l − UVCHNci,t−l|. F-statistics of the first stages are 915
and 805 ([1]), 930 and 621 ([2]), 993 and 1102 ([3]) as well as 1071 and 754
([4]). All columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects
and control for vnci,t−1.
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Table A.18: Disparity in unit values – weighted observations
Dependent Variable G(vnci)t:t+5
Weights ln(GDPnt +GDPct) ln(vcit)
Method OLS IV OLS IV
Mean 0.073 0.225 0.225 0.080 0.236 0.236
Standard deviation 1.174 1.170 1.170 1.167 1.163 1.163
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
MSCHNcit -0.190??? -0.224??? -0.223??? -0.208??? -0.244??? -0.246???
(0.015) (0.019) (0.035) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.111??? 0.157??? 0.216??? 0.124??? 0.183??? 0.238???
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018)
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.024??? 0.019??? 0.012??? 0.024??? 0.018??? 0.012???
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
# observations 1036004 682,548 682,548 1036004 682,548 682,548
Adjusted R2 0.094 0.070 0.069 0.096 0.070 0.070
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust
standard errors (clustered by destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. Observations are
weighted with total GDP of trading partners and total imports of a destination-product combination,
respectively. The dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.4), respectively. Unit values are in logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ . UVniτ =
1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 UVnip. MS
CHN
cit is instrumented with (2.4) and MS
CHN
cit × |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | with
(2.4)×|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ |. F-statistics of the first stages are 876 and 849 ([3]); 868 and 856 ([6]).
All columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1.
Chapter 2 61
Ta
bl
e
A
.1
9:
A
lt
er
na
ti
ve
st
ra
te
gy
to
ad
dr
es
s
en
do
ge
ne
ity
G
(v
n
c
i
)t
:t
+
5
)
ap
p
ro
x
im
at
in
g
d
em
an
d
an
d
te
ch
n
ol
og
y
sh
o
ck
s
w
it
h
G
(v
c
i
)t
:t
+
5
an
d
G
(v
n
i
)t
:t
+
5
co
n
tr
ol
li
n
g
fo
r
te
ch
n
ol
og
y
sh
o
ck
s
w
it
h
p
ro
d
u
ct
-y
ea
r-
in
co
m
e-
gr
ou
p
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
E
x
p
or
te
r
n
∈
al
l
H
IC
s
U
M
IC
s
L
M
IC
s
L
IC
s
al
l
al
l
al
l
H
IC
s
U
M
IC
s
L
M
IC
s
L
IC
s
al
l
al
l
M
ea
n
0.
34
8
0.
28
0
0.
41
8
0.
43
9
0.
51
3
0.
35
3
0.
22
6
0.
34
8
0.
28
0
0.
41
8
0.
43
9
0.
51
3
0.
35
3
0.
22
6
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
1.
22
9
1.
18
8
1.
28
6
1.
28
0
1.
25
8
1.
21
9
1.
17
3
1.
22
9
1.
18
8
1.
28
6
1.
28
0
1.
25
8
1.
21
9
1.
17
3
[1
]
[2
]
[3
]
[4
]
[5
]
[6
]
[7
]
[8
]
[9
]
[1
0]
[1
1]
[1
2]
[1
3]
[1
4]
M
S
C
H
N
c
i
t
-0
.0
97
?
?
?
-0
.0
92
?
?
?
-0
.1
45
?
?
?
-0
.1
23
?
?
?
-0
.0
52
?
-0
.0
76
?
?
?
-0
.2
58
?
?
?
-0
.0
56
?
?
?
-0
.0
49
?
?
?
-0
.1
10
?
?
?
-0
.0
79
?
?
?
-0
.0
32
-0
.0
23
-0
.2
20
?
?
?
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
13
)
(0
.0
28
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
18
)
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
14
)
(0
.0
29
)
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.0
23
)
(0
.0
19
)
×
|F
I
n
i
τ
−
F
I
C
H
N
i
τ
|
0.
00
1
-0
.0
06
(0
.0
11
)
(0
.0
13
)
×
|U
V
n
c
i
τ
−
U
V
C
H
N
c
i
τ
|
0.
13
1?
?
?
0.
15
2?
?
?
(0
.0
12
)
(0
.0
12
)
|F
I
n
i
τ
−
F
I
C
H
N
i
τ
|
0.
01
2?
?
?
0.
02
7?
?
?
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
04
)
|U
V
n
c
i
τ
−
U
V
C
H
N
c
i
τ
|
0.
01
8?
?
?
0.
02
0?
?
?
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
G
(v
c
i
)t
:t
+
5
0.
10
9?
?
?
0.
11
4?
?
?
0.
10
9?
?
?
0.
12
1?
?
?
0.
06
3?
?
?
0.
10
8?
?
?
0.
16
3?
?
?
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
04
)
G
(v
n
i
)t
:t
+
5
0.
20
9?
?
?
0.
20
8?
?
?
0.
17
9?
?
?
0.
19
3?
?
?
0.
16
1?
?
?
0.
21
7?
?
?
0.
22
1?
?
?
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
05
)
(0
.0
04
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
03
)
P
ro
d
u
ct
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
(f
e)
?
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P
ro
d
u
ct
-y
ea
r-
gr
ou
p
fe
’s
?
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
#
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s
11
66
86
3
68
91
51
15
74
41
23
36
14
86
65
7
95
55
40
68
25
48
11
66
86
3
68
91
51
15
74
41
23
36
14
86
65
7
95
55
40
68
25
48
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
0.
07
3
0.
07
2
0.
07
0
0.
07
6
0.
09
8
0.
07
5
0.
08
4
0.
06
5
0.
06
3
0.
05
9
0.
06
2
0.
08
8
0.
06
9
0.
07
5
N
ot
es
:
?
?
?
,?
?
,?
d
en
ot
e
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
on
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
l,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
R
ob
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
(c
lu
st
er
ed
b
y
d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
-p
ro
d
u
ct
p
ai
rs
c
i)
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
A
ll
m
o
d
el
s
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
w
it
h
O
L
S
fo
r
th
e
sa
m
p
le
fr
om
20
01
-2
00
6
to
m
ak
e
it
co
m
p
ar
ab
le
to
ab
ov
e
IV
re
su
lt
s.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
,
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
an
d
in
st
ru
m
en
t
ar
e
d
efi
n
ed
in
eq
u
at
io
n
(2
.1
),
(2
.2
)
an
d
(2
.4
),
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
F
I
n
i
t
is
m
ea
su
re
d
w
it
h
ln
(
V
A
L
) n
i
t
(2
.A
.1
).
τ
d
en
ot
es
th
e
av
er
ag
e
fr
om
la
g
1
to
5,
ln
(
V
A
L
) n
i
τ
=
1
/
5
∑ p=
t
−
1
p
=
t
−
5
ln
(
V
A
L
) n
i
p
.
U
n
it
va
lu
es
ar
e
in
lo
gs
,
i.
e.
U
V
n
c
i
τ
=
ln
(u
v
) n
c
i
τ
.
v
c
i
m
ea
su
re
s
co
u
n
tr
y
c
’s
im
p
or
ts
of
p
ro
d
u
ct
i
st
em
m
in
g
fr
om
al
l
ex
p
or
te
rs
b
u
t
n
an
d
C
h
in
a
an
d
v
n
i
is
co
u
n
tr
y
n
’s
ex
p
or
ts
in
go
o
d
i
to
al
l
d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
s
b
u
t
c
.
I.
e.
v
c
i
is
h
er
e
∑ m
6⊂
{n
,C
H
N
}
v
m
c
i
an
d
v
n
i
is
∑ k6=
c
v
n
k
i
.
A
ll
co
lu
m
n
s
in
cl
u
d
e
ex
p
or
te
r-
ye
ar
an
d
im
p
or
te
r-
ye
ar
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
an
d
co
n
tr
ol
fo
r
v
n
c
i
,t
−
1
.
62 China and Other Countries’ Exports
Table
A
.20:
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Table A.21: Excluding observations based on zero trade flows
G(vnci)
t:t+5
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
(a) excluding observations where G(vnci)t:t+5 = 0
MSCHNcit -0.066
??? -0.103??? -0.007 0.003 -0.153??? -0.300??? -0.246??? -0.323???
(0.012) (0.035) (0.013) (0.037) (0.022) (0.051) (0.019) (0.043)
× 1(n ∈ UMICs) -0.116??? -0.254???
(0.022) (0.048)
× 1(n ∈ LMICs) -0.210??? -0.207???
(0.019) (0.038)
× 1(n ∈ LICs) -0.111??? -0.373???
(0.024) (0.052)
× |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.072??? 0.166???
(0.011) (0.024)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.139??? 0.288???
(0.012) (0.024)
# observations 1721052 897,051 1721052 897,051 1422873 747,492 905,158 577,430
(b) excluding observations where G(vnci)t:t+5 ∈ {−2, 0, 2}
MSCHNcit -0.133
??? -0.081??? -0.111??? -0.032 -0.209??? -0.134??? -0.236??? -0.300???
(0.010) (0.025) (0.011) (0.027) (0.020) (0.040) (0.016) (0.033)
× 1(n ∈ UMICs) -0.092??? -0.149???
(0.022) (0.039)
× 1(n ∈ LMICs) -0.084??? -0.116???
(0.018) (0.032)
× 1(n ∈ LICs) -0.006 -0.176???
(0.024) (0.044)
× |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.066??? 0.059???
(0.010) (0.019)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.123??? 0.232???
(0.010) (0.019)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
# observations 1019896 538,813 1019896 538,813 871,104 464,303 683,368 422,546
(c) excluding observations where G(vnci)t:t+5 ∈ {−2, 0, 2} or MSCHNcit = 0
MSCHNcit -0.098
??? -0.072??? -0.059??? -0.019 -0.208??? -0.157??? -0.228??? -0.310???
(0.011) (0.026) (0.012) (0.028) (0.022) (0.041) (0.017) (0.033)
× 1(n ∈ UMICs) -0.121??? -0.147???
(0.023) (0.040)
× 1(n ∈ LMICs) -0.137??? -0.134???
(0.019) (0.032)
× 1(n ∈ LICs) -0.078??? -0.193???
(0.025) (0.043)
× |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | 0.087??? 0.075???
(0.010) (0.020)
× |UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | 0.125??? 0.237???
(0.010) (0.019)
# observations 702,198 398,433 702,198 398,433 591,271 340,393 603,109 368,834
Notes: ???,?? ,? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by
destination-product pairs ci) are given in parentheses. Models estimated with OLS use the full sample (1996-2006) and IV models
data from 2001 to 2006. The dependent variable, explanatory variable and instrument are defined in equation (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4),
respectively. 1(n ∈ UMICs) is one if exporter n is an upper middle income country. 1(n ∈ HICs) is the base category. FInit is
measured with ln(VA
L
)nit (2.A.1). τ denotes the average from lag 1 to 5, ln(VAL )niτ = 1/5
∑p=t−1
p=t−5 ln(
VA
L
)nip. Unit values are in
logs, i.e. UVnciτ = ln(uv)nciτ . MSCHNcit is instrumented with (2.4) and MS
CHN
cit × 1(n ∈ UMICs) with (2.4)×1(n ∈ UMICs). All
columns include exporter-year, importer-year and HS4 fixed effects and control for vnci,t−1. Main effects of |FIniτ − FICHNiτ | and
|UVnciτ − UVCHNciτ | are omitted.
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Table
A
.22:
A
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levelofdisaggregation
–
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H
S
6-digit
level
G
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n
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5
E
xporter
n
∈
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H
IC
s
U
M
IC
s
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IC
s
LIC
s
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all
M
ean
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0.278
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0.213
Standard
deviation
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1.330
1.323
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[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
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S
C
H
N
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+
G
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S
C
H
N
i
)
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5
:t/2 )
-0.027
?
?
?
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?
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?
?
?
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?
?
?
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?
?
-0.070
?
?
?
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?
?
?
(0.006)
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(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.012)
(0.010)
×
|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |
0.035
?
?
?
(0.007)
×
|U
V
n
ciτ −
U
V
C
H
N
ciτ |
0.088
?
?
?
(0.007)
|F
I
n
iτ −
F
I
C
H
N
iτ |
0.018
?
?
?
(0.002)
|U
V
n
ciτ −
U
V
C
H
N
ciτ |
0.019
?
?
?
(0.002)
#
observations
3811333
2415401
464290
680462
251180
3190807
1878472
A
djusted
R
2
0.056
0.058
0.058
0.060
0.087
0.057
0.063
N
otes:
?
?
?, ?
?
, ?
denote
statisticalsignificance
on
the
1%
,5%
,and
10%
level,respectively.
R
obust
standard
errors
(clustered
by
destination-product
pairs
ci)
are
given
in
parentheses.
A
llm
odels
are
estim
ated
w
ith
O
LS
using
directly
the
instrum
ent
as
explanatory
variable
w
hich
is
a
reduced
form
regression.
T
he
dependent
variable
and
explanatory
variable
are
defined
in
equation
(2.1)
and
(2.4),
respectively.
F
I
n
it
is
m
easured
w
ith
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
it
(2.A
.1).
τ
denotes
the
average
from
lag
1
to
5,
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
iτ
=
1/
5 ∑
p
=
t−
1
p
=
t−
5
ln
(
V
AL
)
n
ip .
U
nit
values
are
in
logs,
i.e.
U
V
n
c
iτ
=
ln
(u
v
)
n
c
iτ .
A
ll
colum
ns
include
exporter-year,
im
porter-year
and
H
S4
fixed
effects
and
controlfor
v
n
c
i,t−
1 .
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3 Per Capita Income and the Quality and
Variety of Imports
Joint with Tobias Wuergler
3.1 Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on how the division of aggregate income into per capita income
and population affects the margins of imports. In most of the prominent trade theories,
imports only depend on aggregate income. How the latter is composed in terms of per
capita income and population does not play a role.
We provide a thorough analysis of the empirical relationship between countries’ GDP
per capita and all three margins of their imports. We document, for a given aggregate
income, a positive association between per capita income and the extensive as well as
the quality margin of imports. We find no relation between per capita income and the
quantity margin of aggregate imports. This is due to a composition effect as, at the
product level, richer countries import higher quantities. Thus, we document that besides
aggregate income, there is a separate role for per capita income in the determination
of the extensive and quality (and quantity) margin of imports. These findings are at
odds with predictions of standard trade models based on homothetic preferences. For
example, a Krugman-type model implies that when controlling for aggregate income, per
capita income should have no impact on any margin of imports.1 However, Krugman
(1980) was not designed to explain the margins of trade. We show a potential mechanism
through which the empirical regularity of richer countries having higher extensive and
quality margins of imports may arise, by sketching a model featuring non-homothetic
preferences.
Throughout the chapter we compare imports of two countries with equal aggregate
income but differing population sizes. In one country, the amount of aggregate income
1Individuals in every country consume all available varieties in the world economy. Hence, only
aggregate income matters for variety. If quality is introduced into the Krugman model, the quality
level does neither depend on per capita income nor on aggregate income as preferences admitting a
representative agent implicitly assume perfect substitution between quality and quantity. Quantities
depend only on aggregate income as all individuals split their income equally across all varieties. See
Appendix 3.A.4 for details.
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is divided between fewer individuals and hence per capita income is higher than in the
other country. For illustration, in 2007 Switzerland and Columbia had roughly the same
GDP (300 billion I$).2 With population differing by a factor of five, GDP per capita
in Switzerland is five times higher than in Columbia (37’000 I$ versus 8’000 I$). In a
standard trade model with homothetic preferences, these two countries are observationally
equivalent importers. Trade data, however, uncovers that the value of Switzerland’s
imports is eight times higher than Columbia’s. Moreover, Switzerland’s imports are more
diversified (extensive margin), have higher unit values (quality margin) and feature higher
quantities (quantity margin).3 Thus, the richer country imports more in terms of value
and exceeds the poorer country in all three margins.
Our main contribution is the thorough and detailed analysis of the empirical relation-
ship between per capita income and all three margins of imports, for a given aggregate
income. As a second contribution, we sketch a simple model which predicts, consistent
with the data, that, for given aggregate income, the extensive and quality margin of
imports jointly increase in per capita income.
This chapter provides three main results. First, the analysis of imports of 123 countries
reveals that nations with a higher GDP per capita have, for a given aggregate GDP, higher
aggregate import values in consumer goods. Decomposing overall imports into the three
margins exposes that the higher import values of richer countries are driven by both,
a higher extensive and a higher quality margin but not by differences in the quantity
margin. The magnitude of the effects is of economic importance. On average, increasing
GDP per capita by 1% and contemporaneously decreasing population by 1%, i.e. holding
overall GDP constant, raises the extensive margin by 0.10% and the quality margin by
0.07%. Moreover, evidence for bi lateral import margins is fully in line with findings for
multi lateral import margins, suggesting that the latter are not driven by the composition
of source countries and their characteristics.
Second, by studying disaggregate trade flows at the six digit level of the Harmonized
System, we document that countries with a higher GDP per capita have a higher probabil-
ity, within a given product category and for a given aggregate GDP, to import a product
(extensive margin) and import higher qualities and larger quantities. Hence, at both, the
aggregate and product level, we find that richer countries have a higher extensive as well
as quality margin of imports. However, as rich countries import in many categories with
typically low quantities, the positive association between the quantity margin and per
capita income disappears at the aggregate level. Furthermore, also at the product level,
insights from bi- and multilateral imports are qualitatively the same.
2in 2005 constant prices and PPP
3We use the terms ’variety’ and ’extensive margin’ interchangeably.
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Third, we sketch a model to show that non-homothetic preferences offer a possible
explanation for the empirical regularity of richer countries importing more along the ex-
tensive and quality margin. We extend Krugman’s (1980) variety model with vertical
quality differentiation and non-homothetic consumer behavior. Individuals consume ei-
ther zero or one unit of a variety, choosing a quality level if consuming the product.
Despite the firms’ ability to differentiate quality continuously, richer individuals not only
consume goods of higher quality, but also a broader set of varieties. As a result, richer
countries import, for given aggregate income, a broader set of varieties and higher quality
versions than poorer countries. We abstract from a quantity margin on the one hand to
keep the model as simple as possible and, on the other hand, because the empirical results
on the quantity margin depend on the level of disaggregation.
The literature on international trade has focused on the margins of trade at least since
the seminal contributions on variety by Melitz (2003) and on quality by Schott (2004).
Export margins have been studied extensively. The influential article of Hummels and
Klenow (2005) documents the relationship between aggregate GDP, GDP per capita and
the margins of exports. Interestingly, they also find that conditional on GDP, richer
countries export more along the extensive and quality margin, but not along the quantity
margin. As they concentrate on aggregate flows, it is unclear whether there is also a
composition effect regarding export quantities. To some extent, this chapter can be
viewed as a counterpart to Hummels and Klenow (2005). The combined finding is that
richer countries im- and export a broader set of varieties, im- and export goods of higher
unit values yet do not feature a specific pattern regarding the quantity margin of their
im- and exports, everything conditional on aggregate income. Albeit smaller, there is
also a literature on import margins emerging. Some recent empirical studies analyze in
particular the relationship with per capita income. Fieler (2011b), Choi et al. (2009),
Fontagné et al. (2008), Harrigan et al. (2011) and Bekkers et al. (2012) find that within
product categories unit values of imports are increasing in per capita income. Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011) and Hepenstrick (2010) document that the extensive margin of imports
is increasing in the level of per capita income as well. The magnitudes of our estimates
are similar to the ones in these articles. The first four studies estimate an elasticity
of GDP per capita on import unit values between 0.04 and 0.16, our estimate is 0.07.4
The substantially higher estimate of Bekkers et al. (2012), 1.06, might be due to the
different variation they exploit. For the extensive margin at the product level we find
4The positive association between per capita income and prices in a destination in Harrigan et al.
(2011) vanishes when they include product-firm fixed effects. If, within product categories, prices vary
mostly across rather than within firms, this is in line with our findings. However, the result in Baldwin
and Harrigan (2011) that US export unit values are lower in richer destinations is very different from
ours. The discrepancy is not due to US data (Harrigan et al. (2011)).
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an elasticity of per capita income of 0.05 a little below the coefficient of Baldwin and
Harrigan (2011) which is 0.09. For aggregate imports we estimate an elasticity of per
capita income of 0.1 which is similar to Hepenstrick (2010). The empirical part of this
chapter ’unifies’ the results of these studies. Moreover, we document that these relations
hold for aggregate and disaggregate, as well as for bi- and multilateral trade flows. In
addition, we extend the previous findings by providing evidence on the quantity margin.
We are not aware of any paper analyzing the relationship between per capita income
and the quantity margin of imports. Recent theoretical work abandoned the assumption
of homothetic preferences. When individuals purchase a single vertically differentiated
product the quality and price of consumption goods rises in the income level, creating the
positive relationship between prices and per capita income observed in the data (e.g. Choi
et al. (2009), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011b), Hallak (2006) and Murphy and Shleifer (1997)).
Models in which individuals purchase a range of horizontally differentiated products,
with richer individuals consuming a broader range of varieties due to non-homothetic
preferences, predict a positive correlation between per capita income and the extensive
margin of imports (e.g. Foellmi et al. (2010), Hepenstrick (2010), Matsuyama (2000) and
Sauré (2009)).5 In the theoretical part of this chapter, we ’unify’ the predictions of these
models in one simple framework in which the extensive and the quality margin of imports
are jointly increasing in per capita income.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The data and margins of imports
are described in section 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Section 3.4 documents the relationship
of per capita income and a country’s import margins. In section 3.5 we sketch a trade
model with non-homothetic preferences, qualities as well as varieties and compare the
predictions to our empirical findings. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
We compute the margins of international trade flows with the data of Gaulier and Zignago
(2010) which reports yearly unidirected bilateral trade flows at the six digit level of the
Harmonized System (version 1992) from 1995 to 2007. The original database has been
collected by UN COMTRADE. We use the dataset of Gaulier and Zignago (2010) because
they cleaned and compiled the data in order to create a dataset with comparable values,
5The closed economy framework in Jackson (1984) is one of the first formal models which predicts
that the variety of goods an individual consumes increases with income. Note that other studies analyze
the predictions of non-homothetic preferences for trade volumes. Markusen (2010) develops a generic
trade model which provides demand side explanations for a number of popular phenomena, such as the
mystery of the missing trade. Francois and Kaplan (1996) conclude that countries with higher per capita
incomes have higher trade volumes.
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quantities and unit values.6 All prices are on a free on board (FOB) basis. The unit of
observation in the data is: year (t), importer (c), exporter (n), HS6 code (i). At the six
digit level we observe 5’018 different product categories. As the focus is on explanations
for trade based on consumer preferences we only use categories which include consumer
goods according to the classification of Broad Economic Categories (BEC), see Table A.1
for some examples. This leaves us with 1’263 product categories, corresponding to 25%
of the worldwide value of trade.
We screen the data as follows: (i) we discard observations that involve countries from
which we do not have data on GDP, (ii) we drop countries with a population smaller
than 1 million in order to avoid that very small countries dominate the sample, (iii) we
discard observations with negative or zero quantities, (iv) we discard observations with
a value less than US$2’000 as small trade flows are more prone to measurement error,
(v) we discard, for each HS6 code and year, observations with unit values smaller than
10% of the worldwide median or larger than 10 times the worldwide median. The final
sample accounts for 92% of the value of worldwide trade in consumer goods and covers
123 countries (see Table A.3).
Data on income, population and purchasing power parity come from Heston et al.
(2009). We approximate per capita income with GDP per capita (PPP, in I$, in 2005
constant prices). To capture region specific effects we use the seven regions as defined by
the World Bank.7 Measures for trade costs are from Elhanan Helpman, Marc Melitz and
Yona Rubinstein8 and are complemented with data from the CIA World Factbook which
indicates whether a country is an island or landlocked.
3.3 Measuring the Margins of Imports
We study four different types of import flows. We start with aggregate multilateral import
margins. One observation reveals, for example, that Switzerland imports consumer goods
from the rest of the world worth 44 billion US$; all examples refer to 2007. As trade
flows may differ a lot across product categories, we also study disaggregate multilateral
6Values are reported in thousands of US$ and quantities in tons. Most trade flows are reported in tons
originally. They estimate rates of conversion into tons for flows reported in different units of measurement.
These rates are estimated, for each product separately, with trade flows which are reported both in tons
and the other unit of measurement. Trade flows appear twice if both the importer and exporter report
their trade statistics to the UN.
7The region classification of the World Bank is only for developing countries. The missing data for
the developed countries and the region North America, Australia, New Zealand has been complemented.
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups
8At http://scholar.harvard.edu/melitz/publications/estimating-trade-flows-trading-partners-and-
trading-volumes they kindly provide the dataset used in “Estimating Trade Flows: Trading Partners and
Trading Volumes”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008.
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import margins. There we observe, for example, that the value of cars (with large cylinder
capacity, HS 870324) which Switzerland imports from the rest of the world is 1,2 billion
US$. With ’aggregate trade flows’ we mean trade in all consumer good categories while
trade flows in a product category are called ’disaggregate trade flows’. To show that our
results on imports from the rest of the world are not driven by the composition of source
countries and their characteristics, we additionally analyze bilateral imports, both at the
aggregate (e.g. Swiss imports from Japan in all consumer goods) and disaggregate (e.g.
Switzerland’s car imports from Japan) level. We present the definitions of import margins
in another order as they are most comprehensible when starting at the most detailed level
of data and subsequently aggregating over exporters and products.
3.3.1 Disaggregate Import Margins
Bilateral Imports
The most detailed level which we observe in our dataset is country c’s imports from source
country n in product category i (HS6 code). For each trade flow the corresponding value
vnci and quantity xnci are reported. The unit value uvnci = vnci/xnci reflects the value
per unit within a product category i and hence its average price. To give an example,
Switzerland and Columbia both import cars (HS 870324) from Spain for approximately
1,3 million US$. However, Columbia imports three times more units than Switzerland.
Hence, the value per unit of Columbia’s car imports is a third of the value per unit of
Switzerland’s car imports from Spain. Although Swiss and Columbian car imports from
Spain are equivalent in terms of value the corresponding quantities and unit values differ
considerably.
It is widely accepted that unit values are, at least to some extent, related to product
quality (e.g. Hallak (2006), Hummels and Klenow (2005), Schott (2004)). Products
which are of higher quality have a higher price and this translates into higher unit values.
However, prices can vary for products of equal quality. This might be due to (i) differing
markups, see for example Simonovska (2010), (ii) differences in production costs or (iii)
composition. If a category includes several products with different prices, differences in
unit values might be due to differences in the composition of goods within a category. We
deal with (ii) by documenting that results are qualitatively unchanged when analyzing
bilateral import flows and including exporter fixed effects. Moreover, we show that our
results are also unchanged if we include exporter-product fixed effects which should absorb
most of the variation due to differences in production costs. To mitigate the impact of (iii)
we measure unit values at the finest possible level of disaggregation. We cannot disentangle
how much of the correlation between unit values and importer per capita income is due to
quality and how much due to markups (richer countries might have a higher willingness to
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pay).9 However, as we believe that a least some fraction of the observed relation between
unit values and per capita income is driven by quality we interpret, in what follows, unit
values as quality. We do not use more sophisticated methodologies to extract the quality
component from unit values, as for example proposed in Khandelwal (2010) or Hallak
and Schott (2011), because they do not allow a decomposition of values into the various
margins.
By definition bilateral disaggregate import values can be decomposed into a unit value
and a quantity component.
Vnci = UVnci ·Xnci, Ynci ≡ ynci, Y ∈ {V, UV,X}
The extensive margin for trade flows at the disaggregate level is an indicator, 1nci,
which is equal to one if country c has positive imports in product category i from source
country n.
1nci =
1 if vnci > 00 if vnci = 0
For illustration, Switzerland imports cars (HS 870324) from Brazil while Columbia
does not (1BRA,CHE,cars=1, 1BRA,COL,cars=0). However, both Switzerland and Columbia
import cars from Japan (1JPN,CHE,cars=1JPN,COL,cars=1). The level of the unit value and
quantity margin is not informative as it depends on the unit of measurement. Yet, the
comparison across countries is interesting. We observe that Switzerland’s car imports
from Japan have 70% higher unit values and consist of 20% more units than Columbia’s
car imports from Japan.
Multilateral Imports
We construct disaggregate multilateral import margins by taking the weighted geometric
mean of bilateral import margins across exporters.
Yci =
∏
n∈N−c
(ynci)
wnci , wnci =
vnci∑
n∈N−c vnci
, Y ∈ {V, UV,X}, Vci = UV ci ·Xci
Weight wnci represents the importance of source country n in country c’s overall imports
in product i. N denotes the set of all exporters. For example, VCHE,cars = 236m and
implies that from the average exporter Switzerland imports cars worth 236 million US$.
Regarding the unit value and quantity components we observe that Switzerlands’ car
9According to our model prices increase in product quality and the willingness to pay of consumers.
74 Per Capita Income and Imports
imports, from the average exporter, have three times higher unit values and consist of
four times more units than Columbia’s car imports.
Applying the geometric mean has the nice property that the multilateral value margin
is still the product of the unit value and quantity margin. For robustness we define alter-
native measures which sum over bilateral imports, we refer to them as ’straightforward’
disaggregate multilateral import margins Y˘ci. The two versions of disaggregate import
margins are highly correlated and yield similar results.
V˘ci =
∑
n∈N−c
vnci, X˘ci =
∑
n∈N−c
xnci, U˘V ci =
∑
n∈N−c vnci∑
n∈N−c xnci
, V˘ci = U˘V ci · X˘ci
The extensive margin of disaggregate multilateral imports is an indicator, 1ci, which
is equal to one if country c has positive imports in product category i. For illustra-
tion, Switzerland imports articles of ivory (HS 960110), whereas Columbia does not
(1CHE,ivory=1, 1COL,ivory=0).
1ci =
1 if
∑
n∈N−c vnci > 0
0 if
∑
n∈N−c vnci = 0
3.3.2 Aggregate Import Margins
Bilateral Imports
We construct aggregate bi lateral import margins by aggregating over product categories.
In what follows we present the decomposition of aggregate import values into extensive
and intensive margins as well as a break down of the intensive margin into the unit value
and the quantity component. This decomposition is analog to Hummels and Klenow
(2005).
The value of country c’s imports from exporter n is normalized by imports of the rest
of the world r from n. In other words, we compare importer c to importer r, for a given
exporter n. For example, Swiss imports from Japan (808 million US$) are normalized
with all other countries’ imports from Japan (146 billion US$). This eliminates that
Swiss imports from Japan appear to be high just because Japan is a large exporter.
Vnc =
∑
i∈I vnci∑
i∈I vnri
, vnri =
∑
cˆ∈C−c
vncˆi
The rest of the world r denotes all countries which import from n other than c, C denotes
the set of all importers and I denotes the set of all product categories.
The extensive margin is a weighted count of product categories which c imports from
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n relative to categories which r imports from n. Each category i is weighted by r’s import
value from n in order to avoid that products which are primarily imported by c appear
large. Switzerland has positive imports from Japan in 410 categories, whereas the rest of
the world imports in 1’169 product categories from Japan. If all 1’169 products were of
equal importance then EMJPN,CHE would be 410/1’169=0.35. However, as Japan exports
only few Garden umbrellas i=660110 has a small weight and as Japan has a high export
value in cars i=870324 has a large weight.
EMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnri∑
i∈Inr vnri
Inc is the set of product categories in which c has positive imports from n and Inr is the
set of categories with positive flows from n to the rest of the world r.
The intensive margin compares c’s imports from n to r’s imports from n in a common
set of goods Inc. For example, Swiss imports from Japan (808 million US$) are normalized
with imports of all other countries from Japan in the before mentioned 410 categories (140
billion US$).
IMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc vnri
The product of the extensive and intensive margin is equal to the normalized import
value.
Vnc = EMnc · IMnc
We compare the unit value of c’s imports from n to the unit value of r’s imports from
n in a given category i. To construct the unit value margin of c’s aggregate imports from
n we take the geometric mean of these unit value ratios across product categories. To
give an example, the unit value of Swiss car imports from Japan is 29% higher than the
unit value of the rest of the world’s Japanese car imports. The geometric mean across
products implies UVJPN,CHE=1.28, i.e. on average Swiss import unit values from Japan
are 28% higher than other countries’ import unit values from Japan.
UVnc =
∏
i∈Inc
(
uvnci
uvnri
)wnci
, uvnri =
vnri
xnri
, xnri =
∑
cˆ∈C−c
xncˆi
wnci =
snci−snri
ln(snci)−ln(snri)∑
i∈Inc
snci−snri
ln(snci)−ln(snri)
, snbi =
vnbi∑
i∈Inc vnbi
, b ∈ {c, r}
wnci is the logarithmic mean of snci (the share of category i in country c’s imports from
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n) and snri (the share of category i in r’s imports from n, where i ∈ Inc), normalized such
that weights sum to 1 over i.10
By decomposing the intensive margin into a unit value and residual quantity margin,
Xnc = IMnc/UVnc, the normalized import value can be expressed as the product of the
extensive, the unit value and the quantity margin.
Vnc = EMnc · UVnc ·Xnc
Alternatively, we define unnormalized aggregate bilateral import margins Y˜nc, which
yield similar results.
V˜nc =
∑
i∈Inc
vnci, E˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc
1nci, I˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc 1nci
, U˜V nc =
∏
i∈Inc
(uvnci)
w˜nci
w˜nci =
vnci∑
i∈Inc vnci
, X˜nc = I˜Mnc/U˜V nc, V˜nc = E˜Mnc · U˜V nc · X˜nc
Multilateral Imports
The geometric mean across exporters yields aggregate multilateral import margins for
each country c.
Yc =
∏
n∈N−c
(Ync)
wnc , wnc =
snc−snw
ln(snc)−ln(snw)∑
n∈N−c
snc−snw
ln(snc)−ln(snw)
, Y ∈ {V,EM, IM,UV,X}
snc =
vnc∑
n∈N−c vnc
, snw =
∑
cˆ∈C−c,−n vncˆ∑
n∈N−c
∑
cˆ∈C−c,−n vncˆ
, vnc =
∑
i∈Inc
vnci
Where wnc is the logarithmic mean of the shares of n in overall imports of c and C−c,−n
respectively, normalized such that weights sum to 1 over the set of exporters N−c. As
mentioned above, the geometric mean has the nice property that the multilateral value
margin is still the product of the extensive, unit value and quantity margin.
Vc = EMc · UVc ·Xc
The graphs on the left hand side in Figure A.1 illustrate that the raw correlation between
importer GDP per capita and each multilateral import margin is clearly positive.
10The ratio of uvnci to uvnri is weighted with a mean (specifically, the logarithmic mean) of snci to
snri. Each component of wnci, snci and snri, sums to 1 over i. As wnci is a mean of these two components
it is normalized again, such that it sums to 1 over i. snci is equal to what we define below as w˜nci.
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We construct unnormalized aggregate multilateral import margins analogously.
Y˜c =
∏
n∈N−c
(Y˜nc)
w˜nc , w˜nc =
vnc∑
n∈N−c vnc
, Y ∈ {V,EM, IM,UV,X}, V˜c = E˜M c · U˜V c · X˜c
For robustness, we define very simple and intuitive ’straightforward’ multilateral ag-
gregate import margins, Y˘c, which sum over product categories and exporters.
V˘c =
∑
i∈Ic
vci, ˘EM c =
∑
i∈Ic
1ci, ˘IM c =
∑
i∈Ic vci∑
i∈Ic 1ci
, U˘V c =
∏
i∈Ic
(uvci)
w˘ci , uvci =
vci
xci
vci =
∑
n∈N−c
vnci, xci =
∑
n∈N−c
xnci, w˘ci =
vci∑
i∈Ic vci
, X˘c =
˘IM c
U˘V c
, V˘c = ˘EM c · U˘V c · X˘c
All three measures for multilateral aggregate import margins are highly correlated and
yield similar results. Summary statistics on all variables are listed in Table A.4.
3.4 Discussion of Empirical Results
The purpose of this section is to document that there is a robust relationship between
per capita income and imports. Our results show that per capita income is an important
determinant of imports, besides the frequently studied ’gravity forces’ such as aggregate
income and trade costs. We document that richer countries have higher import values,
conditional on aggregate income. The value is decomposed into its extensive, its quality
and its quantity margin in order to analyze the relationship between per capita income and
each margin separately. Richer countries do not only import more in terms of value but
also along the extensive and quality margin. For disaggregate imports there is a positive
association between per capita income and the quantity margin. Though, this relation is
offset by a composition effect for aggregate flows. We first discuss our findings on multi-
lateral imports, both at the aggregate and disaggregate level. Subsequently we show that
these results are not driven by characteristics of source countries as they are qualitatively
the same for bilateral imports. Finally, the findings on all levels of disaggregation are
shortly summarized.
3.4.1 Per Capita Income and Aggregate Multilateral Imports
We regress each aggregate multilateral import margin on GDP and GDP per capita,
exploiting the cross sectional variation in the data.
ln(Yc) = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rcχ+ c, (3.1)
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where Y ∈ {EM,UV,X, V }. We are interested in the coefficient β2. It is the marginal
effect of increasing GDP per capita while holding fixed aggregate GDP. A higher GDP
per capita and unchanged GDP implies an offsetting decrease in population. In other
words, β2 is the difference of the effect of GDP per capita and the effect of population,
on Yc. β1 is the effect of population, conditional on GDP per capita.11 xc is a vector
of control variables. It includes region dummies12, a dummy for OECD membership and
the purchasing power parity exchange rate as trade values are measured in US$. Part
of the variation in GDP per capita is absorbed by region dummies, see Table A.2. We
approximate importer specific trade costs with τc. It includes dummies for whether a
country is an island, landlocked and a member of the WTO as well as the number of
free trade agreements, the number of currency unions, the number of direct neighbor
countries, the number of countries with a common language and the average distance to
all potential exporters. The remoteness index rc measures how far away an importer is
from large exporters.13 Thus, the marginal effect of GDP per capita is a within region
effect and conditional on multilateral trade costs τc and remoteness rc. We calculate
robust HC3 standard errors as the sample size is small.
Table A.5, panel (a), presents estimates for 2007, where import margins are computed
with categories including consumer goods. For a given GDP, higher GDP per capita is
associated with both, a higher extensive as well as quality margin of imports, yet has no
significant effect on the quantity margin.
The interpretation for the extensive margin, which measures the diversification of a
country’s import bundle is as follows: While the extensive margin of imports increases by
0.19% as a result of a 1% higher GDP per capita it is raised by 0.09% when population
increases by 1%. Hence, both average income and population are positively and signifi-
cantly related to the variety margin of imports. However, the effect of GDP per capita is
significantly larger than the effect of population. For a given aggregate GDP, an increase
in GDP per capita and a contemporaneous decrease in population, by 1% each, leads to
a 0.10% increase in the variety margin of imports.
The second column shows that, conditional on GDP, countries with a higher GDP
per capita have a higher quality margin of imports. The elasticity is 0.07 and highly
significant. Note that population is not significantly related to import prices.
Both GDP per capita and population are significantly and positively related to the
11β1 and β2 can also be inferred from the following alternative specification.
ln(Yc) = κ0 +κ1ln(GDPpcc)+κ2ln(POPc)+x
′
cκ3 +τ
′
cκ4 +rcκ5 +uc, β1 = κ2, β2 = κ1−κ2, β1 +β2 = κ1
12East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and
North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America
13rc =
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · (vn/v). I.e. importer c is remote if it is far away from those countries which
export a lot.
Chapter 3 79
quantity margin of imports. However, the size of the effects is not significantly different.
Hence, after controlling for GDP there is no significant role for GDP per capita to explain
the quantity margin of aggregate multilateral imports. The graphs on the right hand side
in Figure A.1 represent the conditional relation of GDP per capita and all three import
margins graphically. The slopes of the fitted lines are equal to the coefficients in Table
A.5, panel (a).
The sum of the coefficients for the extensive, the quality and the quantity margin
is equal to the coefficient for the value margin as Vc = EMc · UVc · Xc and because all
variables are in logs. Both, GDP per capita and population are positively related to the
value margin of imports Vc. However, the effect of average income is significantly larger.
Increasing GDP per capita by 1% and contemporaneously decreasing population by 1%,
i.e. holding GDP constant, raises the value margin by 0.29%, on average.
In sum, for a given aggregate GDP there is a separate role for GDP per capita to
determine the level of aggregate multilateral imports. When we compare two countries
with equal GDP but differing population sizes and hence different GDP per capita, on
average, these countries differ in their imports. Hence, the patterns we find in the exem-
plary comparison of Switzerland and Columbia are systematic. Moreover, the size of the
effects is of economic importance. An increase of one standard deviation in log per capita
income is associated with an increase of a third of a standard deviation of the extensive
margin (in logs), half a standard deviation of the quality margin (in logs) and a quarter
of a standard deviation of the value margin (in logs).
Robustness Checks
The above results are robust to a number of variations. (i) Qualitatively, the results are
unchanged when we use the unnormalized or straightforward version of import margins
defined in section 3.3.2, see panel (b) and (c) of Table A.5. (ii) Table A.6 shows that the set
of controls is not crucial for the marginal effects presented above. (iii) Baseline results are
for 2007. There is nothing special about this year as the coefficients are both qualitatively
and also quantitatively similar for all years between 1995 and 2007, see Table A.7. In
each and every year there is a positive and highly significant effect of GDP per capita
on the variety and quality margin, for a given aggregate GDP. For the quantity margin,
the coefficient on GDP per capita is positive in all years, however, it is insignificant in
most years. (iv) Our findings are qualitatively unchanged if we pool all cross sections and
additionally include year fixed effects, see Table A.8. The only difference is that the effect
of GDP per capita on the quantity margin is significantly larger than zero. However,
we do not stress this result as it is not robust when using alternative measures for the
margins.
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3.4.2 Per Capita Income and Disaggregate Multilateral Imports
In the analysis above we look at aggregate multilateral import flows, e.g. Switzerland’s
total imports. As trade flows may differ across the analyzed categories, in what follows,
disaggregate multilateral import flows, e.g. Switzerland’s car imports from the rest of the
world, are considered. At the 6-digit level each importer can have up to 1’263 observations.
With disaggregated trade flows, we can control for product category specific effects. This
takes care of any compositional effects which are potentially present when looking at
aggregate imports. We use a cross section of the data to show that per capita income also
plays an important role for the determination of disaggregate multilateral imports.
1ci = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rciχ+ Ai + ci (3.2)
ln(Yci) = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rciχ+ Ai + ci (3.3)
Equation (3.2) specifies a linear probability model for the extensive margin at the disag-
gregate level, 1ci, and (3.3) is a linear model at the disaggregate level, analog to (3.1),
where Y ∈ {UV,X, V }. Both equations are estimated with OLS. β2 is again the coeffi-
cient of interest, the marginal effect of GDP per capita on the quality and the quantity
margin, respectively, as well as on the probability of importing a category, conditional
on GDP. Remoteness rci measures how far away an importer is, on average, from the
supply of a product.14 For example Switzerland, which is geographically close to large
car exporters in Europe, is less remote for cars than Columbia, which is somewhat close
to North America but far away from Europe. Product category fixed effects, Ai, capture
everything which is specific for a category, e.g. the average unit value of products (cars
versus cashew nuts). Thus, the marginal effect β2 is a within category effect and it is
conditional on importer region, trade costs and remoteness. Standard errors are clustered
by importers to account for the fact that the explanatory variable is observed at a higher
level of aggregation than the dependent variable (see Moulton (1986)).15
Table A.9, panel (a), presents our findings on disaggregate imports of consumer goods
in 2007. The first column reports the results for the linear probability model. Both, GDP
per capita and population have a significant positive effect on the probability of importing
a product. βˆ2, which tests for the difference of the effects, implies that the effect of GDP
per capita is significantly larger. Conditional on aggregate GDP, an increase in GDP per
capita by 10% approximately increases the probability that a country imports a given
14rci =
(∑
n∈N 1(vni > 0)
)−1∑
n∈N−c distancenc · (vni/vi). I.e. country c is remote regarding category
i if it is far away from countries exporting a lot in product i.
15 Bias from few clusters is no risk as we have 123 clusters in all specifications. Moreover, standard
errors clustered by importers and categories are only slightly larger and do not alter statistical significance
(1%, 5%, 10%).
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product category by 0.5 percentage points. This effect might seem small, yet an increase
of one standard deviation in log GDP per capita is associated with a 6 percentage point
increase in the probability of importing a category. The observation that some product
categories are imported by more countries than other is accounted for by product fixed
effects. They capture for example that, on average, a country has a low probability of
importing mouth organs (HS 920420, imported by 16 countries) and a high probability of
importing cars (HS 870324, imported by 123 countries).
In the second column it is documented that countries with a higher GDP per capita
have significantly higher import unit values, within product categories. The elasticity is
0.09%. We interpret this as evidence that richer countries import goods of higher quality.
Also, at the disaggregate level, import prices are unrelated to population. As unit values
are not defined for zero trade flows the sample size is reduced. We show in the robustness
section that results are similar if we account for selection.
In contrast to our results from aggregate flows, we find that the quantity margin at
the disaggregate level depends on how aggregate income is divided into per capita income
and population. According to column three the elasticity with respect to GDP per capita
is 0.33. We conjecture that the differential results for the quantity margin for aggregate
versus disaggregate flows is because rich countries import in many categories with low
average quantities. Hence, when aggregating over categories, the positive relationship of
the quantity margin and importer per capita income is offset by the negative association
between the composition of product categories and per capita income. Thus, even though
rich countries import more within products, the composition of categories levels the effect
for aggregate imports.
As Vci = UV ci · Xci and because all variables are in logs the coefficients for the unit
value and the quantity margin add up to the coefficient for import values. We estimate
an elasticity of GDP per capita on the value margin of imports of 0.41, conditional on
GDP.
To sum up, conditional on GDP, countries with a higher GDP per capita have not
only a larger probability to import a product, but also import goods of higher quality and
in higher quantities. This confirms our findings on aggregate imports, suggesting that
richer countries import a broader set of goods and source goods of higher quality. While
richer countries import higher quantities within products this association disappears at the
aggregate level as rich countries import in many categories with typically low quantities.
Robustness Checks
The following variations do not alter our findings for disaggregate multilateral import
margins. (i) Qualitatively the results are unchanged when we use the straightforward
definitions of import margins defined in section 3.3.1, see panel (b) of Table A.9. (ii) One
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may worry that the above relations are driven by nonOECD countries as there is not as
much variation in GDP per capita within the OECD. However, the positive association
between per capita income and all three margins of imports is present for both groups
of countries, see Table A.10. The effect on the probability of importing a category is
smaller for OECD countries, presumably because the latter import almost all categories.
In contrast, the relationship between unit values and per capita income is stronger within
the OECD. Population is negatively related to unit values when restricting the sample to
the OECD. Under economies of scale prices decrease in the number of consumers. This
mechanism may be stronger in the OECD as a larger fraction of the population buys
many of the imported categories. Hence, population size approximates the number of
consumers arguably better in OECD than nonOECD countries. For the quantity margin
the effect of GDP per capita is somewhat larger for OECD countries.16 (iii) In Tables A.11
and A.12 it is shown that the results hold for differentiated as well as non-differentiated
goods, for durable as well as non-durable goods and for all industries (SITC 1-digit codes).
For non-differentiated goods, the positive effect on the unit value margin should not be
attributed entirely to higher markups as for example HS6 code 020322 includes hams.
Hence, categories classified as non-differentiated also include products featuring a quality
dimension. Goods are classified according to Rauch (1999). In industries with few ob-
servations some effects are, unsurprisingly, insignificant. (iv) Table A.13 shows first that
the set of controls is not crucial for the marginal effects presented above and second that
the results are robust to additional controls for source country regions. xnci is a set of
dummy variables indicating whether country c does import product i from region 1, 2,
. . . , 7. (v) In Table A.14 we present the results for each third year between 1995 and
2007. The coefficients are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar for all years. In
each and every year there is a positive and highly significant effect of GDP per capita
on the probability of importing a product as well as on the quality, the quantity and the
value margin. (vi) Our findings are unchanged if we pool all cross sections and include
year fixed effects, see Table A.15. (vii) In Table A.16 we show that the results at the HS
6-digit level are qualitatively the same as findings at the HS 4-digit, 2-digit and 1-digit
level.17 (viii) 21% of multilateral HS 6-digit import flows are zero. Above we neglect this
information as the log of zero is not defined. In order to control for a potential selection
bias of positive trade flows, we apply a simplified version of the semi-parametric analog
of Heckman’s two-step estimator which is proposed in Cosslett (1991). This estimator
16We do not report separate results for OECD and nonOECD countries for aggregate multilateral
import margins as the sample for OECD countries is very small.
17Note that there are only four hierarchical levels for the Harmonized System. The 1-digit level corre-
sponds to sections, the 2-digit level represents chapters, 4-digit codes identify headings and 6-digit codes
represent sub-headings.
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specifies the selection correction function very flexibly and does not require any distribu-
tional assumption about the error terms, see Appendix 3.A.1 for details. Qualitatively
the results are unchanged if we control for selection with a step function representing
the probability of positive imports, see Table A.17. These point estimates are very close
to baseline OLS estimates. We suppose that this is because we do not find systematic
selection patterns.18 This suggests that the controls in (3.3) capture most of the potential
selection effects. In Table A.17 we use 10 bins. The results are similar for 100 bins,
although less precise. (ix) The extensive margin is a binary variable, 1ci ∈ {0, 1}. In
equation (3.2) we model it as a linear function of independent variables. In Table A.18
we report that the marginal effects at mean from a probit, logit and linear probability
model are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively quite close.
3.4.3 Per Capita Income and Bilateral Imports
In this section, we document that results for bilateral imports are qualitatively the same
as for multilateral imports. This is reassuring and suggests that our above results on
multilateral imports are not driven by characteristics of source countries. We first discuss
bilateral imports at the aggregate level and then at the disaggregate level.
Aggregate Bilateral Imports
By studying aggregate bi lateral imports, e.g. Switzerland’s total imports from Japan,
we can control for exporter specific effects to demonstrate that our results for aggregate
multilateral imports are not driven by the composition of source countries, and their
characteristics.
ln(Ync) = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rcχ+ τ
′
ncκ+ An + nc, (3.4)
where Y ∈ {EM,UV,X, V }. We are again interested in β2, the marginal effect of im-
porter GDP per capita on bilateral import margins, conditional on GDP. τnc approximates
bilateral trade costs. It includes geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement,
currency union, common border, common legal system, common language and colonial
ties. Therefore, τc only contains dummies which indicate whether an importer is an island,
landlocked and a member of the WTO. Exporter fixed effects An control for everything
which is specific to an exporter, e.g. GDP or production possibilities. Standard errors
are clustered by importers.
18The coefficients on the indicator variables, the λˆj ’s, shed light on the selection pattern. There is no
correlation between λˆj and j, where j ∈ {1, ..., J}. Hence, trade flows with low and high probability of
positive imports (i.e. low and high j) do not have systematically different import margins.
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Panel (a) of Table A.19 reports the results for normalized aggregate bilateral import
margins in 2007. We find a positive and highly significant effect of GDP per capita on the
extensive, the quality and the value margin and a positive, yet insignificant relationship
with the quantity margin. For a given aggregate GDP, an increase in importer GDP per
capita of 1% is associated with a 0.2% higher extensive margin, a 0.1% higher quality
margin and a 0.3% higher value margin of aggregate bilateral imports. Qualitatively
the results for aggregate bi lateral imports are fully in line with the results for aggregate
multi lateral imports. While the elasticity for the extensive margin is higher for bilateral
imports, the magnitude for the quality margin is quite similar.
Robustness Checks
The results for bilateral aggregate import margins are robust to a number of variations. In
order to save space we do not report all robustness checks we document for multilateral
imports. (i) Qualitatively the findings are unchanged when we use the unnormalized
import margins defined in section 3.3.2, see panel (b) of Table A.19. (ii) The results
are qualitatively the same if we restrict the sample to nonOECD importers, even the
magnitudes are close. For OECD countries, we find a positive effect of GDP per capita
on all three margins of bilateral imports. The effect on unit values is however only weakly
significant (17% level). In contrast to the whole sample, we find a significant and large
effect on the quantity margin for OECD countries. See Table A.20 for details. (iii)
Results are similar for all years, both qualitatively and quantitatively, see Table A.21.
(iv) 36% of aggregate bilateral trade flows are zero. Table A.22 reports that our findings
are qualitatively unchanged if we take into account this information by applying the
simplified version of Cosslett (1991). Trade flows with a high probability of being positive
have a systematically higher extensive margin than trade relations with a low probability
of positive imports.19 This suggests that controls in (3.4) do not capture all selection
effects for the extensive margin and that the OLS estimate is biased upwards. As there is
no clear selection pattern for the unit value and quantity margin, the point estimates are
very close to baseline OLS coefficients. Note that the probability to import from a given
exporter also increases in importer GDP per capita.
Disaggregate Bilateral Imports
Finally, we go to the most detailed level and analyze disaggregate bi lateral import mar-
gins, e.g. Switzerland’s car imports from Japan. This allows us to include product and
exporter fixed effects.
19λˆj is increasing in j for the extensive margin.
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1nci = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + τ
′
ncκ+ An + Ai + nci (3.5)
ln(Ynci) = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + τ
′
ncκ+ An + Ai + nci (3.6)
Equation (3.5) specifies a linear probability model for the extensive margin at the dis-
aggregate level and (3.6) is a linear model for bilateral imports analog to (3.3), where
Y ∈ {UV,X, V }. Both equations are estimated with OLS. β2 is again the coefficient of
interest. Controls xc, τc and τnc are the same as in (3.4). An and Ai are exporter and
product fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by importers.
The first column of Table A.23 presents the results on the extensive margin. On
average, if a country’s GDP per capita increases by 10% this is associated with an increase
in the probability of importing a given product category from a given exporter by 0.01
percentage points. This effect seems small, however, an increase of one standard deviation
of log GDP per capita is related to an increase in the probability of importing a product
by 1.4 percentage points. Columns two to four document that the elasticity of GDP per
capita on both, the unit value and quantity margin of imports is 0.1, and hence on the
import value 0.2. However, these estimates are only based on information of non-zero
trade flows. The enormous share of 93% of all bilateral HS6-digit trade flows is zero, this
poses a potential selection problem. We apply the simplified version of Cosslett (1991),
described in Appendix 3.A.1, to account for this. Qualitatively the results are unchanged
if we control for selection with a step function representing the probability of positive
imports, see columns five to seven of Table A.23. For the unit value even the point
estimate hardly changes. As there is no systematic relationship between the probability
of importing and the unit value of imports, this suggests that controls in (3.6) capture
a lot of potential selection effects for unit values and that therefore the bias of the OLS
estimate is small.20 However, the elasticity for the quantity margin with respect to GDP
per capita almost doubles. Presumably, this is because trade flows with a low probability
of positive imports have systematically a larger quantity margin than trade flows with a
high probability of positive imports.21 This suggests that controls in equation (3.6) do not
capture all selection effects for import quantities and that the OLS estimate is downward
biased. In Table A.23 we report results with 10 bins. Using 100 bins does not alter our
findings qualitatively, and not even much quantitatively.
In sum, for a given GDP, we find a positive association between GDP per capita and
all three margins of disaggregate bilateral imports. These results are fully in line with our
20The λˆj ’s are unrelated to j. Hence, trade flows with low and high probability of positive imports
(i.e. low and high j) do not have systematically differing unit values UVnci.
21There is a strong negative correlation between λˆj and j for the quantity margin.
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findings for disaggregate multi lateral imports, suggesting that the latter are not driven
by characteristics of source countries.
Robustness Checks
The following variations do not change the above results for disaggregate bilateral import
margins. (i) The findings hold for both OECD as well as nonOECD importers, see Table
A.24. The only exception is that the coefficient on GDP per capita is insignificant for
the unit value margin of OECD importers. (ii) In Table A.25 we present the results for
each third year between 1995 and 2007. The estimated coefficients are both qualitatively
and also quantitatively similar for all years. (iii) Finally, we additionally include exporter-
product fixed effects to show that our results are robust to controlling for category specific
production possibilities of exporters.22 This should absorb a lot of the variation in unit
values due to differences in production costs and hence makes the unit value a closer
approximation of quality. The resulting estimates are very close to the baseline, see Table
A.26.
3.4.4 Summary of Results
The general message of our empirical section is that how aggregate income is divided
into per capita income and population matters for imports on all levels of disaggregation.
Hence, when we compare two countries with equal GDP but differing population sizes, and
hence different GDP per capita, on average, these two countries have different patterns of
imports. We find a robust positive and highly significant relationship between importer
GDP per capita and both, the extensive and the quality margin of imports at all levels of
disaggregation, conditional on GDP. At the aggregate level, the extensive margin measures
how diversified a country’s imports are. We estimate an elasticity with respect to GDP per
capita between 0.1 and 0.17. At the disaggregate level, the extensive margin represents
the probability that a product is imported. The corresponding estimate is no longer an
elasticity but reflects that an increase of one standard deviation of GDP per capita (in
logs) is associated with a 1.4 to 6.2 percentage point increase in the probability to import a
product. The elasticity of GDP per capita on the unit value margin of imports is between
0.07 and 0.09 on all levels of disaggregation. Although the concept of measurement is
similar on all levels of disaggregation this is surprisingly close.23 For the quantity margin,
22As the dimensionality of the fixed effects is too high to include dummies in the regressions we apply
the Stata program gpreg developed by Johannes F. Schmieder which is based on the algorithm developed
by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010).
23At the aggregate level unit values are normalized within products and then averaged over products
and source countries, see section 3.3.2. This normalization is somewhat related to using the level of the
unit value (disaggregate level) and conditioning on product fixed effects as the latter partial out the mean
unit value within a category.
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the elasticity with respect to GDP per capita is between 0.21 and 0.33 at the disaggregate
level. Estimates at the aggregate level are imprecise and not robust across different
types of measurement. Hence, there is a discrepancy of the relation between per capita
income and the quantity margin of imports at the aggregate and disaggregate level. We
conjecture that this is because rich countries import in many categories with typically
low quantities. When aggregating over products the positive relationship of the quantity
margin and importer per capita income is offset by the negative association between the
composition of product categories and per capita income.
The finding that richer countries import a more diverse bundle of goods and goods of
higher qualities is not in line with predictions of standard trade models with homothetic
preferences (see Appendix 3.A.4). In the next section, we sketch a simple theory in which
an individual’s demand for variety and quality depends on the income level due to non-
homothetic preferences. In a trade equilibrium richer countries have a higher extensive
and a higher quality margin of imports than poorer countries. Our theory illustrates that
non-homothetic preferences offer an explanation for why richer countries have a higher
variety and quality margin of imports. The model does not incorporate a quantity margin
in order to keep it as simple as possible and because the empirical results on the quantity
margin depend on the level of disaggregation. However, Appendices 3.A.5 and 3.A.6
introduce a quantity choice at the individual level.
3.5 A Simple Model of Quality and Variety Trade
In this section we study a simple extension of Krugman’s (1980) trade model and compare
the predictions of a country’s import margins to the ones of the original model. The
present framework is based on a static closed economy model developed in Wuergler
(2010) and related to the trade equilibrium derived in Foellmi et al. (2010).
3.5.1 Environment
An economy is populated by a continuum of L individuals. Each individual is homoge-
neously endowed with A units of labor. Labor is immobile across countries and supplied
inelastically so that an economy’s fixed labor supply amounts to LA. Individuals choose
consumption from a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by j ∈ [0, N ]. In contrast
to the framework of Krugman (1980), which is based on homothetic preferences (CES),
we assume that these goods are indivisible. Only the first unit of each variety yields utility
while no additional utility is derived from consuming further units. Moreover, utility is
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increasing in the quality level of goods, q(j).24
Consumer good varieties are produced with labor. Firms need to invest a fixed amount
of labor φ > 0 in order set up production of a variety. The manufacturing of each unit
requires an additional amount of ψ (q (j)) /N units of labor which is increasing in the
quality levels produced, q (j) ≥ 0. The cost function ψ (·) is assumed to be twice con-
tinuously differentiable, strictly positive and unbounded, strictly increasing, strictly and
sufficiently convex in the quality level q (j) such that q · ψ′ (q) /ψ (q) is strictly increasing
and ψ′ (q) > ψ (q) /q for sufficiently large q.25 Firms can manufacture different quality
levels simultaneously without incurring additional fixed setup costs. Note that there are
positive effects from (global) variety on productivity in manufacturing. Without such
spillovers, an increase in population would reduce qualities, as a larger market increases
variety and production of indivisible goods of each variety.
3.5.2 Autarky Equilibrium
An individual i chooses varieties {di(j)} and qualities {qi(j)} to maximize utility subject
to its budget constraint
Ui =
∫ N
j=0
di(j)qi(j)dj s.t. Aiw =
∫ N
j=0
di(j)p(j, qi)dj,
where di(j) is an indicator function with di(j) = 1 if good j is consumed, and di(j) = 0
if not, w is the wage rate and p(j, qi) is the price of variety j in quality qi(j). The first
order condition for consumption of good j is
{di(j), qi(j)} =
{
{1, qi(j)} if µiqi(j)− p(j, qi) ≥ max [0, µiq−i(j)− p(j, q−i)] ,
{0, ·} otherwise,
where µi is the inverse of the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. The Lagrange
multiplier, µ−1i , represents the marginal utility of income and µi determines an individual’s
willingness to pay per unit of quality. In equilibrium richer individuals have a lower
marginal utility of income and hence a higher willingness to pay. The willingness to pay
for one unit of variety j in quality qi(j), µiqi(j), minus the price, p(j, qi), is equal to the
consumer surplus. The first order condition simply states that an individual consumes
one unit of variety j in quality qi(j) if the consumption surplus is nonnegative (rationality
24Appendix 3.A.4 presents an extension of Krugman’s model with CES preferences and endogenous
quality showing that quality is fixed in equilibrium, does not depend on per capita labor endowment and
population, and consequently can be ignored.
25Functional forms which satisfy these conditions include ϕ (q) = ϕ + q1+δ, ϕ (q) = ϕ exp (δq) and
ϕ (q) = [ϕ/ (qsup − q)]δ for parameters ϕ, δ, qsup > 0 (see Wuergler (2010)).
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constraint) and greater than the one of all other quality levels offered of the same variety,
q−i(j), (incentive compatibility constraint). If no quality level is sufficiently attractive the
individual does not consume variety j.
The utility function has two important properties. First, only the first unit of a
variety yields positive utility. This implies that individuals can choose the variety of their
consumption bundle (extensive margin) but not the quantities. This may seem restrictive
at first glance, however the 0-1 choice is a counterpart of standard CES preferences. Under
the latter individuals choose the quantities of their consumption bundle. But essentially
they do not have a choice about the variety as the marginal utility is infinitely high as a
quantity approaches zero, hence all varieties are consumed, whatever the prices.26 Second,
quality and quantity of a good are imperfect substitutes. With perfect substitutability
between quality and quantity an individual is indifferent between one Ferrari and ten
Volvos, as only the product of quantity and quality enters utility (see e.g. Lancaster
(1966)).
A firm chooses its quality levels and prices in order to maximize profits. Since all
individuals in the economy are identical (Ai = A), it supplies one quality level (qi(j) =
q(j)). This eliminates the incentive compatibility constraint, hence a firm only faces the
rationality constraints of individuals. As a firm can increase the price until µq(j) without
losing demand it will set the price equal to the willingness to pay, p(j, q) = µq(j). Profits
are given by
pi (j) = L [µq(j)− ψ (q (j))]− φN,
if we choose labor as numéraire and set the wage rate equal to variety, w = N . The
quality level which maximizes profits is determined by the first order condition
µ = ψ′ (q) ,
which is unique given strict convexity of costs, and identical across firms. The optimal
quality level is such that the marginal revenue and cost from increasing the quality level
are equalized. Intuitively the quality level supplied by firms is increasing in the willingness
to pay per unit of quality and hence increasing in income.
Free entry leads to zero profits in equilibrium,
L [ψ′ (q) q − ψ (q)] = φN.
26Let us abstract from the quality choice for a moment and rewrite the first order condition as: di(j) = 0
if ∂Ui/∂di(j)− 1/µi · p(j) < 0. This representation shows that individuals can choose consumption along
the extensive margin as long as marginal utility is finite as the quantity of a variety approaches zero.
With bounded marginal utility the above condition may be fulfilled for some varieties and individuals,
hence there may be a nontrivial extensive margin of consumption.
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Finally, labor markets clear in equilibrium if aggregate labor demand in manufacturing
and setting up varieties equals aggregate supply of labor,
Lψ (q) +Nφ = AL.
These last two equations determine the variety and quality level in the economy. Since
the cost function ψ (q) is assumed to be sufficiently convex, a unique solution with N > 0
(and q > 0) exists. As individuals are identical, every individual consumes the entire
continuum of varieties in the same quality. An increase in the population size L raises
variety N proportionally while leaving quality levels unaffected.27 An increase in per
capita labor endowment A, on the other hand, raises variety as well as quality.28 In
other words, the quality level, which is the same for all varieties, is increasing in A and
independent of L and the variety of goods is increasing in both A and L. While variety
increases proportionately in L it raises disproportionately (more than one to one) in
A.29 Thus, if we compare two closed economies which only differ in A and L, however
have the same aggregate labor endowment AL, the economy with higher per capita labor
endowment A and lower population L produces and consumes more varieties N and all
these varieties are of higher quality q.
Appendix 3.A.5 shows that when households have quadratic preferences regarding
quantities, and hence also choose along the quantity margin, predictions for relative va-
rieties and qualities when comparing two closed economies with equal aggregate labor
supply but differing populations do not change.
3.5.3 Trade Equilibrium
Consider now two such economies, R and P , trading consumer goods with each other.
They only differ in population size, LR and LP , and per capita labor endowment, AR and
AP , all other parameters are identical across the two countries. Suppose that per capita
labor endowment is higher in R, AR > AP . Therefore R denotes the rich country and
P the poor country. Note that there is only between country income inequality, within
countries individuals are homogeneous. For simplicity, we assume that there are no trade
27Divide both equations by L to see that the ratio of N to L does not depend on L. Combine the two
equations to see that the quality level is independent of L and increases in A, ψ′(q)q = A.
28The free entry condition combined with the assumption of q · ψ′ (q) /ψ (q) being strictly increasing
implies that q and N are positively related (for a given L). If N and q did not (jointly) rise with A, the
labor market clearing condition would be violated.
29To see that the ratio of N to A is increasing in A rewrite the labor market clearing condition to
N
A
=
L
φ
(
1− ψ(q)
A
)
. The right hand side is increasing in A as
ψ(q)
A
=
(
ψ′(q)q
ψ(q)
)−1
is decreasing in A
and smaller than 1 (for sufficiently large q).
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costs and firms cannot price discriminate due to the threat of parallel imports. Hence,
wages are the same across countries, wR = wP = N ≡ NR +NP .
A firm faces two types of customers and may choose to produce two different qual-
ity levels, qR(j) and qP (j), one for the rich and one for the poor country. The profit
maximization problem for such a firm is
max
qR(j),qP (j),pR(j),pP (j)
LR [pR(j)− ψ (qR(j))] + LP [pP (j)− ψ (qP (j))]− φN,
subject to the constraints given by the first order conditions of individuals
µRqR(j)−pR(j) ≥ max [0, µRqP (j)− pP (j)] , µP qP (j)−pP (j) ≥ max [0, µP qR(j)− pR(j)] .
Price setting is constrained by the willingness to pay of the two types of individuals
(rationality constraints), and by incentive compatibility requiring that each type prefers
the assigned quality level since firms cannot price discriminate. Given that individuals
in the rich country have a higher labor endowment, their income and willingness to pay
for quality is higher in equilibrium, µR > µP . It may be optimal for a firm to offer its
good in a higher quality level in the rich country, qR > qP . However, the firm cannot
fully skim the willingness to pay of rich individuals in this case as they would prefer the
lower quality which would leave them a strictly positive consumer surplus given their
higher willingness to pay. The firm can charge at most qPµP +(qR − qP )µR for the higher
quality while setting the price of the lower quality equal to the willingness to pay in the
poor country, qPµP .30 The intuition for optimal prices of firms selling to both countries
is as follows. Quality levels until qP are demanded by both types of customers. As a firm
cannot price discriminate it can only charge the lower willingness to pay per unit of quality
(qPµP ). Quality levels from qP until qR are only demanded by rich individuals. Therefore
the firm can charge the full willingness to pay of rich individuals for these quality levels
((qR − qP )µR). Hence, rich individuals have an ’information rent’ (µR − µP ) per unit of
quality for quality levels up to qP .31
Substituting optimal prices pR(j) and pP (j) simplifies profit maximization to
max
qR(j),qP (j)
LR [qP (j)µP + (qR (j)− qP (j))µR − ψ (qR(j))]+LP [qP (j)µP − ψ (qP (j))]−φN,
30It is a well known result from the monopolistic screening literature, see for example 3.5.1.1 in Tirole
(1988), that the incentive compatibility constraint of the rich and the rationality constraint of the poor
will be binding and that the rationality constraint of the rich and incentive compatibility constraint of
the poor will not be binding. See Appendix A in Wuergler (2010) for more details.
31pR(j) = qR(j)µR − qP (j)(µR − µP ) < qR(j)µR
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with first order conditions
µR = ψ
′ (qR) and µP − (µR − µP )LR/LP = ψ′ (qP ) . (3.7)
While the quality level for individuals in the poor country is set below the level that would
prevail in a closed economy, µP > ψ′ (qP ), there is no distortion at the top. Firms can
increase prices for the higher quality in the rich country by lowering the quality sold in
the poor country.32 The firm may be even better off exclusively selling the higher quality
version, not selling in the poor country, and charging the full willingness to pay in the rich
country qRµR. The revenue gain by charging higher prices for the higher quality version
may more than offset the profits lost in the poor country.33 A firm never exclusively sells
in the poor country given the higher willingness to pay in the rich country.
Although firms can differentiate the quality level of their products continuously, a
positive measure of firms exclusively sells to the rich country in any trade equilibrium
given AR > AP , while the other firms sell both to rich and poor individuals. If all firms
sold in both countries, rich individuals would not exhaust their budgets since no firm
would charge their full willingness to pay. Individuals in the rich country would have no
binding first order condition leading to an infinite willingness to pay which firms would
optimally exploit by exclusively targeting rich individuals.
Given perfect symmetry across varieties, the location of firms exclusively selling to
rich individuals is not determined in the absence of trade costs. We will focus on an
equilibrium where these firms are located in the rich country. Such an equilibrium is
intuitive and would occur if we introduced slight asymmetries such as a home market bias
of firms (firms preferring strategies involving the home market in the case of equal profits)
or small fixed export market entry costs.
Free entry leads to zero profits for firms selling to both countries as well as for firms
exclusively selling to the rich country, respectively,
LR [qPµP + (qR − qP )µR − ψ (qR)] + LP [qPµP − ψ (qP )] = φN,
LR [µRqR − ψ (qR)] = φN.
(3.8)
32Increasing the quality level by a small unit, starting at qP , has the familiar implications of µPLP
more revenue and ψ′(qP )LP more costs. However, by increasing qP by a small unit the firm needs to give
the information rent (µR − µP ) for one more unit of quality to LR individuals.
33A firm selling exclusively to rich individuals chooses its quality level such that µR = ψ′(qR), as in
autarky.
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Labor markets in the poor and rich country clear if
n [LRψ (qR) + LPψ (qP ) +Nφ] = LPAP ,
(1− n) [LRψ (qR) +mLPψ (qP ) +Nφ] = LRAR,
(3.9)
where n ≡ NP/N , and thus (1− n) = NR/N , and m is the fraction of goods produced
in the rich country which is purchased by poor individuals. All firms sell their products
in their market of location. And all firms in the poor country export to the rich country
while only a subset of the firms in the rich country export to the poor country. Payments
are balanced if the value of R’s imports is equal to the value of P ’s imports.
n [qPµP + (qR − qP )µR]LR = m (1− n) qPµPLP (3.10)
We can again decompose imports into an extensive, unit value and quantity margin.
The extensive margin is the number of varieties a country imports, EMR = NP and
EMP = mNR. By symmetry of firms the rich country imports all products at price
UVR = pR and the poor country at price UVP = pP . In this model import prices depend on
quality and the willingness to pay. As we fix individual quantities ( 0-1 choice) the quantity
margin of imports is solely determined by population size, XR = LR and XP = LP .
The equilibrium is determined by equations (3.7)-(3.10). Rich individuals consume
all varieties available in the global economy. Individuals in the poor country consume
only a fraction of the varieties, n+m(1− n) < 1, and purchase these products in a lower
quality than individuals in the rich country given ψ′ (qR) = µR > µP−(µR − µP )LR/LP =
ψ′ (qP ) and convexity of costs. Let us characterize trade in such an equilibrium generating
empirical predictions, and compare them to the ones of Krugman (1980).
3.5.4 Per Capita Income and Imports
Consider first the case of two countries with the same per capita labor endowment (GDP
per capita), AR = AP , and R having a larger population, LR > LP . As all individuals
earn the same income, the willingness to pay is identical across countries, µR = µP .
Hence, all individuals consume all available varieties, m = 1, in the same level of quality
qR = qP . The fraction of varieties produced in R is equal to the fraction of the world
population living in R, 1− n = LR/ (LR + LP ), as can be derived from the labor market
clearing conditions (3.9) or the trade balance condition (3.10). The extensive margin of
imports in P is larger than the one in R, (1− n) > n, since more varieties are produced
in the country with the larger population. The quantity margin of imports consequently
is smaller in P , LP < LR. Prices and quality of imports are identical. If per capita labor
endowment is the same across countries, the predicted trade patterns are qualitatively
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identical to the ones in the Krugman (1980) framework. The country with the larger
population needs to import less varieties but in higher quantities.
If population size is identical across countries, LR = LP , but the rich country has
a higher per capita labor endowment, AR > AP , the results deviate from the Krugman
framework. The willingness to pay and quality purchased in the rich country is higher
than in the poor country in equilibrium, µR > µP and qR > qP . If they were identical,
firms would have an incentive to undercut each other infinitesimally, competing for the
individuals in the poor country who can only afford a subset of all varieties. Therefore,
AR > AP implies µR > µP , qR > qP and m < 1. Poor individuals only purchase a subset
of varieties produced in the rich country. The labor market clearing conditions (3.9) imply
that the rich country produces a larger set of varieties, (1− n) > n, and the trade balance
condition (3.10) that the poor country imports a larger set of varieties, m (1− n) > n,
despite only purchasing a subset. In line with Krugman, the country with the higher GDP
per capita imports a smaller set of varieties as more varieties are produced domestically
if population sizes are identical. In contrast to Krugman, however, the prices of imports
are higher in the country with a higher GDP per capita as the quality margin of imports
is higher.
Finally, consider the most interesting and illustrative case of two countries having the
same aggregate labor supply, LRAR = LPAP . If per capita labor endowment is the same
across countries, AR = AP , the two countries are identical, n = (1− n) and m = 1. All
individuals have the same willingness to pay µR = µP and consume all available varieties
N in the same level of quality qR = qP . Both countries import the full set of varieties
produced in the other country in the same quality. If per capita labor endowment is higher
in the rich country instead, AR > AP , trade patterns change. Given that LR < LP , the
balance of payments condition (3.10) no longer holds for n = (1− n), m = 1 and qR = qP .
Poor individuals cannot afford to purchase all goods from the rich country, m < 1. Some
firms produce exclusively for the rich country which implies µR > µP in equilibrium. As
a result, the quality purchased in the rich country is higher than in the poor country,
qR > qP . The labor market clearing conditions (3.9) imply m (1− n) < n < 1 − n. The
poor country imports less varieties than the rich.
Despite of two countries having the same aggregate GDP, their margins of imports
differ if GDP per capita differ. The extensive margin of imports in the richer country is
higher while the intensive margin is lower. The intensive margin can be decomposed into
price and quantity. While prices of imports in the country with higher GDP per capita
are higher, (aggregate) quantities are lower. The higher prices of imports are driven by
the higher quality margin of imports in the richer country. As there is no quantity choice
at the individual level the quantity margin of imports is solely determined by population
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of a trade equilibrium with ARLR = APLP and AR > AP
N NP + mNR NP 
qP 
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pP = µPqP = UVP 
 
pR = µPqP + µR(qR-qP) = UVR 
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not traded traded 
EMR = NP EMP = mNR > 
 
Varieties j ∈ [0, NP ] (j ∈ (NP , NP + mNR]) are produced in P (R) by firms selling to both types
of customers and varieties j ∈ (NP + mNR, N ] are produced in R by firms exclusively selling to
rich individuals. NR > NP , mNR < NP . Rich individuals consume all varieties, poor individuals
purchase only a subset (NP +mNR < N). Rich individuals buy all varieties in quality qR at prices pR
and pexclR . Individuals in P purchase all varieties in quality qP at price pP . qR > qP , p
excl
R > pR > pP .
size and hence lower in the richer country. See Figure 3.1 for an overview of the results.
These predictions differ markedly from the one of Krugman where the various margins of
imports would be the same across the two countries (see Appendix 3.A.4). If individuals
have homothetic preferences, only aggregate GDP matters for the extensive and intensive
margin. Furthermore, qualities and prices of imports do not depend on GDP per capita
if continuous qualities are introduced in the Krugman framework.
Let us briefly summarize the main theoretical results. In our model it matters for
the margins of imports how aggregate income is divided into per capita income and
population. If individuals buy only one unit of a variety or do not buy it at all, the quality
and variety demanded depends on their incomes. For two countries with equal GDP
and integrated goods markets the set of varieties imported is larger in the country with
higher per capita income, while the intensive margin is lower (given balanced payments).
The qualities and consequently prices of imports are higher in the richer country, while
quantities imported are lower. Hence, the extensive and quality (price) margin of imports
are increasing in per capita income for a given level of aggregate income. The analysis in
the previous section shows robust evidence for these two relationships.
In Appendix 3.A.6 we conjecture, without solving the model in detail, that the relative
margins of imports of two countries with equal aggregate labor supply but differing popu-
lation sizes are unchanged if households have quadratic preferences regarding quantities,
and hence also choose along the quantity margin.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we analyze how the division of aggregate income into per capita income and
population affects the margins of imports. In prominent trade theories with homothetic
preferences imports only depend on aggregate income. How the latter is divided into per
capita income and population does not play a role.
The general message of our empirical section is that besides aggregate income there
is a separate role for per capita income to determine imports. Hence, when we compare
two countries with equal GDP but differing population sizes, and hence diverse GDP
per capita, on average, these two countries have different patterns of imports. We find
a robust positive relationship between importer GDP per capita and both, the extensive
and the quality margin of imports, conditional on GDP. We document this association for
aggregate as well as disaggregate trade flows, hence also when exploiting within product
variation. Moreover, we analyze bilateral trade flows and control for exporter specific
effects to show that our results on multilateral imports are not driven by the composition of
source countries and their characteristics. The quantity margin is increasing in per capita
income at the disaggregate level. However, as rich countries import in many categories
with typically low quantities, the positive association between the quantity margin and
the per capita income disappears at the aggregate level.
To show a potential mechanism through which the empirical regularity of richer coun-
tries having higher extensive and quality margins of imports may arise, we sketch a model
featuring non-homothetic preferences. We extend Krugman’s (1980) variety model with
vertical quality differentiation and non-homothetic consumer behavior. Individuals con-
sume either zero or one unit of each product variety, choosing a quality level if consuming
the variety. We show that, despite firms’ ability to differentiate quality continuously,
poorer individuals not only consume lower quality levels, but also a narrower set of va-
rieties. As a result, poorer countries import a smaller set of varieties and lower quality
versions than richer countries, which is consistent with the data.
This chapter could be extended in several directions. First, various extensions of
the model (e.g. trade costs) would show whether our predictions on import margins are
robust. Moreover, a more detailed analysis of the quantity choice would be helpful for
the interpretation of our empirical results. Second, both the empirical and the theoretical
part could be extended to a North-South setting to analyze how the margins differ if two
rich countries, two poor countries or a rich and a poor country trade. Third, the analysis
could be extended to within country inequality. With disaggregate trade data, one can
analyze first and second moments of import margins.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Simplified Version of the Semi-Parametric Analog of Heck-
man’s Two-Step Estimator Proposed by Stephen Cosslett
The advantage of the estimation procedure proposed in Cosslett (1991) over Heckman’s
(1979) two-step estimator is the very flexible specification of the selection correction func-
tion and that there is no need to make any distributional assumptions about the error
terms. The binary response model, the first stage, is estimated with the nonparametric
maximum likelihood estimator which is derived in Cosslett (1983). The estimator Fˆ (·)
of the marginal cumulative density function of the selection error is a step function, it is
constant on a finite number J of intervals. In the second stage the selection correction
function is approximated by a piecewise constant function on those intervals. As the
second stage is linear it can be estimated with OLS. It is shown in Cosslett (1991) that
both the estimator of the first and second stage are consistent. We simplify the procedure
by specifying the first stage as a linear probability model. Equation (3.11) is the first
stage and is equivalent to (3.2). The resulting predicted probabilities w′ciθˆ are ranked
and assigned into J bins with equal number of observations. The bins are denoted with
Ij, where j = 1, . . . , J . They approximate the selection correction function with a step
function, hence nonparametrically and in a flexible way. Regression equation (3.12) is the
second stage and nests (3.3). It additionally controls for selection with a set of indicator
variables representing the J bins. In other words, compared to the baseline specification
the second stage additionally controls for the probability of a positive import flow by
allowing bin-specific intercepts. λˆj is an estimate for the intercept of bin j.
1ci = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rciχ+ Ai + ci
≡ w′ciθ + ci (3.11)
ln(Yci) = α + β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rciχ+ Ai
+
J∑
j=1
λj · 1(w′ciθˆ ∈ Ij) + uci, Y ∈ {UV,X, V } (3.12)
It is straightforward to adjust equations (3.11) and (3.12) to account for zeros.34 Note,
that although we do not use an exclusion restriction the identification of β2 does not stem
from a specific functional form of the selection function as the latter is nonparametric.
34 1(Vnc > 0) = β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rcχ+An + τ
′
ncκ+ nc ≡ w′ncθ + nc
ln(Ync) = β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ + rcχ+An + τ
′
ncκ+
∑J
j=1 λj · 1(w′ncθˆ ∈ Ij) + unc
1nci = β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ +An +Ai + τ
′
ncκ+ nci ≡ w′nciθ + nci
ln(Ynci) = β1ln(GDPc) + β2ln(GDPpcc) + x
′
cγ + τ
′
cδ +An +Ai + τ
′
ncκ+
∑J
j=1 λj · 1(w′nciθˆ ∈ Ij) + unci
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3.A.2 Figures
Figure A.1: GDP per capita and the three margins of aggregate multilateral imports (Yc)
(a) The extensive margin of imports (EMc)
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(b) The quality margin of imports (UVc)
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(c) The quantity margin of imports (Xc)
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3.A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Examples of product categories in the 6-digit Harmonized System classification
HS 6-digit code Name
080130 Cashew nuts, fresh or dried
200970 Apple juice not fermented or spirited
220300 Beer made from malt
220830 Whiskies
490191 Dictionaries and encyclopedias
660110 Garden and similar umbrellas
821191 Table knives
841821 Refrigerators, household compression type
842211 Dish washing machines (domestic)
851650 Microwave ovens
870321 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of < 1000 cc
870322 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1000-1500 cc
870323 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1500-3000 cc
870324 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of > 3000 cc
900410 Sunglasses
900640 Instant print cameras
950310 Electric trains, train sets, etc
Notes: The examples are taken from the 1992 version of the 6-digit
Harmonized System classification.
Table A.2: Regions
Name # countries GDP per capita
mean min max sd
North America, Australia, New Zealand 4 35137 25397 42682 7170
Europe & Central Asia 25 25640 4729 48391 11971
Middle East & North Africa 16 15084 1117 51343 14513
East Asia & Pacific 14 14353 2206 44599 15261
Latin America & Caribbean 22 9235 1581 25895 5638
South Asia 6 3082 753 6050 1839
Sub-Saharan Africa 36 2665 386 20008 3539
All countries 123 12532 386 51343 13329
GDP per capita is PPP converted, in I$, in 2005 constant prices
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Table A.3: List of countries
Name ISO3 Name ISO3 Name ISO3
Afghanistan AFG Ghana GHA Nigeria NGA
Albania ALB Greece GRC Norway NOR
Algeria DZA Guatemala GTM Oman OMN
Angola AGO Guinea GIN Pakistan PAK
Argentina ARG Guinea-Bissau GNB Panama PAN
Australia AUS Haiti HTI Papua N.Guinea PNG
Austria AUT Honduras HND Paraguay PRY
Bangladesh BGD Hong Kong HKG Peru PER
Belgium-Lux. BEL Hungary HUN Philippines PHL
Benin BEN India IND Poland POL
Bolivia BOL Indonesia IDN Portugal PRT
Brazil BRA Iran IRN Romania ROM
Bulgaria BGR Iraq IRQ Rwanda RWA
Burkina Faso BFA Ireland IRL Saudi Arabia SAU
Burundi BDI Israel ISR Senegal SEN
Cambodia KHM Italy ITA Sierra Leone SLE
Cameroon CMR Jamaica JAM Singapore SGP
Canada CAN Japan JPN Somalia SOM
Central Afr. Rep. CAF Jordan JOR South Africa ZAF
Chad TCD Kenya KEN Spain ESP
Chile CHL Korea Rp (South) KOR Sri Lanka LKA
China CHN Kuwait KWT Sudan SDN
Colombia COL Laos P.Dem.R LAO Sweden SWE
Congo COG Lebanon LBN Switzerland CHE
Costa Rica CRI Liberia LBR Syrn Arab Rp SYR
Cote D’Ivoire CIV Liby Arab Jm LBY Thailand THA
Cuba CUB Madagascar MDG Togo TGO
Denmark DNK Malawi MWI Trinidad-Tobago TTO
Dominican Rp DOM Malaysia MYS Tunisia TUN
Ecuador ECU Mali MLI Turkey TUR
Egypt EGY Mauritania MRT Uganda UGA
El Salvador SLV Mauritius MUS United Kingdom GBR
Ethiopia ETH Mexico MEX Untd Arab Em ARE
Finland FIN Mongolia MNG Untd Rp Tanzania TZA
Fm Czechoslovakia CZE Morocco MAR Uruguay URY
Fm Ussr SUN Mozambique MOZ USA USA
Fm Yugoslavia YUG Nepal NPL Venezuela VEN
France FRA Netherlands NLD Vietnam VNM
Gabon GAB New Zealand NZL Yemen YEM
Gambia GMB Nicaragua NIC Zambia ZMB
Germany GER Niger NER Zimbabwe ZWE
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics
Variable mean std. dev. min. max. N
Vc 0.009 0.025 0 0.222 123
EMc 0.632 0.217 0.196 0.953 123
UVc 0.961 0.178 0.529 1.511 123
Xc 0.009 0.023 0 0.208 123
ln(Vc) -6.459 1.885 -10.408 -1.506 123
ln(EMc) -0.528 0.393 -1.631 -0.048 123
ln(UVc) -0.057 0.191 -0.636 0.413 123
ln(Xc) -5.874 1.426 -8.904 -1.569 123
Vci 4631.781 63842.182 2 15299381 123367
1ci 0.794 0.404 0 1 155349
UVci 89.646 1139.732 0.065 88421 123367
Xci 1182.525 14178.331 0 2785029 123367
ln(Vci) 5.296 2.442 0.693 16.543 123367
ln(UVci) 2.217 1.585 -2.733 11.39 123367
ln(Xci) 3.079 2.952 -8.57 14.84 123367
Vnc 0.017 0.147 0 8.293 9585
EMnc 0.405 0.311 0 0.999 9585
UVnc 1.223 0.955 0.023 50.361 9585
Xnc 0.286 6.999 0 582.346 9585
ln(Vnc) -7.079 2.644 -16.047 2.115 9585
ln(EMnc) -1.604 1.711 -13.453 -0.001 9585
ln(UVnc) 0.079 0.47 -3.786 3.919 9585
ln(Xnc) -5.555 2.39 -13.799 6.367 9585
Vnci 2034.493 50590.282 2 30286088 1319315
1nci 0.07 0.254 0 1 18952578
UVnci 92.205 1335.748 0.045 140781 1319315
Xnci 425.392 7776.452 0 2785028 1319315
ln(Vnci) 4.064 2.281 0.693 17.226 1319315
ln(UVnci) 2.497 1.595 -3.096 11.855 1319315
ln(Xnci) 1.566 2.848 -8.727 14.84 1319315
GDP (in million) 552490 1616361 1232 13027462 123
GDP per capita 12532 13329 386 51343 123
ln(GDP (in million)) 11.547 1.843 7.117 16.383 123
ln(GDP per capita) 8.769 1.256 5.955 10.846 123
Note GDP data is PPP converted, real, in 2005 constant prices, and measured
in I$. All variables are reported for year 2007.
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Table A.5: Effect of GDP per capita on aggregate multilateral import margins Yc
(a) Normalized aggregate multilateral import margins (Yc)
ln(EMc) ln(UVc) ln(Xc) ln(Vc)
Mean -0.528 -0.057 -5.874 -6.459
Standard deviation 0.393 0.191 1.426 1.885
ln(GDPc) 0.085??? 0.017 0.452??? 0.555???
(0.024) (0.013) (0.064) (0.062)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.101??? 0.069??? 0.120 0.289??
(0.026) (0.021) (0.112) (0.114)
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.819 0.605 0.857 0.911
(b) Unnormalized aggregate multilateral import margins (Y˜c)
ln(E˜M c) ln(U˜V c) ln(X˜c) ln(V˜c)
Mean 5.612 2.004 4.730 12.345
Standard deviation 0.839 0.691 0.944 1.904
ln(GDPc) 0.126??? 0.139??? 0.235??? 0.500???
(0.038) (0.047) (0.083) (0.061)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.264??? 0.246??? -0.128 0.382???
(0.054) (0.083) (0.126) (0.136)
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.841 0.598 0.450 0.882
(c) Straightforward aggregate multilateral import margins (Y˘c)
ln( ˘EM c) ln(U˘V c) ln(X˘c) ln(V˘c)
Mean 6.879 1.891 6.400 15.169
Standard deviation 0.275 0.680 1.334 1.941
ln(GDPc) 0.060??? 0.131??? 0.377??? 0.568???
(0.017) (0.045) (0.074) (0.061)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.076??? 0.251??? 0.012 0.339???
(0.023) (0.081) (0.109) (0.115)
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 20 20 20 20
Adjusted R2 0.680 0.619 0.782 0.916
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
HC3 standard errors are given in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies (East Asia and
Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North
Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP).
Controls τc: dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, # of neighbor
countries, # of countries with common language, average distance to all other countries.
Control rc: remoteness index (rc =
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnv ). Sample: countries with popu-
lation > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Year=2007.
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Table A.6: Yc – Controls
(a) Extensive Margin EMc
ln(GDPc) 0.079??? 0.084??? 0.087??? 0.085???
(0.010) (0.012) (0.022) (0.024)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.185??? 0.122??? 0.100??? 0.101???
(0.014) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
xc ? No Yes Yes Yes
τc ? No No Yes Yes
rc ? No No No Yes
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 3 11 19 20
Adjusted R2 0.780 0.806 0.820 0.819
(b) Quality Margin UVc
ln(GDPc) 0.032??? 0.014? 0.016 0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.075??? 0.060??? 0.070??? 0.069???
(0.013) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
xc ? No Yes Yes Yes
τc ? No No Yes Yes
rc ? No No No Yes
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 3 11 19 20
Adjusted R2 0.542 0.611 0.607 0.605
(c) Quantity Margin Xc
ln(GDPc) 0.467??? 0.465??? 0.443??? 0.452???
(0.059) (0.047) (0.062) (0.064)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.396??? 0.108 0.128 0.120
(0.079) (0.104) (0.111) (0.112)
xc ? No Yes Yes Yes
τc ? No No Yes Yes
rc ? No No No Yes
# observations 123 123 123 123
# regressors 3 11 19 20
Adjusted R2 0.770 0.844 0.855 0.857
Notes: The same notes apply as in Table A.5. The dependent
variables are normalized aggregate multilateral import margins.
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Table A.7: Yc – Years
year ln(EMc) ln(UVc) ln(Xc) ln(Vc)
1995 ln(GDPc) 0.100??? 0.015 0.400??? 0.515???
(0.018) (0.011) (0.075) (0.074)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.161??? 0.065??? 0.203? 0.429???
(0.024) (0.017) (0.115) (0.124)
1996 ln(GDPc) 0.097??? 0.011 0.397??? 0.506???
(0.020) (0.014) (0.072) (0.069)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.170??? 0.069??? 0.190 0.429???
(0.026) (0.023) (0.116) (0.122)
1997 ln(GDPc) 0.095??? 0.028?? 0.408??? 0.531???
(0.022) (0.013) (0.075) (0.071)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.183??? 0.066??? 0.206? 0.455???
(0.028) (0.022) (0.119) (0.120)
1998 ln(GDPc) 0.104??? 0.027?? 0.385??? 0.516???
(0.024) (0.013) (0.073) (0.072)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.157??? 0.070??? 0.195 0.422???
(0.027) (0.020) (0.123) (0.127)
1999 ln(GDPc) 0.099??? 0.033??? 0.385??? 0.517???
(0.023) (0.011) (0.064) (0.062)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.153??? 0.068??? 0.153 0.374???
(0.027) (0.021) (0.118) (0.121)
2000 ln(GDPc) 0.106??? 0.024? 0.414??? 0.543???
(0.026) (0.013) (0.073) (0.067)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.163??? 0.079??? 0.135 0.377???
(0.028) (0.023) (0.113) (0.122)
2001 ln(GDPc) 0.111??? 0.038??? 0.419??? 0.567???
(0.027) (0.014) (0.074) (0.069)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.152??? 0.079??? 0.157 0.388???
(0.031) (0.023) (0.117) (0.122)
2002 ln(GDPc) 0.099??? 0.038?? 0.396??? 0.532???
(0.022) (0.016) (0.075) (0.069)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.140??? 0.080??? 0.192? 0.412???
(0.027) (0.023) (0.114) (0.120)
2003 ln(GDPc) 0.092??? 0.030?? 0.419??? 0.541???
(0.024) (0.014) (0.072) (0.069)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.131??? 0.084??? 0.118 0.334??
(0.031) (0.020) (0.128) (0.134)
2004 ln(GDPc) 0.082??? 0.037??? 0.408??? 0.528???
(0.023) (0.011) (0.069) (0.065)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.132??? 0.069??? 0.106 0.307??
(0.028) (0.019) (0.121) (0.124)
2005 ln(GDPc) 0.087??? 0.021? 0.428??? 0.536???
(0.023) (0.011) (0.067) (0.063)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.129??? 0.054??? 0.140 0.323???
(0.028) (0.016) (0.116) (0.115)
2006 ln(GDPc) 0.086??? 0.010 0.443??? 0.538???
(0.022) (0.010) (0.068) (0.067)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.112??? 0.064??? 0.141 0.317???
(0.026) (0.017) (0.116) (0.117)
2007 ln(GDPc) 0.085??? 0.017 0.452??? 0.555???
(0.024) (0.013) (0.064) (0.062)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.101??? 0.069??? 0.120 0.289??
(0.026) (0.021) (0.112) (0.114)
Notes: The same notes apply as in Table A.5. However, this table
shows the coefficient and standard error (HC3, in parentheses) of
ln(GDP ) and ln(GDPpc) resulting from estimation of equation (3.1)
for each year between 1995 and 2007. The dependent variables are
normalized aggregate multilateral import margins.
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Table A.8: Yc – Pooled cross section
ln(EMct) ln(UVct) ln(Xct) ln(Vct)
Mean -0.644 -0.071 -5.883 -6.598
Standard deviation 0.465 0.189 1.415 1.901
ln(GDPct) 0.097??? 0.024??? 0.407??? 0.528???
(0.016) (0.007) (0.049) (0.048)
ln(GDPpcct) 0.144??? 0.070??? 0.161? 0.376???
(0.019) (0.013) (0.092) (0.095)
# observations 1,599 1,599 1,599 1,599
# regressors 32 32 32 32
Adjusted R2 0.822 0.591 0.854 0.912
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by
importer) are given in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, #
of neighbor countries, # of countries with common language, aver-
age distance to all other countries. Control rc: remoteness index
(rc =
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnv ). Year fixed effects. The dependent
variables are normalized aggregate multilateral import margins. Sam-
ple: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include
consumer goods. 1995-2007.
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Table A.9: Effect of GDP per capita on disaggregate multilateral import margins Yci
(a) Unnormalized disaggregate multilateral import margins (1ci, Yci)
1ci ln(UVci) ln(Xci) ln(Vci)
Mean 0.794 2.217 3.079 5.296
Standard deviation 0.404 1.585 2.952 2.442
ln(GDPc) 0.044??? -0.002 0.466??? 0.463???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.047) (0.045)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.049??? 0.085??? 0.328??? 0.413???
(0.011) (0.020) (0.088) (0.084)
# observations 155,349 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 1282 1276 1276 1276
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.841 0.665 0.609
(b) Straightforward disaggregate multilateral import margins (Y˘ci)
ln(U˘V ci) ln(X˘ci) ln(V˘ci)
Mean 2.088 4.280 6.368
Standard deviation 1.554 3.235 2.812
ln(GDPc) -0.016 0.568??? 0.552???
(0.013) (0.055) (0.052)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.084??? 0.451??? 0.535???
(0.022) (0.102) (0.095)
# observations 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 1276 1276 1276
Adjusted R2 0.834 0.712 0.693
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Robust (clustered by importer) standard errors are given
in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies (East Asia and Pacific, Eu-
rope and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and
North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America), belonging
to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc: dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, #
of FTA’s, # of CU’s, # of neighbor countries, # of countries with com-
mon language, average distance to all other countries. Control rci: remote-
ness index (rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnivi ). HS6 fixed effects.
Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include
consumer goods. Year=2007.
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Table
A
.11:
Y
ci –
D
ifferent
T
ypes
ofG
oods
(a)
D
ifferentiated
versus
non-differentiated
goods
differentiated
goods
non-differentiated
goods
1
c
i
ln
(U
V
c
i )
ln
(X
c
i )
ln
(V
c
i )
1
c
i
ln
(U
V
c
i )
ln
(X
c
i )
ln
(V
c
i )
M
ean
0.797
2.308
2.982
5.290
0.775
1.504
3.839
5.342
Standard
deviation
0.403
1.521
2.908
2.437
0.418
1.870
3.180
2.479
ln(G
D
P
)
0.045
?
?
?
-0.000
0.466
?
?
?
0.466
?
?
?
0.043
?
?
?
-0.017
0.461
?
?
?
0.444
?
?
?
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.048)
(0.045)
(0.009)
(0.011)
(0.050)
(0.048)
ln(G
D
P
pc)
0.047
?
?
?
0.082
?
?
?
0.342
?
?
?
0.424
?
?
?
0.061
?
?
?
0.108
?
?
?
0.221
?
?
0.328
?
?
?
(0.011)
(0.021)
(0.090)
(0.085)
(0.014)
(0.020)
(0.086)
(0.084)
#
observations
137,391
109,451
109,451
109,451
17,958
13,919
13,919
13,919
#
regressors
1138
1135
1135
1135
167
167
167
167
A
djusted
R
2
0.417
0.826
0.668
0.625
0.374
0.895
0.635
0.503
(b)
D
urable
versus
non-durable
goods
durable
goods
non-durable
goods
1
c
i
ln
(U
V
c
i )
ln
(X
c
i )
ln
(V
c
i )
1
c
i
ln
(U
V
c
i )
ln
(X
c
i )
ln
(V
c
i )
M
ean
0.819
2.900
2.311
5.211
0.778
1.577
3.800
5.376
Standard
deviation
0.385
1.434
2.824
2.438
0.416
1.446
2.888
2.443
ln(G
D
P
)
0.052
?
?
?
-0.003
0.513
?
?
?
0.510
?
?
?
0.038
?
?
?
-0.001
0.421
?
?
?
0.419
?
?
?
(0.008)
(0.014)
(0.048)
(0.045)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.050)
(0.047)
ln(G
D
P
pc)
0.045
?
?
?
0.068
?
?
?
0.391
?
?
?
0.459
?
?
?
0.053
?
?
?
0.103
?
?
?
0.268
?
?
?
0.370
?
?
?
(0.012)
(0.024)
(0.103)
(0.097)
(0.012)
(0.019)
(0.082)
(0.079)
#
observations
72,939
59,728
59,728
59,728
81,795
63,632
63,632
63,632
#
regressors
614
614
614
614
686
686
686
686
A
djusted
R
2
0.403
0.798
0.677
0.652
0.405
0.818
0.616
0.572
N
otes:
T
he
sam
e
notes
apply
as
in
T
able
A
.9.
T
he
dependent
variables
are
unnorm
alized
disaggregate
m
ultilateralim
port
m
argins.
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Table A.12: Yci – By industries
(a) Extensive margin, 1ci
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Section
0 1 2 4 5 6 7 8
Mean 0.722 0.871 0.685 0.963 0.953 0.837 0.856 0.808
Standard dev. 0.448 0.336 0.465 0.188 0.211 0.369 0.351 0.394
ln(GDP) 0.034??? 0.018??? 0.104??? 0.017 0.019??? 0.045??? 0.040??? 0.056???
(0.009) (0.006) (0.019) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
ln(GDPpc) 0.067??? 0.019?? 0.085??? 0.025 0.014? 0.041??? 0.017? 0.047???
(0.014) (0.009) (0.028) (0.016) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.014)
# observations 48,831 2,829 615 246 6,150 20,418 10,578 65,313
# regressors 418 44 26 23 71 187 107 552
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.465 0.449 0.150 0.228 0.400 0.490 0.394
(b) Unit value margin, ln(UVci)
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Section
0 1 2 4 5 6 7 8
Mean 0.851 1.255 1.494 1.357 2.235 1.942 2.572 3.202
Standard dev. 1.023 1.401 0.664 0.396 1.557 0.936 0.975 1.421
ln(GDP) -0.000 0.015 -0.001 0.042 0.041??? -0.013 -0.005 -0.004
(0.014) (0.023) (0.038) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
ln(GDPpc) 0.112??? 0.041 0.056 0.075 0.117??? 0.096??? 0.071?? 0.064??
(0.021) (0.038) (0.050) (0.046) (0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026)
# observations 35,280 2,463 421 237 5,862 17,097 9,051 52,783
# regressors 416 43 26 23 71 187 107 552
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.805 0.206 0.183 0.863 0.543 0.657 0.781
(c) Quantity value margin, ln(Xci)
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Section
0 1 2 4 5 6 7 8
Mean 4.507 4.938 3.452 4.806 3.961 2.957 3.608 1.890
Standard dev. 2.754 2.906 2.619 2.344 2.499 2.373 2.856 2.785
ln(GDP) 0.369??? 0.418??? 0.394??? 0.685??? 0.415??? 0.485??? 0.556??? 0.516???
(0.061) (0.060) (0.131) (0.118) (0.046) (0.046) (0.050) (0.050)
ln(GDPpc) 0.307??? 0.263?? 0.615??? 0.405?? 0.116 0.264??? 0.348??? 0.389???
(0.088) (0.121) (0.196) (0.173) (0.079) (0.084) (0.091) (0.113)
# observations 35,280 2,463 421 237 5,862 17,097 9,051 52,783
# regressors 416 43 26 23 71 187 107 552
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.596 0.579 0.661 0.681 0.571 0.695 0.661
Notes: The same notes apply as in Table A.9. The dependent variables are unnormalized disaggregate
multilateral import margins.
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Table A.13: Yci – Controls
(a) Extensive Margin 1ci
ln(GDPc) 0.043??? 0.043??? 0.045??? 0.044??? 0.044???
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.070??? 0.070??? 0.056??? 0.049??? 0.049???
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
HS6 Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
xc? No No Yes Yes Yes
τc? No No No Yes Yes
rci? No No No No Yes
# observations 155,349 155,349 155,349 155,349 155,349
# regressors 3 1265 1273 1281 1282
Adjusted R2 0.141 0.399 0.404 0.411 0.411
(b) Quality Margin UVci
ln(GDPc) 0.035??? 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.106??? 0.093??? 0.082??? 0.085??? 0.085??? 0.086???
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
HS6 Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
xc? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
τc? No No No Yes Yes Yes
rci? No No No No Yes Yes
xnci? No No No No No Yes
# observations 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 3 1259 1267 1275 1276 1283
Adjusted R2 0.012 0.837 0.840 0.841 0.841 0.845
(c) Quantity Margin Xci
ln(GDPc) 0.383??? 0.462??? 0.452??? 0.464??? 0.466??? 0.329???
(0.056) (0.056) (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.513??? 0.613??? 0.331??? 0.332??? 0.328??? 0.182???
(0.070) (0.071) (0.091) (0.088) (0.088) (0.067)
HS6 Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
xc? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
τc? No No No Yes Yes Yes
rci? No No No No Yes Yes
xnci? No No No No No Yes
# observations 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 3 1259 1267 1275 1276 1283
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.647 0.660 0.664 0.665 0.697
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, re-
spectively. Robust (clustered by importer) standard errors are given in parenthe-
ses. xc: region dummies (East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). τc: dummies for island, land-
locked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, # of neighbor countries, # of countries with
common language, average distance to all other countries. rci: remoteness index
(rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnivi ). xnci : source country region dummies
indicating whether c imports in category i from region 1, 2, . . . , 7. The depen-
dent variables are unnormalized disaggregate multilateral import margins. Sample:
countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods.
Year=2007.
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Table A.14: Yci – Years
year 1ci ln(UVci) ln(Xci) ln(Vci)
1995 ln(GDPc) 0.047??? 0.014 0.398??? 0.413???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.061) (0.056)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.076??? 0.054??? 0.488??? 0.542???
(0.011) (0.020) (0.114) (0.106)
1998 ln(GDPc) 0.047??? 0.008 0.431??? 0.440???
(0.009) (0.010) (0.054) (0.050)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.072??? 0.062??? 0.444??? 0.507???
(0.011) (0.019) (0.116) (0.107)
2001 ln(GDPc) 0.053??? 0.013 0.444??? 0.458???
(0.008) (0.011) (0.060) (0.055)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.059??? 0.090??? 0.367??? 0.457???
(0.011) (0.018) (0.106) (0.104)
2004 ln(GDPc) 0.043??? 0.015 0.433??? 0.448???
(0.008) (0.010) (0.052) (0.049)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.059??? 0.068??? 0.372??? 0.440???
(0.013) (0.019) (0.097) (0.094)
2007 ln(GDPc) 0.044??? -0.002 0.466??? 0.463???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.047) (0.045)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.049??? 0.085??? 0.328??? 0.413???
(0.011) (0.020) (0.088) (0.084)
Notes: This table shows the coefficient and standard error (clustered
by importer, in parentheses) of ln(GDP ) and ln(GDPpc) resulting
from estimation of equations (3.2) and (3.3) for every third year be-
tween 1995 and 2007. ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, #
of neighbor countries, # of countries with common language, av-
erage distance to all other countries. Control rci: remoteness index
(rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnivi ). HS6 fixed effects. The
dependent variables are unnormalized disaggregate multilateral im-
port margins. Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6
codes which include consumer goods.
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Table A.15: Yci – Pooled cross section
1cit ln(UVcit) ln(Xcit) ln(Vcit)
Mean 0.741 2.064 2.813 4.877
Standard deviation 0.438 1.516 2.871 2.361
ln(GDPct) 0.048??? 0.005 0.433??? 0.438???
(0.007) (0.008) (0.051) (0.048)
ln(GDPpcct) 0.065??? 0.079??? 0.389??? 0.468???
(0.010) (0.016) (0.102) (0.096)
# observations 2019537 1496832 1496832 1496832
# regressors 1294 1294 1294 1294
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.798 0.636 0.585
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by
importer) are given in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, #
of neighbor countries, # of countries with common language, aver-
age distance to all other countries. Control rci: remoteness index
(rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnivi ). HS6 and year fixed
effects. The dependent variables are unnormalized disaggregate mul-
tilateral import margins. Sample: countries with population > 1
million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. 1995-2007.
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Table A.16: Yci – Higher levels of aggregation
digits 1ci ln(UVci) ln(Xci) ln(Vci)
HS6 ln(GDPc) 0.044??? -0.002 0.466??? 0.463???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.047) (0.045)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.049??? 0.085??? 0.328??? 0.413???
(0.011) (0.020) (0.088) (0.084)
# observations 155,349 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 1282 1276 1276 1276
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.841 0.665 0.609
HS4 ln(GDPc) 0.020??? -0.004 0.485??? 0.481???
(0.005) (0.013) (0.047) (0.045)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.023??? 0.087??? 0.351??? 0.438???
(0.007) (0.022) (0.093) (0.088)
# observations 38,499 35,404 35,404 35,404
# regressors 332 332 332 332
Adjusted R2 0.313 0.851 0.729 0.695
HS2 ln(GDPc) 0.012??? 0.012 0.466??? 0.478???
(0.003) (0.015) (0.044) (0.044)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.015??? 0.100??? 0.279??? 0.379???
(0.004) (0.026) (0.093) (0.086)
# observations 8,241 7,889 7,889 7,889
# regressors 86 86 86 86
Adjusted R2 0.255 0.855 0.806 0.788
HS1 ln(GDPc) 0.004??? 0.043?? 0.477??? 0.521???
(0.001) (0.019) (0.047) (0.045)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.005?? 0.106??? 0.328??? 0.434???
(0.002) (0.033) (0.104) (0.096)
# observations 2,460 2,448 2,448 2,448
# regressors 39 39 39 39
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.869 0.869 0.840
Notes: This table shows the coefficient and standard error (clustered by im-
porter, in parentheses) of ln(GDP ) and ln(GDPpc) resulting from estimation
of equations (3.2) and (3.3) for different levels of aggregation. Note that there
are four hierarchical levels for the Harmonized System. The 1-digit level cor-
responds to sections (coded by Roman numerals), the 2-digit level represents
chapters, the 4-digit codes identify headings and the 6-digit codes represent sub-
headings. The dependent variables are unnormalized disaggregate multilateral
import margins. Otherwise, the same notes apply as in Table A.9.
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Table A.17: Yci – Accounting for the zeros
Cosslett (10 bins)
1ci ln(UVci) ln(Xci) ln(Vci)
Mean 0.794 2.217 3.079 5.296
Standard deviation 0.404 1.585 2.952 2.442
ln(GDPc) 0.044??? -0.003 0.431??? 0.428???
(0.008) (0.012) (0.050) (0.046)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.049??? 0.085??? 0.297??? 0.382???
(0.011) (0.021) (0.086) (0.082)
# observations 155,349 123,367 123,367 123,367
# regressors 1284 1288 1288 1288
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.841 0.668 0.613
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust (clustered by importer) stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, #
of neighbor countries, # of countries with common language, av-
erage distance to all other countries. Control rci: remoteness index
(rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnivi ). HS6 fixed effects. The
dependent variables are unnormalized disaggregate multilateral im-
port margins. Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6
codes which include consumer goods. Year=2007.
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Table A.18: Yci – Comparison of Linear Probability Model, Probit and Logit
1ci
LPM Probit Logit
Mean 0.794 0.777 0.777
Standard deviation 0.404 0.416 0.416
ln(GDPc) 0.044??? 0.049??? 0.042???
(0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.049??? 0.035??? 0.029???
(0.011) (0.001) (0.001)
# observations 155,349 141,942 141,942
# regressors 1282 1282 1282
Adjusted R2 0.411
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust (clus-
tered by importer) standard errors are given in paren-
theses. For probit and logit the marginal effect is re-
ported at mean. Controls xc: region dummies (East
Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin Amer-
ica and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North America), belonging to
OECD, ln(PPP). Control τc: dummies for island, land-
locked, WTO, # of FTA’s, # of CU’s, # of neighbor
countries, # of countries with common language, aver-
age distance to all other countries. Controls rci: remote-
ness index (rci = 1∑
n∈N 1(vni>0)
∑
n∈N−c distancenc ·
vni
vi
). HS6 fixed effects. Sample: countries with pop-
ulation > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer
goods. Year=2007.
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Table A.19: Effect of GDP per capita on aggregate bilateral import margins Ync
(a) Normalized aggregate bilateral import margins (Ync)
ln(EMnc) ln(UVnc) ln(Xnc) ln(Vnc)
Mean -1.604 0.079 -5.555 -7.079
Standard deviation 1.711 0.470 2.390 2.644
ln(GDPc) 0.185??? -0.006 0.430??? 0.610???
(0.022) (0.008) (0.047) (0.050)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.168??? 0.084??? 0.096 0.348???
(0.043) (0.015) (0.086) (0.094)
# observations 9,585 9,585 9,585 9,585
# regressors 144 144 144 144
Adjusted R2 0.464 0.178 0.586 0.647
(b) Unnormalized aggregate bilateral import margins (Y˜nc)
ln(E˜Mnc) ln(U˜Vnc) ln(X˜nc) ln(V˜nc)
Mean 3.227 2.018 2.757 8.002
Standard deviation 2.017 1.338 2.268 3.439
ln(GDPc) 0.296??? 0.040? 0.274??? 0.609???
(0.029) (0.021) (0.044) (0.051)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.285??? 0.190??? -0.107 0.367???
(0.059) (0.051) (0.078) (0.099)
# observations 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763
# regressors 144 144 144 144
Adjusted R2 0.789 0.357 0.387 0.751
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by
importer) are given in parentheses. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO. Controls rc: remoteness index
(rc =
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnv ). Controls τnc: distance, dummies for free
trade agreement, currency union, common border, common legal sys-
tem, common language and colonial ties. Exporter fixed effects. Sam-
ple: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include
consumer goods. Year=2007.
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Table A.21: Ync – Years
year ln(EMnc) ln(UVnc) ln(Xnc) ln(Vnc)
1995 ln(GDPc) 0.185??? -0.016? 0.429??? 0.598???
(0.021) (0.008) (0.049) (0.056)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.330??? 0.054??? 0.197?? 0.582???
(0.048) (0.016) (0.085) (0.121)
1996 ln(GDPc) 0.195??? -0.015? 0.436??? 0.616???
(0.021) (0.009) (0.053) (0.063)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.308??? 0.081??? 0.118 0.508???
(0.046) (0.016) (0.093) (0.118)
1997 ln(GDPc) 0.207??? -0.006 0.403??? 0.604???
(0.021) (0.008) (0.055) (0.062)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.308??? 0.086??? 0.165? 0.560???
(0.051) (0.015) (0.089) (0.116)
1998 ln(GDPc) 0.229??? -0.006 0.396??? 0.619???
(0.024) (0.008) (0.052) (0.060)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.309??? 0.084??? 0.116 0.509???
(0.043) (0.017) (0.089) (0.108)
1999 ln(GDPc) 0.208??? -0.007 0.397??? 0.598???
(0.022) (0.009) (0.049) (0.054)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.303??? 0.074??? 0.133 0.511???
(0.040) (0.017) (0.084) (0.103)
2000 ln(GDPc) 0.215??? -0.010 0.413??? 0.618???
(0.022) (0.009) (0.049) (0.055)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.306??? 0.097??? 0.097 0.500???
(0.035) (0.018) (0.079) (0.096)
2001 ln(GDPc) 0.221??? 0.000 0.402??? 0.623???
(0.024) (0.010) (0.053) (0.059)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.238??? 0.097??? 0.130 0.464???
(0.041) (0.020) (0.088) (0.104)
2002 ln(GDPc) 0.222??? -0.003 0.398??? 0.618???
(0.022) (0.009) (0.053) (0.056)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.265??? 0.089??? 0.138 0.492???
(0.042) (0.018) (0.093) (0.101)
2003 ln(GDPc) 0.198??? -0.007 0.417??? 0.609???
(0.024) (0.008) (0.051) (0.058)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.252??? 0.075??? 0.085 0.412???
(0.043) (0.014) (0.092) (0.108)
2004 ln(GDPc) 0.207??? -0.002 0.373??? 0.578???
(0.024) (0.008) (0.051) (0.056)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.198??? 0.061??? 0.120 0.379???
(0.042) (0.014) (0.093) (0.106)
2005 ln(GDPc) 0.191??? 0.004 0.391??? 0.586???
(0.023) (0.007) (0.046) (0.051)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.204??? 0.056??? 0.123 0.383???
(0.044) (0.014) (0.089) (0.100)
2006 ln(GDPc) 0.204??? -0.004 0.431??? 0.631???
(0.020) (0.007) (0.048) (0.050)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.162??? 0.083??? 0.103 0.348???
(0.040) (0.014) (0.085) (0.099)
2007 ln(GDPc) 0.185??? -0.006 0.430??? 0.610???
(0.022) (0.008) (0.047) (0.050)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.168??? 0.084??? 0.096 0.348???
(0.043) (0.015) (0.086) (0.094)
Notes: The same notes apply as in Table A.19. However, this table
shows the coefficient and standard error (robust, clustered by importer,
in parentheses) of ln(GDP ) and ln(GDPpc) resulting from estimation
of equation (3.4) for each year between 1995 and 2007. The dependent
variables are normalized aggregate bilateral import margins.
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Table A.22: Ync – Accounting for the zeros
Cosslett (10 bins)
1(Vnc > 0) ln(EMnc) ln(UVnc) ln(Xnc) ln(Vnc)
Mean 0.639 -1.604 0.079 -5.555 -7.079
Standard deviation 0.480 1.711 0.470 2.390 2.644
ln(GDPc) 0.051??? 0.080??? -0.000 0.452??? 0.532???
(0.006) (0.027) (0.008) (0.054) (0.054)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.031??? 0.088? 0.085??? 0.109 0.281???
(0.012) (0.048) (0.016) (0.087) (0.097)
# observations 15,006 9,585 9,585 9,585 9,585
# regressors 146 156 156 156 156
Adjusted R2 0.532 0.481 0.182 0.604 0.655
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, re-
spectively. Robust standard errors (clustered by importer) are given in parentheses.
Controls xc: region dummies (East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc: dummies for is-
land, landlocked, WTO. Controls rc: remoteness index (rc =
∑
n∈N−c distancenc · vnv ).
Controls τnc: distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common
border, common legal system, common language and colonial ties. Exporter fixed ef-
fects. The dependent variables are normalized aggregate multilateral import margins.
Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer
goods. Year=2007.
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Table A.25: Ynci – Years
year 1nci ln(UVnci) ln(Xnci) ln(Vnci)
1995 ln(GDPc) 0.010??? 0.009 0.230??? 0.239???
(0.002) (0.009) (0.033) (0.030)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.013??? 0.093??? 0.207??? 0.300???
(0.003) (0.016) (0.073) (0.069)
1998 ln(GDPc) 0.011??? 0.004 0.245??? 0.248???
(0.002) (0.009) (0.033) (0.030)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.013??? 0.122??? 0.177?? 0.299???
(0.003) (0.021) (0.073) (0.064)
2001 ln(GDPc) 0.010??? 0.002 0.245??? 0.248???
(0.002) (0.011) (0.035) (0.031)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.012??? 0.145??? 0.115 0.260???
(0.003) (0.029) (0.075) (0.063)
2004 ln(GDPc) 0.011??? 0.008 0.235??? 0.243???
(0.002) (0.010) (0.036) (0.032)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.011??? 0.084??? 0.167?? 0.251???
(0.003) (0.024) (0.071) (0.061)
2007 ln(GDPc) 0.013??? 0.018? 0.235??? 0.253???
(0.002) (0.010) (0.030) (0.026)
ln(GDPpcc) 0.011??? 0.095??? 0.118? 0.213???
(0.003) (0.029) (0.071) (0.053)
Notes: This table shows the coefficient and standard error (clustered
by importer, in parentheses) of ln(GDP ) and ln(GDPpc) resulting
from estimation of equations (3.5) and (3.6) for every third year be-
tween 1995 and 2007. ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Controls xc: region dummies
(East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and
Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan
Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls τc:
dummies for island, landlocked, WTO. Controls τnc: distance, dum-
mies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border, com-
mon legal system, common language and colonial ties. HS6 and ex-
porter fixed effects. Sample: countries with population > 1 million,
HS6 codes which include consumer goods.
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Table A.26: Ynci – Including exporter-product fixed effects
1nci ln(UVnci) ln(Xnci) ln(Vnci)
Mean 0.070 2.497 1.566 4.064
Standard deviation 0.254 1.595 2.848 2.281
ln(GDP) 0.013??? 0.016??? 0.283??? 0.299???
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
ln(GDPpc) 0.011??? 0.090??? 0.188??? 0.279???
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
# observations 18952578 1319315 1319315 1319315
# regressors 155369 85707 85707 85707
Notes: The models in this table are estimated with the Stata program
gpreg developed by Johannes F. Schmieder, see Guimaraes and Portugal
(2010). The adjusted R2 is not reported as gpreg does not calculate it
properly. ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Controls xc:
region dummies (East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-
Saharan Africa, North America), belonging to OECD, ln(PPP). Controls
τc: dummies for island, landlocked, WTO. Controls τnc: distance, dum-
mies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border, common
legal system, common language and colonial ties. Exporter-HS6 fixed ef-
fects. Sample: countries with population > 1 million. HS6 codes which
include consumer goods. Year=2007.
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3.A.4 Krugman Model with Quality
Suppose preferences exhibit constant elasticities of substitution (CES) as in the Krugman
setup while goods can be purchased and supplied in different quality levels as above,
Ui =
(∫ N
j=0
[∑
qi(j)
ci(j, qi)qi(j)
] ε−1
ε
dj
) ε
ε−1
,
with ε > 1 being the elasticity of substitution. The first order condition of utility maxi-
mization for variety j in quality qi(j) is(∫ N
j=0
[∑
qi(j)
ci(j, qi)qi(j)
] ε−1
ε
dj
) 1
ε−1 [∑
qi(j)
ci(j, qi)qi(j)
]− 1
ε
qi(j)− λip(j, qi)
·ci(j, qi) = 0.
Each individual only consumes the quality with the lowest quality-adjusted price p(j, qi)/qi(j),
no matter what the labor endowment is. Therefore, firms offer one and the same quality
level to all individuals, choosing quality and prices to maximize profits based on individ-
uals’ first order conditions. Optimal prices and qualities are identical across firms given
symmetry, with prices determined by the CES mark-up formula,
p(q) =
ε
ε− 1ψ (q) ,
depending on the optimal quality level. Using first order conditions and price formula,
profits net of entry costs can be expressed as
pi (q) =
[
q
ψ (q)
]ε−1(
ε− 1
ε
)ε
1
ε− 1
∫
i
Ui
λi
dF (i)− φN,
where F (i) is the distribution function of labor endowments (across countries). One
can immediately see that firms optimally choose the quality level q which maximizes the
quality to cost ratio q/ψ (q), determined by
ψ′ (q) = ψ (q) /q,
which exists and is unique given our assumptions on the cost function (q · ψ′ (q) /ψ (q) is
strictly increasing and ψ′ (q) > ψ (q) /q for sufficiently large q). As a result, the quality
level in the economy solely depends on quality upgrading technology and not on per capita
labor endowment or population size.
For our focus, of how the division of aggregate income into per capita income and
population affects aggregate variables, quality can be normalized to one and the model
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reduces to the standard Krugman framework. It is straightforward to show that in the
latter the number of varieties a country produces and the quantity per variety a country
consumes depends on aggregate income rather than per capita income or population size.35
Given that marginal utility becomes infinite as consumption of any variety approaches
zero, all individuals consume all globally available varieties. Hence, in a two country
open economy model both countries export all varieties they produce. Consequently,
two countries, R and P , which only differ in per capita income Ai and population size
Li but have equal aggregate income AiLi (ARLR = APLP , AR > AP , LR < LP ) and
integrated goods markets have identical import margins (NP = EMR = EMP = NR,
pR = PR = PP = pP (as qR = qP ), XR = XP ).
Quality does not matter in a Krugman-type model with CES preferences, which im-
plicitly assume perfect substitution between quality and quantity. In such a model the
extensive, quality and quantity margin of imports do not depend on how aggregate income
is divided into per capita income and population.
3.A.5 Autarky Model with all three Margins of Consumption
In this appendix we show that when households have quadratic preferences regarding
quantities, and hence also choose along the quantity margin, predictions for variety N ,
quality q and aggregate quantity X when comparing two closed economies with equal
aggregate labor supply AL but differing population L do not change.
Consider a closed economy as described in section 3.5.1. An individual i chooses quan-
tities {c(j, qi)} and qualities {qi(j)} to maximize utility subject to its budget constraint.36
max
c(j,qi),qi(j)
Ui =
∫ N
j=0
∑
qi(j)
(
sc(j, qi)− 1
2
c(j, qi)
2
)
qi(j)
 dj
s.t. Aiw =
∫ N
j=0
c(j, qi)p(j, qi)dj and c(j, qi) ≥ 0 ∀j
Individual i is endowed with Ai units of labor and consumes c(j, qi) units of variety j in
quality qi(j). Note that (i) due to bounded marginal utility the nonnegativity constraint
c(j, qi) ≥ 0 might become binding for some individuals and varieties and hence the exten-
sive margin of consumption is nontrivial as individuals effectively choose the variety of
goods they purchase37 and (ii) the utility function embeds imperfect substitution between
35To save space we do not derive these results here, see for example Hummels and Klenow (2002).
36To shorten the problem we already impose in the maximization problem that the budget constraint
will be binding in equilibrium. Although there is “local satiation” (s is the satiation level for a given
variety) the utility function is “globally” non-satiated as new varieties always yield additional utility.
37∂Ui/∂c(j, qi) = [s− c(j, qi)]qi(j) and limc(j,qi)→0 ∂Ui/∂c(j, qi) = sqi(j) <∞
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quantity and quality. The first order conditions for consumption of good j in quality qi(j)
are
[s− c(j, qi)]qi(j)− µ−1i p(j, qi) + ηi(j) = 0
ηi(j)c(j, qi) = 0, ηi(j) ≥ 0, c(j, qi) ≥ 0,
where µ−1i is the Lagrange multiplier on individual i’s budget constraint and ηi(j) is
the multiplier on i’s nonnegativity constraint for good j. For a given quality qi(j) the
individual demand function for good j is
c(j, qi) =
s− µ
−1
i
p(j, qi)
qi(j)
if p(j, qi) < sµiqi(j)
0 otherwise.
sµi determines the willingness to pay for one unit of quality. An individual consumes a
positive amount of variety j in quality qi(j) if the price p(j, qi) is less than the willingness
to pay. Note that we omit the incentive compatibility constraint. As households are
homogeneous a firm will only produce one quality level, this will eliminate the incentive
compatibility constraint.38 In what follows we omit index i. Aggregate demand for variety
j is
X(j, q) =

(
s− µ−1p(j, q)
q(j)
)
L if p(j, q) ≤ sµq(j)
0 otherwise.
(3.13)
For positive X(j, q) and for a given quality q(j) aggregate demand is linear in the price.
A firm chooses its quality levels, prices and quantities in order to maximize profits.
Due to homogeneous agents a firm supplies one quality level (this eliminates the incentive
compatibility constraints) and faces the demand function (3.13). Firms solve the following
problem
max
X(j,q),q(j)
Π(j) = {[s−X(j, q)/L]µq(j)− ψ(q(j))}X(j, q)− φN,
where we choose labor as numéraire and set the wage rate equal to variety, w = N , and
substitute the price p(j, q) by (3.13). The first order conditions are
[s−X(j, q)/L]µq(j)− µq(j)X(j, q)/L = ψ(q(j)) (3.14)
[s−X(j, q)/L]µ = ψ′(q(j)) (3.15)
38By our assumption of the cost function there will never be two, or more, equal price-quality ratios.
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(3.14) states that an optimizing firm equalizes the marginal revenue and cost of selling
one more unit and (3.15) requires that the marginal revenue and cost of increasing the
quality level by one unit are equalized. Combining these two first order conditions and
(3.13) yields an expression for the optimal quantity and price, respectively, as a function
of quality q(j).
X(j, q) = s
ψ′(q(j))q(j)− ψ(q(j))
2ψ′(q(j))q(j)− ψ(q(j))L (3.16)
p(j, q) = ψ′(q(j))q(j) (3.17)
In equilibrium firms make zero profits (free entry) and labor markets clear.39
φN = [p(q)− ψ(q)]X(q)
= sΨ(q)L, Ψ(q) ≡ [ψ
′(q)q − ψ(q)]2
2ψ′(q)q − ψ(q) > 0, Ψ
′(q) > 0 (3.18)
AL =
(
ψ(q)
N
X(q) + φ
)
N
= ψ(q)s
ψ′(q)q − ψ(q)
2ψ′(q)q − ψ(q)L+ φN, X
′(q) > 0 (3.19)
(3.18) implies that all firms choose the same quality level q and hence the same price p(q)
and quantity X(q). The autarky equilibrium is determined by (3.16)-(3.19), these are four
equations in four unknowns, N , q, p and X. As individuals are identical, every individual
consumes the entire continuum of varieties in the same quality and in the same quantity.
Combining (3.18) and (3.19) reveals that q depends positively on A and is independent of
L.40 This implies that X increases in both A and L. The zero profit condition implies that
for a given L, q and N are positively related. If N and q did not (jointly) rise with A, the
labor market clearing condition would be violated. The zero profit condition reveals that
N increases proportionately in L. As the price p depends only on quality q, positively, it
increases in A and is independent of L.
Let us compare two closed economies with equal aggregate labor supply ARLR = APLP
but differing population sizes LR = 1dLP < LP , hence AR = dAP > AP . R and P
39Assuming that ψ′(q)q/ψ(q) is strictly increasing in q implies ψ′′(q)ψ(q) > ψ′(q)[ψ′(q)− ψ(q)/q].
Ψ′(q) =
(ψ′(q)q − ψ(q)) {q (2ψ′′(q)ψ′(q)q − ψ′(q)[ψ′(q)− ψ(q)/q])}
[2ψ′(q)q − ψ(q)]2
Ψ′(q) > 0 as 2ψ′′(q)ψ′(q)q > ψ′′(q)ψ(q) > ψ′(q)[ψ′(q)− ψ(q)/q]
X ′(q) = sL
1
q {ψ′′(q)ψ(q)− ψ′(q) [ψ′(q)− ψ(q)/q]}
[2ψ′(q)q − ψ(q)]2 > 0 as ψ
′′(q)ψ(q) > ψ′(q)[ψ′(q)− ψ(q)/q]
40A = ψ′(q)qc(q), c(q) = X(q)/L = s ψ
′(q)q−ψ(q)
2ψ′(q)q−ψ(q)
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are identical in all other dimensions. The richer economy R produces more varieties
(NR > NP ). All varieties are of a higher quality (qR > qP ) but produced in smaller
aggregate quantities (XR = cRLR < XP = cPLP ). However, per capita quantities of a
variety are larger in the rich country (cR > cP ). The price for one unit of a variety is
higher in R (pR > pP ) as the rich country produces everything in a higher quality.
qR > qP as q depends positively on A and is independent of L. Divide the labor market
clearing conditions of R and P and substitute A = ψ′(q)qc(q) to see that NR > NP .
NR
NP
=
LR
φ
[
1− ψ(qR)
ψ′(qR)qR
]
AR
LP
φ
[
1− ψ(qP )
ψ′(qP )qP
]
AP
=
1− ψ(qR)
ψ′(qR)qR
1− ψ(qP )
ψ′(qP )qP
> 1 as
ψ(qR)
ψ′(qR)qR
<
ψ(qP )
ψ′(qP )qP
< 1
Writing out the ratio of AR to AP implies that c(qR)/c(qP ) < d. Using this one can show
that XR < XP by dividing the two expressions for X.
AR
AP
=
dAP
AP
= d =
ψ′(qR)qRc(qR)
ψ′(qP )qP c(qP )
⇔ c(qR)
c(qP )
= d
ψ′(qP )qP
ψ′(qR)qR
< d as ψ′(qP )qP < ψ′(qR)qR
XR
XP
=
c(qR)LR
c(qP )LP
=
c(qR)
1
d
LP
c(qP )LP
=
1
d
c(qR)
c(qP )
< 1
qR > qP implies c(qR) > c(qP ) as c′(q) > 0 and p(qR) > p(qP ) as p′(q) = ψ′′(q)q+ψ′(q) > 0.
The same comparison for the model described in section 3.5.1-3.5.2 yields the following
result.41
qR > qP , NR > NP , XR = LR < XP = LP , cR = cP = 1, pR > pP
Thus, introducing a quantity choice at the individual level with the above utility
function does not change the predictions for relative varieties N , qualities q and aggregate
quantities X when comparing two closed economies with equal aggregate labor supply
but differing populations, which are otherwise identical. However, per capita quantities
c are larger in the rich country when individuals can choose along the quantity margin
(cR > cP |app. D1) while they are equal with a 0-1 choice (cR = cP |section 3.5).
41AR > AP implies qR > qP . Substituting A = ψ′(q)q in the labor market clearing condition yields
N = ALφ
[
1− ψ(q)ψ′(q)q
]
and hence by the same reasoning as above we find that NR > NP . qR > qP implies
p(qR) > p(qP ) as p′(q) = ψ′′(q)q + ψ′(q) > 0.
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3.A.6 Sketch of a Trade Model with all three Margins of
Consumption
In this appendix we conjecture, without solving the model in detail, that the relative
margins of imports of two countries with equal aggregate labor supply AL but differing
per capita labor endowment A and population L, which are otherwise identical, are the
same as in section 3.5 when two countries as described in Appendix 3.A.5 trade with each
other.
Remember from section 3.5 that a trade equilibrium is determined by the first order
conditions of the firms, the zero profit conditions of both types of firms, the labor market
clearing conditions for both countries and the trade balance. Decomposing the trade
balance, NPpRLR = mNRpPLP , into the three margins of imports implies
NP = EMR > EMP = mNR, pR = UVR > UVP = pP , LR = XR < XP = LP ,
where LRAR = LPAP , AR > AP . The two countries are identical in all other dimensions.
An open economy model with two countries as described in Appendix 3.A.5 would
become rather large. Without solving the model in detail we can make the following
conjectures for two such countries with integrated goods markets which only differ in L
and A, where LRAR = LPAP , AR > AP . We assume that there are no trade costs and
firms cannot price discriminate due to the threat of parallel imports. Wages are hence
the same across countries.
Households are homogeneous within countries but differ across countries due to the
difference in per capita labor endowment Ai. An individual in country i ∈ {R,P} chooses
quantities c(j, qi) and qualities qi(j) for each variety j. The first order condition states
that household i buys c(j, qi) > 0 units of variety j in quality qi if the price is less than
the willingness to pay (rationality constraint) and if no other quality level, q−i, is more
attractive for household i (incentive compatibility constraint).
A firm j faces two types of customers and chooses quantities (X(j, qR), X(j, qP )),
qualities (qR(j), qP (j)) and prices (p(j, qR), p(j, qP )) for its variety. Profit maximization
is restricted by two incentive compatibility constraints and two rationality constraints. It
is a well known result from the monopolistic screening literature (e.g. Tirole (1988)) that
the incentive compatibility constraint of the rich and the rationality constraint of the poor
will be binding and that the rationality constraint of the rich and incentive compatibility
constraint of the poor will not be binding. A non binding rationality constraint for the
rich implies that the rich are charged less than their willingness to pay and hence have
an ’informational rent’. In equilibrium there are firms selling to both types of customers
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(all) and firms only selling to the rich (excl).42 Rich individuals have a higher willingness
to pay in equilibrium, hence firms selling to both types find it optimal to produce a higher
quality version of their good for the rich and a lower for the poor and charge a higher
price for the higher quality version.
The equilibrium is determined by the first order conditions of the firms which char-
acterize the quantities and prices as a function of quality (Xall(qR), Xall(qP ), Xexcl(qR),
pall(qR), pall(qP ), pexcl(qR)), the two zero profit conditions (ZP all, ZP excl), the two labor
market clearing conditions (LMCR, LMCP ) and the trade balance. These are eleven
equations in eleven unknowns, µR, µP , qallR , qallP , XallR , XallP , qexclR , XexclR , NR, NP , m.
All firms in the poor country sell their goods in the domestic market and export to
the rich country. A fraction of firms in the rich country only serves the domestic market,
1 −m. Rich individuals consume all globally available varieties. Individuals in the poor
country consume only a fraction of the varieties and purchase them in a lower quality than
rich individuals. We suppose that rich individuals consume higher quantities per variety
than poor individuals, at least for the traded varieties, due to higher qualities. Due to
the higher willingness to pay the richer country imports all varieties in higher quality
and hence has higher import prices (pR > pP ). We expect that although the richer
country produces more varieties but exports only a fraction it imports more varieties
than it exports and hence that EMR > EMP . This would imply (via trade balance) that
XR < XP .
Thus, we expect that for LRAR = LPAP , AR > AP the relative margins of imports are
the same when individuals choose also along the quantity margin as modeled in Appendix
3.A.5 as with our preferences in section 3.5.
NP = EMR > EMP = mNR, pR = UVR > UVP = pP , cRLR = XR < XP = cPLP
A two country model with balanced trade will never predict all margins to be higher in
one country.
42If all firms sold to both types the rich would have no binding first order condition and hence an
infinite willingness to pay. Some firms would enter the market and exploit this by selling only to the rich
and charging a higher price.
4 Similarity of Income Distributions and
the Extensive and Intensive Margin of
Bilateral Trade Flows
4.1 Introduction
The gravity equation identified many determinants of trade flows, such as distance and
economic sizes. Recently, a growing literature focused on the role of demand side forces for
the patterns of trade, such as per capita income and within-country income distribution.
This chapter extends this literature by showing that not only the distribution of income
per se matters but that bilateral trade flows are also determined by the extent to which
two income distributions are similar.
This chapter investigates empirically how similarity of demand structures, approxi-
mated by similarity of income distributions, affects trade patterns along the extensive
and intensive margin. The idea of similarity of demand structures to be intensifying
trade has a long tradition in the economic literature, going back to the well-known Linder
hypothesis. According to Linder (1961) countries produce those goods for which domes-
tic demand is large since proximity to demand serves as a comparative advantage. He
argued that this congruence of consumption and production patterns intensifies trade
among countries with similar demand structures.
Contrasting Japan’s imports from Canada to Japan’s imports from Mexico illustrates
the type of comparison on which the empirical analysis is based.1 In 2002, Japan imports
consumer goods from Canada worth 1.2 billion US$ and from Mexico for less than half as
much. At the same time, Japan has a larger overlap with Canada’s than with Mexico’s
income distribution. The overlap, the main measure of similarity, is the minimum integral
of two income distributions. Hence, Japan imports more from the source country which is
more similar. Moreover, the higher import value from Canada is driven by both margins.
While Japan’s imports from Canada are composed of 671 different products (HS 6-digit
codes) its imports from Mexico consist of 377 categories. Thus, Japan imports a larger
diversity of goods – the extensive margin – from the exporter which has a more similar
1In 2002, Canada and Mexico have approximately the same GDP and are equally far away from Japan.
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income distribution. On average, in a given product category Japan imports goods from
Canada for 1.8 million US$ and from Mexico for 1.4 million US$. Hence, also Japan’s
intensive margin of imports is higher from the source country with the more resembling
income distribution.
This chapter makes two major contributions. First, it is, to the best of my knowledge,
the first study which decomposes the effect of income similarity on trade flows into effects
at the extensive and intensive margin. Second, this chapter is among the very first which
approximate similarity of demand patterns with similarity of income distributions – as
opposed to similarity of average incomes – in order to relate it to bilateral trade.2 Fur-
thermore, I make two methodological contributions. On the one hand, beyond using the
overlap (minimum integral) of two income distributions to quantify similarity, I establish
two novel measures which characterize the overlap area – the average income level and the
width of the overlap. On the other hand, I develop a new way of computing national in-
come distributions with data on decile and quintile income shares and per capita income.
The simple procedure imposes no parametric assumptions about the functional form of
the distributions.
The three main findings of this chapter provide comprehensive and consistent evidence
that similarity of demand structures is an important determinant of bilateral trade mar-
gins. First, the more similar two countries are in terms of income distributions, the higher
is their aggregate bilateral trade volume of consumer goods. The effect of similarity on
trade volumes is driven by both the extensive and intensive margin. The magnitudes of
the effects are economically relevant. On average, countries with a one standard devia-
tion higher overlap have a 35% higher trade value, trade a 22% more diversified bundle
of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more within a given set of goods (intensive
margin). Hence, the patterns of the Japan-Canada versus Japan-Mexico example above
are systematic for a sample of 102 countries. My augmented gravity equation conditions
on importer and exporter fixed effects as well as trade costs in order to isolate the effect
of similarity from various supply side effects, e.g. technology, as well as from gravity
forces, such as trade costs and economic sizes. Moreover, the effect of income similarity
on trade is largest in industries including highly differentiated products, such as chemicals
or machinery and transport equipment, and not present for industries containing mostly
unprocessed goods. The first set of results is very robust, noteworthy to accounting for
zeros in trade data and controlling for similarity of average incomes.
Second, the two novel measures characterizing the overlap area, the average income
level and the width of the overlap, are also positively related to the extensive and intensive
2Searching for the keywords “income distribution” & “similarity” & “trade” on EconLit, for example,
does not give one single reference to such a study. Two related working papers, which are not in EconLit,
are discussed below.
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margin of trade. The average income level of the overlap area serves as an additional
explanatory variable as it describes the location of the overlap, whereas the width of the
overlap is an alternative measure for income similarity as it reflects how broad the range
of incomes is for which two distributions overlap. I find not only the extent to which
two income distributions overlap to be affecting trade but also at which income levels
the overlap is concentrated. Moreover, measuring income similarity with the width of the
overlap implies also that bilateral trade margins increase in similarity of demand patterns.
Third, also both margins of disaggregate bilateral trade flows increase in similarity
of income distributions. I document that both the probability of two countries to be
trading a given product (extensive margin) and the trade value within a given category
(intensive margin) increase in similarity of income distributions. Moreover, both margins
increase in the overlap as well as in the average income level and the width of the overlap.
Disaggregate trade flows are observed at the six digit level of the Harmonized System
(HS). The numerous zeros are taken into account by applying a simplified version of the
semi-parametric selection model of Cosslett (1991). The findings on the disaggregate level
are robust, notably if the analysis is performed on the HS 4, 2, 1-digit level and if it is
controlled for similarity of average incomes. Thus, the findings on aggregate trade margins
are reinforced by the results on disaggregate trade flows. This differs from Hallak (2010)
who finds that due to an aggregation bias the Linder hypothesis can be supported at the
sectoral but not at the aggregate level.
This chapter tests the hypothesis that bilateral trade flows increase along both mar-
gins in similarity of demand structures. In the following, three crucial aspects will be
highlighted considering this hypothesis. (i) If individuals have nonhomothetic preferences
the income level reflects the demand pattern of a consumer. There is considerable ev-
idence that both expenditure shares and the set of goods an individual consumes vary
with income, see e.g. Engel (1857), Jackson (1984), Broda and Romalis (2009) or Li
(2012).3 Hence, a country’s income distribution reflects its demand pattern while similar-
ity of income distributions approximates similarity of demand structures. (ii) The home
bias, meaning a country produces those goods for which domestic demand is relatively
large, can be due to imperfect information of producers. Local producers have a better
knowledge of domestic than foreign needs implying that proximity to demand serves as a
comparative advantage (Linder (1961)). The home bias can, however, also arise due to the
standard home market effect in Krugman (1980) which results from increasing returns to
scale and trade costs.4 The congruence of consumption and production patterns implies
3That the income elasticity of demand varies across goods is shown, among others, in Hunter and
Markusen (1988), Hunter (1991), Bils and Klenow (1998), Deaton (1975) and Dalgin et al. (2008).
4A home bias can also be established through an assumption linking endowments or technology and
income elasticity of demand, see Markusen (2010, 1986), Murphy and Shleifer (1997) or Fieler (2011a).
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that countries with similar demand structures produce similar goods. (iii) Trade emerges
because of product differentiation and love for variety.
The combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) implies that the more similar the demand struc-
tures of two countries are, the more similar goods they produce and due to product
differentiation such country pairs have a larger scope for trade. Moreover, as demand
patterns become more similar this can imply a broader range of goods to be purchased
in the other country (extensive margin) or that demand for a certain product sold in
the other country increases (intensive margin). Consequently, similarity of demand struc-
tures, approximated by similarity of income distributions, raises bilateral trade volumes
along both the extensive and intensive margin.
Note that “solely” considering (i) implies a country’s imports to be affected by its
income distribution (e.g. Dalgin et al. (2008)). The combination of (i), (ii) and (iii) is
needed in order to predict that the degree to which two income distributions are similar
affects the respective bilateral trade flow.
This chapter is mainly related to four strands in the literature on international trade.
First, there are a handful of theories predicting a positive association between income sim-
ilarity and trade. By imposing manufactured goods to be having a high income elasticity
of demand in consumption and simultaneously being relatively capital intensive in produc-
tion,5 the seminal article by Markusen (1986) predicts large trade volumes among capital
abundant industrialized countries with similar demand elasticities in manufactured goods.
Foellmi et al. (2010) build a theoretical framework for the extensive margin. Their model
predicts that countries trade a larger set of goods the more similar they are regarding
their per capita endowments.6 The theory in Auer (2010) provides a formal derivation of
the Linder hypothesis as it predicts higher trade flows among countries with more similar
taste distributions. Murphy and Shleifer (1997), Hallak (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al.
(2011b) hypothesize that countries with more similar levels of per capita incomes trade
more with each other as such country pairs demand and produce goods of similar quality.
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011a) show not only trade flows but also foreign direct investment
is intensive between similar countries. Second, a number of studies empirically analyze
the relationship between income similarity and bilateral trade. The results are mixed for
studies measuring income similarity with similarity of average incomes, see e.g. Hallak
(2010), Choi (2002), McPherson et al. (2000) or Thursby and Thursby (1987). To my
knowledge, there are only two working papers which analyze the relation between similar-
ity of income distributions and bilateral trade flows, Martinez-Zarzoso and Vollmer (2010)
5This assumption is empirically supported in Caron et al. (2012).
6Kohler (2012) introduces dynamics to this model and analyzes the interactions of trade and growth.
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and Bohman and Nilsson (2007).7 Both studies provide evidence for a positive relation-
ship. This chapter, however, goes beyond these studies. I provide a thorough analysis
that disentangles the effect of income similarity on trade values into a separate effect on
the extensive and intensive margin, for both aggregate as well as disaggregate trade flows.
Furthermore, my analysis is especially careful along several dimensions, such as compu-
tation of income distributions, identification strategy and the type of goods which are
considered (consumer goods). Third, how the within-country income distribution shapes
trade patterns is, among others, discussed in Mitra and Trindade (2005), Dalgin et al.
(2008), Matsuyama (2000), Francois and Kaplan (1996), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011b) and
Fieler (2011b).8 Finally, the theories with heterogeneous firms and fixed exporting costs,
starting with Melitz (2003), have contributed considerably to the initiation of a literature
distinguishing trade along the extensive versus intensive margin.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses measurement of simi-
larity among income distributions as well as computation of national income distributions.
Trade margins are defined in section 4.3 while section 4.4 specifies the empirical model.
The results are discussed in section 4.5 and section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Similarity of Income Distributions
In order to approximate the degree to which the demand structure of country c resembles
the demand structure of country n I construct a similarity measure of the income dis-
tributions of country c and n. First, the similarity measures are described conceptually
(section 4.2.1), with a slight abuse of notation, followed by an outline of the operational-
ization of the conceptual measures. In section 4.2.2 I document how I compute a discrete
income distribution with decile respectively quintile income shares and GDP per capita
for each country. Finally, how the similarity measures of two discrete empirical income
distributions are calculated is described in section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Definition of Similarity Measures
Let fa(x) denote the density function of income x of country a ∈ {c, n}, where 0 ≤ x <
∞.9 The overlap Onc, the main measure of similarity, is defined as the minimum integral
7Choi et al. (2009) also study similarity of income distributions, however in another context. They an-
alyze how similarity of income distributions and similarity of import price distributions of two multilateral
importers are related.
8How per capita income affects trade flows is studied, among others, in Markusen (2010), Fieler
(2011a), Simonovska (2010), Sauré (2009), Hepenstrick (2010), Bernasconi and Wuergler (2013).
9It is assumed that fa(x) has no “gaps” in the sense that there exists no  > 0 such that
∫ x¨+
x¨− fa(x)dx =
0 and
∫ x˙+
x˙− fa(x)dx > 0 and
∫ ...x +...
x − fa(x)dx > 0, where x˙+  < x¨−  < x¨+  <
...
x −  and x˙ < x¨ < ...x , for
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of the income distributions of two countries c and n.
Onc =
∫ ∞
0
min {fc(x), fn(x)} dx, ∈ [0, 1] (4.1)
Figure 4.1 depicts the income distributions of country c and n. The gray shaded area
represents the overlap of the two income distributions. The overlap has the following
properties. It is bounded between 0 and 1. It is 0 if two income distributions do not
overlap at all, i.e. if the minimum income of c is larger than the maximum income
of n. The overlap is maximized for two countries with identical income distributions
(Onc =
∫∞
0
fa(x)dx = 1, a ∈ {c, n}). The overlap is symmetric, i.e. Onc = Ocn.
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the Overlap of two Income Distributions, Onc
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I establish an additional measure which characterizes the overlap area. It represents
at which income levels the overlap accrues. Ox¯nc is defined as the average income level of
the overlap area.
Ox¯nc =
∫ ∞
0
[
min {fc(x), fn(x)}
Onc
· x
]
dx, ∈ (0,min{xmaxc , xmaxn }) (4.2)
1 =
∫ ∞
0
min {fc(x), fn(x)}
Onc
dx
xmaxa is the maximum income level of a. The size of the overlap area has no impact on
Ox¯nc as it is rescaled to 1 in order to calculate the average income level. Only the relative
concentration of the overlap area along the income axis matters for Ox¯nc. For two countries
with identical income distributions Ox¯nc is equal to the average income x¯a=
∫∞
0
f(x)axdx,
any positive and finite x˙, x¨ and ...x . All empirical distributions fulfill this assumption by construction.
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a ∈ {c, n}. Ox¯nc varies among country pairs with identical income distributions as the
overlap may occur at different income levels. In contrast, for such country pairs there is
no variation in the overlap Onc as the latter equals 1 whenever the two distributions are
identical.
The alternative measure of similarity represents the width of the overlap area. In
Figure 4.1 the income distributions of country c and n overlap for income levels between
x1 and x2. The width of the overlap area Ownc is defined as the distance between these
two income levels.
Ownc = x2 − x1, ∈ (0,min{xmaxc , xmaxn }] (4.3)
x1 ≥ 0, x2 > x1, x1 and x2 are such that
min {fc(x), fn(x)} =
0 for x < x1 and x > x2> 0 for x1 ≤ x ≤ x2
Ownc is 0 if two income distributions do not overlap at all.10 For two countries with identical
income distributions Ownc is equal to the difference between the maximum and minimum
income level.
The overlap has been used as a measure of similarity of income distributions in the
literature, see Choi et al. (2009), Bohman and Nilsson (2007) or Martinez-Zarzoso and
Vollmer (2010). In this chapter two further similarity measures are proposed, Ox¯nc and
Ownc.
4.2.2 Computation of Income Distributions
I use income shares of deciles and quintiles reported in the World Income Inequality
Database (WIID2c), UNU-WIDER (2008b), and GDP per capita from Heston et al.
(2009) to compute a discrete empirical income distribution for each country and year. sda
(sqa) denotes the share of total income in country a which is earned by decile d (quintile
q), where d ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and q ∈ {1, . . . , 5}. As inequality changes slowly over time I
choose for each country the observation with the highest data quality within a certain
time span – for example between 1992 and 2002 – and use this observation for the whole
period, see the Appendix 4.A.1 for details.
The first step of the transformation of the inequality data (sda, sqa) into income distri-
butions is the assignment of an average income level to each decile respectively quintile.
xdat =
sda ·GDPat
POPat/10
, xqat =
sqa ·GDPat
POPat/5
10The condition pinning down the thresholds x1 and x2 is formulated such that Ownc is strictly positive.
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The numerator of the first expression equals total income earned by decile d and the
denominator amounts to the number of individuals belonging to decile d. Thus, xdat is
the average income of an individual belonging to decile d in country a and year t. Total
income is approximated by real PPP GDP (in I$ and 2005 constant prices), denoted by
GDPat. POPat indicates the population.
As each xdat represents a 10th of the population it has the area of 0.1 in the probability
mass function of the discrete empirical income distribution. In the second step of the
transformation of the inequality data into income distributions, the area of 0.1 of each
xdat, which is collapsed at the value of the average income of decile d, is redistributed on an
income interval. Thereby I make only few assumptions, and importantly no parametric
assumption about the functional form of the income distribution. The assumptions are,
(i) the area of 0.1 of xdat is redistributed on the interval [xdat, x
d
at],
xd
at
=
xdat − (xdat − xd−1at )/2 if d > 1xminat if d = 1 , xdat =
xdat + (xd+1at − xdat)/2 if d < 10xmaxat if d = 10
(ii) the redistribution described in assumption (i) occurs uniformly over the income in-
terval [xd
at
, x
d
at]11, (iii) xminat = 1 ∀ a, ∀ t, (iv) xmaxat = x10at + 2.7(x10at − x9at). I estimated the
relationship in assumption (iv) using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) which contains
individual data on income for a small number of countries.12 13
In order to facilitate the calculation of similarity measures of two discrete income
distributions, the densities are partitioned into common intervals with a length of 5’000,
where income goes from 1 to 150’000 (in I$ and 2005 constant prices), for all countries.
After this final step, a discrete empirical income distribution has been computed for each
country a and year t. Figure 4.2 visualizes as an example Canada’s income distribution
for 2002, consult Figure A.2 for further countries. The discrete income distributions have
a slightly different notation. x˘ denotes the income interval, x˘ ∈ {[1−5′000], . . . , [145′001−
150′000]}. fa(x˘) is the density of country a’s income distribution which accrues at income
interval x˘. For instance, fCAN([1 − 5′000]) = 0.04.14 By definition the densities sum to
one,
∑
x˘ fa(x˘) = 1, i.e. the area below the line in Figure 4.2 equals one.
Although income shares (sda, sqa) are constant within a time span, average income levels
11The uniform redistribution is a parametric assumption about the functional form of the income
distribution within deciles. There is no parametric assumption about the functional form of the entire
income distribution, i.e. across deciles.
12I approximate xmaxat by the 100th percentile, on average (xmaxat − x10at)/(x10at − x9at) is equal to 2.7.
13For quintiles, the area of 0.2 of each xqat is redistributed on [xqat, x
q
at]. (iv) is xmaxat = x5at+3.8(x5at−x4at).
14In the graphs, the width of the intervals is 1 such that the area below the line of an interval x˘ is
equal to fa(x˘).
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Figure 4.2: A Discrete Empirical Income Distribution for Canada
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
de
ns
ity
0 50000 100000 150000
income interval
 
The time span of income shares sdCAN is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdCAN,t.
of deciles and quintiles (xdat, x
q
at), and hence income distributions, change yearly. However,
as will be outlined in section 4.4, the effect of similarity on trade is identified with variation
across exporters and variation across importers. Hence, I do not rely on variation of the
similarity measures over time.
Using Canada as an example, Figure A.3 visualizes an income distribution computed
with WIID and LIS, respectively. These two income distributions are not too different
although WIID only has information on deciles while LIS reports percentiles.
4.2.3 Calculation of Similarity Measures
Equation (4.1), which is based on continuous income distributions, is adapted such that
it yields the overlap of two discrete income distributions.15
Onc =
∑
x˘
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)} , ∈ [0, 1] (4.4)
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the overlap for Japan and Canada is measured empirically. The
additional measure takes into account at which income levels the overlap is concentrated
while the alternative measure represents the width of the overlap area. They are calculated
as follows with discrete income distributions, where ˘˘x(x˘) designates the middle income
level of income interval x˘, ˘˘x ∈ {2′500, . . . , 147′500}.
15I could use a Kernel smoothing procedure to transform the discrete income distributions into contin-
uous income distributions, however, I believe that this would suggest an exaggerated precision for income
distributions which are based on 10, or even 5, data points (x1at, . . . , x10at), respectively (x1at, . . . , x5at).
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Ox¯nc =
∑
x˘
[
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)}
Onc
˘˘x(x˘)
]
,∈ [2′500, 147′500],
∑
x˘
min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)}
Onc
= 1 (4.5)
Ownc =
∑
x˘
1 (min {fc(x˘), fn(x˘)} > 0) · 5′000, ∈ [5′000, 150′000] (4.6)
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the Overlap of two Discrete Empirical Income Distributions
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The time span of income shares sda is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdat.
For illustration, Table 4.1 lists all three measures for the country pairs Japan-Canada
and Japan-Mexico. As the income distributions of Japan and Canada are very alike (see
Figure 4.3) the overlap is as high as 0.83. In contrast, incomes in Mexico are much more
concentrated at low income levels, which leads to an overlap with Japan of only 0.36, see
Figure A.4. In the whole sample, the overlap effectively goes from almost 0 to 1, with mean
0.49 and standard deviation 0.29 (see Figure A.5 and Table A.2). Japan’s and Canada’s
income distributions overlap for a wide range of income levels, OwCAN,JPN=125’000. As
incomes in Mexico are rather dispersed also the overlap of Japan and Mexico accrues over
a wide range of incomes, namely from 1 up to 115’000. Thus, while the overlap of Japan-
Canada is more than twice as large than the overlap of Japan-Mexico, the overlap region
of these two country pairs occurs at a similar income range. In addition, the relative
concentration of the overlap area is not very different, therefore the average income of
the overlap area for Japan-Canada is only slightly higher than for Japan-Mexico. In the
entire sample, the average income level of the overlap area Ox¯nc ranges from 2’500 up to
45’000. The mean is 12’300 and the standard deviation 9’100. The width of the overlap
area Ownc covers the entire range of values from 5’000 to 150’000, with mean 48’700 and
standard deviation 36’300. Remember that all similarity measures are symmetric.
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Table 4.1: Illustrating the Similarity Measures with an Example
CAN MEX
JPN
Onc 0.829 0.363
Ox¯nc 30’875 28’649
Ownc 125’000 115’000
year=2002
Note the following difference between the overlap Onc and the average income level of
the overlap areaOx¯nc. While the overlap is typically large for North-North and South-South
country pairs, the average income level of the overlap area is much higher for North-North
country pairs than for South-South country pairs, see Table A.4. For illustration, the
overlap for Japan-Canada as well as for Somalia-Guinea is around 0.83. In contrast, the
average income level of the overlap area of Japan and Canada is 30’900 while it amounts
to less than a tenth for Somalia and Guinea (2’500). The same discrepancy is present
between the overlap Onc and the width of the overlap area Ownc. For instance, Somalia-
Guinea overlap only over a small income range (5’000) and Japan-Canada almost over
the entire range of incomes (125’000). Consequently, the correlation between the overlap
and the two alternative measures is low, whereas the two alternative measures are highly
correlated.16
Most previous studies approximate similarity of demand patterns with similarity of
average income levels. However, using the average income as a first order approximation of
the income distribution neglects important information. About one third of the variation
in the overlap cannot be explained by the variation in the GDP per capita ratio. There is
substantial variation in similarity of income distributions for a given similarity in average
income levels. The overlap ranges, for example, from 0.28 up to 0.97 for a GDP per capita
ratio of 0.50, see the gray bar in Figure 4.4. In the same figure it is illustrated similarity
in average incomes to be approximating similarity in income distributions much better
for North-North and North-South country pairs than for South-South country pairs.
16corr(Onc, O
x¯
nc)=-0.14, corr(Onc, Ownc)=0.18, corr(Ox¯nc, Ownc)=0.89
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Figure 4.4: Similarity of Income Distributions versus Similarity of Average Incomes
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High income countries, as classified by the World Bank, belong to the North, see table A3.
4.3 Trade Margins
4.3.1 Trade Data
The margins of international trade flows are computed with the database of Gaulier and
Zignago (2010) which reports annual bilateral trade flows at the six digit level of the
Harmonized System (HS), version 1992, from 1995 until 2007. The original data has been
collected by UN Comtrade. If both the importer and the exporter report to Comtrade two,
possibly different, figures show up for the same trade flow. I use the dataset of Gaulier
and Zignago (2010) because they reconciled double observations into a single harmonized
value per trade flow.17 The unit of observation in the data is: importer (c), exporter (n),
HS 6-digit code (i), year (t).18 At this level of disaggregation 5’018 product categories are
observed. However, only categories including consumer goods are used since the rationale
for my hypothesis is driven by the demand side. The corresponding classification is taken
from CEPII which in turn is based on the classification of Broad Economic Categories.19
1’263 product categories include consumer goods, they correspond to 27% of worldwide
value of trade, in 2002. Examples are cars with large cylinder capacity, microwave ovens
or cashew nuts (fresh or dried), see Table A.1 for more examples.
17They reconcile double observations into a single figure by weighting the values by the reliability of
the two reporting countries, where the measure for reliability is based on a variance analysis. Another
advantage of this database is that all values are converted to a Free on Board (FOB) basis. Originally
imports are reported inclusive of the Cost for Insurance and Freight (CIF) and exports FOB. The authors
estimated transport and insurance rates in order to transform CIF values into FOB values.
18In the text below, the terms “HS 6-digit” and “HS6” are used interchangeably.
19http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/baci/non_restrict/sector.asp
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I screen the data as follows: (i) I discard observations which involve countries from
which I do not have information on income distribution, (ii) countries with a population
smaller than one million are being dropped in order to avoid that very small countries
dominate the sample and (iii) I discard observations of less than US$2’000 as small trade
flows are more prone to measurement error. The sample I use accounts for 94% of the
value of worldwide trade in consumer goods. It covers 102 countries at all stages of
development (33 poor, 42 middle income and 27 rich nations), see Table A.3.
4.3.2 Definition of Trade Margins
I study both aggregate and disaggregate bilateral trade flows. Aggregate trade margins,
Ync, describe the flow from exporter n to importer c in all product categories. As an
example, one observation reveals that Japan imports consumer goods from Canada worth
1.24 billion US$; all examples refer to 2002. As trade flows differ considerably across
product categories I additionally study disaggregate trade flows, Ynci, i.e. flows from
exporter n to importer c in a specific category i. For example, it is recorded that Japan
imports cars (with large cylinder capacity, HS 870324) from Canada for 69 million US$.
Disaggregate Bilateral Trade Margins, Ynci
The data contains information on country c’s imports from exporter n in product category
i. For each trade flow the corresponding value vnci, in thousands of US dollars, is observed.
The extensive margin of disaggregate bilateral trade flows EMnci is an indicator which
equals one if c has positive imports from source country n in product category i and zero
otherwise.
EMnci =
1 if vnci > 00 if vnci = 0 (4.7)
At the disaggregate level there is no difference between the intensive margin and the
value as the latter describes trade in a given product category i. The intensive margin of
a disaggregate bilateral trade flow IMnci is defined as the value of the respective flow.20
IMnci = vnci (4.8)
Aggregate Bilateral Trade Margins, Ync
By summing over product categories, aggregate bilateral trade margins are constructed.
20For illustration, while Japan does import motorcycles (with middle cylinder capacity, HS 871130) from
Canada it does not from Mexico (EMCAN,JPN,871130 = 1, EMMEX,JPN,871130 = 0). Japan imports cars
(HS 870324) from Canada for 69 million US$ and from Mexico for only 7 million US$ (IMCAN,JPN,870324 =
69, IMMEX,JPN,870324 = 7).
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The value of the overall trade flow from n to c is decomposed into an extensive and inten-
sive margin. Where the extensive margin reflects in how many categories two countries
engage in trade, i.e. the diversity of the trade flow, the intensive margin describes how
much is traded in the average product. The decomposition of trade values into the two
margins is along the lines of Hummels and Klenow (2005).
The value of country c’s imports from exporter n is normalized by c’s imports from
the rest of the world r. To give an example, Japan’s imports from Canada (1.24 billion
US$) are normalized by Japan’s imports from the rest of the world (83.3 billion US$).
Vnc =
∑
i∈I vnci∑
i∈I vrci
, vrci =
∑
nˆ∈N−n
vnˆci (4.9)
The rest of the world r denotes all countries from which c imports other than n, N
designates the set of all exporters and I denotes the set of all product categories containing
consumer goods.
The extensive margin EMnc is a weighted count of the product categories which c
imports from n relative to the categories which c imports from the rest of the world r.
Each category i is weighted by c’s imports from the rest of the world r, vrci, to prevent that
categories which c predominantly imports from n appear important. As Japan imports
only few motorcycles i=871130 has a small weight and as Japan imports a lot of cars
i=870324 has a large weight. Japan imports in 671 categories from Canada and in 1’249
product categories from the rest of the world r. If all 1’249 categories were of equal
importance, EMCAN,JPN would be equal to 671/1’249=0.54. Yet, as those 671 categories
imported from Canada are important for Japan as an importer EMCAN,JPN is higher than
0.54, namely 0.85.
EMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vrci∑
i∈Irc vrci
(4.10)
Inc (Irc) designates the set of categories in which c has positive imports from n (rest of
the world r).
The intensive margin IMnc compares the value of c’s imports from n to the value of
c’s imports from r in a common set of goods, Inc. Japan’s imports from Canada (1.24 bn
US$) are normalized by Japan’s imports from the rest of the world in the before mentioned
671 categories (72.6 billion US$).
IMnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc vrci
(4.11)
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The normalized import value is equal to the product of the extensive and intensive margin.
Vnc = EMnc · IMnc
Alternatively, unnormalized aggregate bilateral trade margins, Y˜nc, are defined as sim-
ply and intuitively as possible. V˜nc denotes the value of c’s overall imports from n. E˜Mnc is
defined as the number of product categories in which c has positive imports from source
country n. I˜Mnc reflects the average value per product category.21 See Table A.2 for
summary statistics of all trade margins.
V˜nc =
∑
i∈Inc
vnci, E˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc
EMnci, I˜Mnc =
∑
i∈Inc vnci∑
i∈Inc EMnci
, V˜nc = E˜MncI˜Mnc (4.12)
4.4 Empirical Model
I test the hypothesis that countries with more similar demand structures trade more with
each other. According to the prediction, they trade more in terms of value and along both
the extensive and intensive margin. Similarity of demand structures is approximated by
similarity of income distributions. I use a cross section of the data to test this hypothesis
with an augmented gravity equation, both for aggregate and disaggregate trade flows.
Aggregate Trade Flows, Ync
Equation (4.13) is the main specification which is estimated with OLS.
ln(Ync) = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ + Ac + An + nc, Y ∈ {V,EM, IM} (4.13)
Ync represents the aggregate bilateral trade flow from exporter n to importer c. Each
trade margin is regressed on the similarity measure Onc, reflecting the similarity of income
distributions among trading partners c and n. The coefficient of interest is βˆ, the marginal
effect of similarity of income distributions on bilateral trade. This effect is conditional on
trade costs τnc and importer as well as exporter fixed effects, Ac and An.
The vector which approximates bilateral trade costs τnc includes the standard controls
– geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border,
common legal system, common language and colonial ties.22 In addition, τnc includes
a dummy variable which allows for a different intercept for North-North, South-South
21The importer fixed effects in the regressions absorb, among other things, c’s overall imports as
well as the overall number of categories imported by c. I.e. Y˜nc are equivalent to import shares, e.g.
V˜nc/(
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈I vnci).
22I use the dataset of Helpman et al. (2008) (http://scholar.harvard.edu/helpman/pages/data-1).
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and North-South trade flows. This is due to two reasons. First, the distribution of
the extensive margin is tremendously different for North-North trade flows compared to
South-South or North-South trade flows, see Table A.5. Second, the distribution of income
similarity differs strongly for the three types of trade flows, also when it is conditioned
on the other proxies for bilateral trade costs and importer and exporter fixed effects, see
Table A.4. Allowing for different intercepts captures these disparities partly. A country
belongs to the North if it is classified as a high income country by the World Bank and
to the South otherwise, see Table A.3.23
Importer fixed effects Ac control for all factors which are specific to importer c, such
as importer GDP, importer population, importer production possibilities, importer tech-
nology or skills in country c. Likewise exporter fixed effects An control for all factors
which are specific to exporter n, such as exporter GDP and population, exporter produc-
tion possibilities, technology and skills. Hence, the marginal effect of similarity on trade
is identified by variation across exporters, for a given importer, and by variation across
importers, for a given exporter. Table A.3 documents high variation of the similarity
measure also within countries. For instance, Japan’s overlap of its income distribution
with the income distribution of its trading partner (On,JPN) ranges from 0.05 (n=SOM)
up to 0.88 (n=GER).
Regression equation (4.13) is closely related to a gravity equation. The gravity model
predicts that bilateral trade increases in economic size of the trading partners and dimin-
ishes in their distance. The economic sizes are captured by the importer and exporter
fixed effects, whereas τnc absorbs several dimensions of distance, such as geography or
language. Thus, the present specification isolates the effect of similarity from standard
gravity forces. Moreover, the effect of similarity is not only separated from the effect of
economic sizes but also from all other factors which are specific to an importer respectively
exporter, such as technology or skills.
Although all three similarity measures are symmetric, one-way trade flows are ana-
lyzed. The explanatory variable Onc is the same for Japan’s imports from Canada as
for Canada’s imports from Japan. However, the importer and exporter fixed effects are
different for the two trade flows. They allow a differential import and export behavior of
a given country.
The fact of a substantial fraction of trade flows to be zero is well known. In 2002,
I have data for 102 countries, hence there are potentially 10’302 one-way trade flows.
Thereof 74% are positive, 25% are zero and for 1% of the trade flows the data is missing.
23Due to conditioning on importer and exporter fixed effects, which control for whether an importer
respectively exporter belongs to the North, only one of the four combinations of North and South is
included in equation (4.13), and one serves as the base group. For the coefficient of interest it does not
matter which of the four combinations is included.
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With a bulk of zeros there is potentially a selection problem, i.e. country pairs which do
engage in trade may not be representative for all country pairs. In order to control for
this I apply a simplified version of the semi-parametric analogue of Heckman’s two-step
estimator which is proposed in Cosslett (1991).24 Equation (4.14) is the first stage and
specifies a linear probability model which is estimated with OLS. 1(Vnc > 0) designates
an indicator which is equal to 1 if imports of c from n are positive and 0 if c does not
import from n. The resulting predicted probabilities w′ncθˆ are ranked and assigned into J
bins with equal number of observations. The bins are denoted with Ij. They approximate
the selection correction function with a step function. Hence, nonparametrically and in a
very flexible way. Equation (4.15) is the second stage and nests my baseline specification
(4.13) as it additionally controls for selection with a set of indicator variables representing
the J bins – 1(w′ncθˆ ∈ Ij), where j = 1, . . . , J . In other words, compared to the baseline
specification, (4.15) additionally controls for the probability of a positive trade flow by
allowing bin-specific intercepts. Note that the coefficients on the bins, the λˆj’s, shed light
on the selection pattern. For instance, if λˆj is increasing in j, trade flows with a higher
probability of being positive have systematically higher trade margins (Ync). I choose
J=100, i.e. allowing a different intercept for each percentile of the predicted probabilities
(w′ncθˆ). Yet, the results are similar for J=50 or J=200.
1(Vnc > 0) = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ + µznc + Ac + An + unc ≡ w′ncθ + unc (4.14)
ln (Ync) = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ +
J∑
j=1
λj · 1(w′ncθˆ ∈ Ij) + Ac + An + nc (4.15)
znc is the exclusion restriction. The constellation of religious affiliation is assumed to affect
whether c imports from country n but not how much c imports from n or how diverse c’s
imports from n are. This common religion variable is taken from Helpman et al. (2008),
they use it for the same type of exclusion restriction.25
Disaggregate Trade Flows, Ynci
As drivers for trade may differ across goods, disaggregate trade flows are also being
analyzed.
24The procedure in Cosslett (1991) is as follows. The binary response model, the first stage, is estimated
with the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator in Cosslett (1983). The estimator Fˆ (·) of the
marginal cumulative density function of the selection error is a step function, it is constant on a finite
number of intervals, J . In the second stage the selection correction function is approximated by a piecewise
constant function on those intervals. As the second stage is linear it can be estimated with OLS. Cosslett
(1991) shows that the estimator of the first and second stage are consistent.
25religionnc = (% Protestants in country n · % Protestants in country c) + (% Catholics in country n
· % Catholics in country c) + (% Muslims in country n · % Muslims in country c), ∈ [0,1].
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EMnci = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ + Ac + An + Ai + nci (4.16)
ln(IMnci) = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ + Ac + An + Ai + nci (4.17)
The extensive margin at the disaggregate level is a binary variable, EMnci ∈ {0, 1}. Its
relation to similarity and controls is specified as a linear probability model in equation
(4.16). Also at the disaggregate level, I regress the margins of bilateral trade on the
similarity measure Onc. The effect of similarity on trade from n to c in product category
i is conditional on bilateral trade costs τnc as well as importer, exporter and product
category fixed effects, Ac, An and Ai.
With product fixed effects, the marginal effects are identified with variation within
product categories. The category fixed effects capture all product specific characteristics,
for example the difficulty of global transport of a good (strawberries versus books), the
technology needed to produce the good or the average value of worldwide trade in a
product. For instance, for cars (HS 870324) the global average bilateral trade value is
47.8 million US$ and for curry (HS 091050) 71’260 US$ .
At the HS 6-digit level 92% of bilateral trade flows are zero in my sample with 102
countries, in 2002. This poses no problem for estimating the linear probability model
for the extensive margin specified in (4.16) with OLS. However, equation (4.17) can only
be estimated for those 8% of all potential trade flows being positive. This is taken into
account by applying the simplified version of the semi-parametric selection model proposed
in Cosslett (1991). The first stage is the linear probability model (4.16). The predicted
probabilities of a positive bilateral disaggregate trade flow, w′nciθˆ, are ranked and assigned
into J bins with equal number of observations. The J bins, denoted with Ij, approximate
the selection correction function with a step function, i.e. nonparametrically. The second
stage (4.18) includes all regressors of equation (4.17) and additionally embeds the selection
correction function.
ln(IMnci) = α + βOnc + τ
′
ncγ +
J∑
j=1
λj · 1(w′nciθˆ ∈ Ij) + Ac + An + Ai + nci (4.18)
As religious affiliation is not positively related to c’s probability of importing good i
from exporter n it cannot be used as an exclusion restriction. Due to lack of a plausible
exclusion restriction at the level of products, the system is estimated without an exclusion
restriction. However, the identification of β does not stem from a specific functional form
of the selection function, as would for example be the case with the Heckman two-step
estimator, since the selection function is nonparametric.
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4.5 Discussion of Results
The three main findings of the empirical analysis provide comprehensive and consistent
evidence that similarity of demand patterns, approximated by similarity of income dis-
tributions, is an important determinant of bilateral trade margins. First, the more the
income distributions of two countries overlap, the higher is their bilateral trade volume in
consumer goods. This effect is driven by both the extensive and intensive margin (section
4.5.1). In the main specification 63% of the effect of income similarity on trade values is
due to a higher extensive margin, and the remaining 37% due to a higher intensive mar-
gin, of countries with more similar income distributions. My augmented gravity equation
conditions on importer and exporter fixed effects as well as trade costs. This isolates the
effect of similarity from supply side effects, such as technology, and from gravity forces,
such as trade costs and economic sizes. Second, the two novel measures characterizing the
overlap area are also positively related to both trade margins (section 4.5.1). The average
income level of the overlap area serves as an additional explanatory variable as it describes
the location of the overlap. On the other hand, the width of the overlap area is an alter-
native measure for income similarity as it reflects how broad the range of incomes is for
which two distributions overlap. Third, also the margins of disaggregate trade flows, i.e.
trade within products, increase in income distribution similarity (section 4.5.2). Thus, the
findings on the aggregate level are reinforced by the results on disaggregate trade flows.
4.5.1 Income Similarity and Aggregate Trade Margins
Panel (a) of Table 4.2 reports the OLS coefficients from regression equation (4.13), based
on data of 2002. In the first three columns the main measure of similarity is used. On
average, countries with a higher overlap of their income distributions have higher bilateral
trade values (Vnc), trade a larger variety of goods (EMnc) and have higher bilateral trade
values in a given set of goods (IMnc).
The first column implies that if the overlap of two income distributions, Onc, increases
by one standard deviation (0.29) the value of bilateral trade in consumer goods increases
by 35%. Respectively, the log value is raised by 0.11 standard deviations (beta coeffi-
cient). This effect is hence both statistically as well as economically highly significant.26
Remember, the marginal effect of the overlap on trade is conditional on importer and
26The overlap ranges from 0 to 1, with mean 0.49 and standard deviation 0.29. For illustration, while
Japan’s overlap with Hungary amounts to 0.47 – which is about the mean of Onc – it is 0.78 with Hong
Kong. I.e. the overlap with Hong Kong is 0.31, or about one standard deviation, higher than the overlap
with Hungary.
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exporter fixed effects as well as on trade costs, in order to isolate the effect of income
similarity from supply side effects and gravity forces.
Decomposing bilateral trade values into the two margins demonstrates that the pos-
itive association between the overlap and trade volumes is driven by both the extensive
and intensive margin. As Vnc = EMncIMnc and as the dependent variables are in loga-
rithms, the OLS coefficients of the two margins add up to the coefficient of trade values.
On average, countries with a one standard deviation higher overlap trade a 22% more
diversified bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more within a given set of
goods (intensive margin). 63% (0.755/1.204) of the effect of a larger overlap on higher
trade values is due to a higher extensive margin of countries with more similar income
distributions. And 37% of the effect are attributed to the intensive margin. With a beta
coefficient of 0.1 for the extensive and 0.06 for the intensive margin the effects are not
only of statistical but also of economic importance.
In column four to six it is shown that not only the extent to which two income distribu-
tions overlap but also at which income levels the overlap is concentrated matters for trade.
Additionally controlling for the average income level of the overlap area, Ox¯nc, somewhat
reduces the marginal effects of the overlap, however, without altering their statistical or
economical significance. Most importantly, the value and both the extensive and intensive
margin of bilateral trade flows are larger for country pairs which income distributions
overlap at higher income levels, conditional on the size of the overlap.27 Quantitatively,
for a given size of the overlap, the bilateral trade value is 36% higher for a country pair
with a one standard deviation higher average income of the overlap area (9’100). Almost
two thirds of this effect is due to a higher extensive margin and one third is due to a
higher intensive margin.
The width of the overlap area, Ownc, is used as an alternative measure for income
similarity as it represents the range of incomes for which two distributions overlap and
hence captures, in a simple way, how similar two income distributions are. The last three
columns in panel (a) of Table 4.2 document that the results are qualitatively the same
when this alternative measure for income similarity is employed.28 An increase of one
standard deviation in the width of the overlap (36’300) is, on average, associated with a
41% higher trade value. Again, the increase in the value is due to both a larger extensive
(24%) and a larger intensive margin (17%).
27Ox¯nc ranges from 2’500 to 45’050, with a standard deviation of 9’100. For illustration, while the area
of Japan’s overlap with both Mexico and Poland is 0.36 the average income level of the overlap area with
Mexico is 9’000 larger than with Poland (28’600 versus 19’700).
28Ownc goes from 5’000 to 150’000, with mean 48’700 and standard deviation 36’300. For illustration,
the width of the overlap of Japan-Bulgaria is 45’000. As the distribution of the Dominican Republic is
more skewed it overlaps with Japan up to incomes of 80’000, which is about one standard deviation more
than the width of Japan-Bulgaria.
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Note that bilateral trade costs are omitted in all tables. All coefficients have the
expected sign and are significantly different from zero. Standard errors are clustered by
two-way country pairs, i.e. nc and cn are allowed to be correlated. This might be the
case if there is a country pair specific shock, such as a bilateral political dispute, which
lowers country c’s imports from n as well as country n’s imports from c.29
Prior to addressing the zeros in trade data, I outline in this paragraph robustness
of the above findings. Panel (b) of Table 4.2 displays that the results are qualitatively
the same for unnormalized trade margins which are computed in a simple and intuitive
way. A country imports more from source countries with a higher overlap, not only in
terms of value but also along both margins.30 Moreover, for a given overlap of income
distributions, the higher the average income level of the overlap area, the larger are
bilateral trade margins. Finally, the broader the range of incomes for which two income
distributions overlap, the larger is the bilateral trade value. Again, this effect is driven
by both margins.
In order to show the identified effect really to be capturing similarity of income distri-
butions, and not similarity of average incomes, I additionally control for the ratio of per
capita incomes. Qualitatively this does not change the results, see Table A.6. There is one
exception, the effect of the overlap on the extensive margin is not significantly different
from zero for normalized trade margins. However, for unnormalized trade margins also
the results about the extensive margin are unchanged.
The above results, which are based on data of 2002, are both qualitatively and quan-
titatively representative for the whole period 1995 to 2007. In each and every year and
for all measures of similarity, trade values increase significantly in similarity of income
distributions. In all years, this effect is driven by both the extensive and intensive margin.
This is true for normalized as well as unnormalized trade margins, see Table A.7 and A.8.
Moreover, pooling all cross sections and including importer-year and exporter-year fixed
effects yields very similar results to using only one cross section, see Table A.9.31
Next, it is shown that taking into account the zeros in the estimation procedure
29One might be worried that the error terms of an importing country are not independent because of
a shock of the following type. A recession lowers c’s import demand resulting in a slightly negative effect
on countries exporting necessity goods to c and a large negative effect on exporters selling durable goods
to c. Although the average effect of the recession is captured by the importer fixed effect the differential
effects on exporters leads to correlated error terms. To account for this, and analogously correlated errors
of an exporting country, I clustered the standard errors both by importers and exporters. This increases
the standard errors, however does not affect the significance levels.
30The marginal effects are quantitatively very similar for normalized and unnormalized trade values as
most of the difference between Vnc and V˜nc is captured by the importer fixed effects.
31Note that the qualitative results of Table 4.2 are also unchanged if equation (4.13) is specified as a
log-log instead of log-lin model or if observations are weighted by the total population of the country
pair.
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does not alter the main findings. In Table 4.3 I apply the simplified version of the semi-
parametric selection model of Cosslett (1991) described in section 4.4. The only difference
to the baseline are the bin-specific intercepts which represent the probability that a trade
flow is positive and approximate the selection function non-parametrically. The first panel
reports the results for normalized trade margins (Ync). The value of bilateral trade flows
increases significantly in income similarity, Onc, if the zeros are taken into account. Even
the magnitude of the marginal effect is close to the baseline estimation. Controlling for
selection lowers the marginal effect of similarity on the intensive margin and raises the
marginal effect on the extensive margin. The effect on the intensive margin is estimated
very imprecisely. The coefficients on the bin-specific intercepts (λˆj) disclose that trade
flows which have a higher probability to be positive, have systematically a lower intensive
and higher extensive margin. Additionally controlling for the average income level of
the overlap area again lowers the marginal effects of the overlap and shows that the
extensive and value margin are larger for country pairs whose overlap is concentrated at
higher incomes, Ox¯nc. Controlling for selection does not alter the results when similarity
is measured with the width of the overlap Ownc.
Selection seems to be less of an issue for unnormalized trade margins (Y˜nc), see second
panel. Income similarity has a significantly positive effect on trade values. This effect is
driven by both margins and is qualitatively the same for all measures of similarity. The
effects are rather close to the baseline OLS estimates as there is no clear selection pattern
for the intensive margin and as the extensive margin is only slightly higher for trade flows
with a higher probability of being positive.
The number of bins J is 100, yet the results are alike for J=50 or J=200. Moreover,
estimates which do not rely on an exclusion restriction are similar. The first stage indi-
cates whether two countries engage in trade depends negatively on similarity. However,
the effect is very small and not even significantly different from zero when additionally
controlling for average income of the overlap.
Last, I outline that the patterns described above hold for trade in various industries.
Aggregate bilateral trade margins are computed for each section of the Standard Interna-
tional Trade Classification (SITC).32 There are three interesting points about Table 4.4.
(i) Estimating the augmented gravity equation (4.13) for each section of SITC separately,
unfolds that the overlap of income distributions is significantly positively associated with
bilateral trade values for all SITC sections except crude materials and oils & fats. The
32 Trade margins are calculated analogously to equations (4.9)-(4.11) for each section of the SITC
(SITC 1-digit codes). For two reasons the SITC rather than the HS classification is used to analyze trade
flows in different industries. (i) The SITC classifies commodities according to their stage of production,
whereas the HS nomenclature is based on the nature of the commodity. (ii) At the 1-digit level there are
10 codes for the SITC and 21 for the HS.
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effects on trade values are driven by both the extensive and intensive margin. (ii) The
effect of income similarity on trade is largest for chemicals, followed by machinery and
transport equipment and manufactured goods. (iii) Estimating a pooled regression, and
controlling for SITC section fixed effects (column one), confirms the qualitative results for
overall trade flows. That there is no effect of income similarity in industries containing
mostly unprocessed goods, and that the effect is largest in industries including highly
differentiated products, such as chemicals or machinery and transport equipment, is in
favor of the hypothesis.33
4.5.2 Income Similarity and Disaggregate Trade Margins
In this section it is shown that also the extensive and intensive margin of disaggregate
bilateral trade flows, i.e. trade within product categories, increase in similarity of income
distributions. At the disaggregate level the extensive margin EMnci is an indicator which
equals 1 if country c does import product category i from source country n. The intensive
margin IMnci is the value of c’s imports in product i from exporter n. Within product
categories, i.e. at the disaggregate level, there is no difference between the value and the
intensive margin.
Table 4.5 documents that country c has a significantly higher probability to import a
given product from those source countries which have an alike income distribution. Col-
umn one implies that, on average, an increase of one standard deviation in the overlap Onc
(0.29) is associated with a 3.4 percentage point higher probability of bilaterally importing
a product. With a beta coefficient of 0.13 this effect is both statistically and economically
highly significant. Moreover, the probability to import a given product from a given ex-
porter does not only increase in the overlap but it is also higher if the exports stem from
source countries with which the overlap is concentrated at higher income levels, Ox¯nc. For
a given size of the overlap, an increase of the average income level of the overlap area of
one standard deviation is associated with a 1.6 percentage point higher probability of a
positive trade flow. Measuring the degree to which two income distributions are alike with
the width of the overlap, Ownc, yields the same implication. An increase of one standard
deviation in the width of the overlap raises the probability of importing a given product
from a given exporter by 2.9 percentage point.
For the results on the intensive margin it matters a lot whether selectivity is accounted
for. The OLS model specified in equation (4.17) implies that there is no, or even a negative,
relation between similarity of income distributions and the bilateral trade value within
a product category. However, controlling for the non-parametric selection function, as
33For lack of space the corresponding results for unnormalized trade margins and other measures of
income similarity are not reported as they yield qualitatively the same insights.
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158 Income Similarity and Bilateral Trade
described in section 4.4, changes the findings completely. Conditioning on the predicted
probability of a trade flow to be positive (bin specific intercepts) implies that the value
of a country’s imports in a given product is significantly higher if stemming from source
countries which have a more similar income distribution. Quantitatively, a one standard
deviation larger overlap is associated with a 8.5% higher trade value, within a category.
The estimates on the bin-specific intercepts (λˆj) unfold that trade flows with a higher
probability of being positive have systematically and substantially lower trade values.
This falling selection pattern constitutes a downward bias for the OLS estimate in column
two. Additionally, controlling for selection reveals countries to be importing more from
exporters with which their income distribution overlaps at higher incomes. Furthermore,
the width of the overlap raises disaggregate trade values significantly. The number of bins
J is 100, yet the results are qualitatively similar for J=50 or J=200.
Bilateral trade costs are omitted in all tables, the coefficients have the same sign as
on the aggregate level. Standard errors are again clustered by two-way country pairs.34
In summary, both aggregate bilateral trade flows as well as bilateral trade flows within
a given product category increase at both margins in similarity of income distributions.
In Table 4.6 the same analysis is shown for higher levels of aggregation. At the 4-
digit level EMnci represents whether or not c does import HS4 code i from n.35 That a
country is more likely to import a given category from source countries with more similar
income distributions holds for all levels of aggregation (HS6, HS4, HS2, HS1) and for both
measures of income similarity. Furthermore, for all levels of aggregation, this probability
increases in the average income level of the overlap area.
Regarding the intensive margin, the results are qualitatively the same on all levels
of aggregation if it is conditioned on the selection function. Within categories, countries
import systematically more from exporters with more similar income distributions. As
mentioned above, the 6-digit OLS results imply no or a negative association between
similarity and bilateral trade values. In contrast, on higher levels of aggregation (HS4,
HS2, HS1) the relation is positive. Because of the following two features of articles of
apparel (HS2 codes 61 and 62) the OLS results on the 6-digit level are biased downwards.
(i) Due to the fine customs structure for articles of apparel they are artificially detailed
and hence have disproportionately many HS6 codes within HS4 codes, see also Cadot
et al. (2011).36 Recall that the Harmonized System is not only used for the collection
34Clustering the standard errors by importer, exporter and HS6 codes does not change the significance
level for the extensive margin. However, the coefficients on the intensive margin have a p-value larger
than 0.1.
35The HS has four hierarchical levels. The 1-digit level corresponds to sections, the 2-digit level
represents chapters, the 4-digit codes identify headings and the 6-digit codes represent sub-headings.
36Whereas a HS4 code including apparel is on average split into 6.9 HS6 codes, a HS4 code without
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160 Income Similarity and Bilateral Trade
of trade statistics but also serves as a basis for customs tariffs. (ii) Trade values in
apparel are negatively related to similarity. Estimating equation (4.17) for each HS4 code
separately yields 313 βˆi’s, see Table A.10. While a HS4 code including apparel has on
average a negative coefficient (-0.79), the average effect of all other HS4 codes is positive
(0.27). In sum, the negative relation of trade in apparel and similarity gets too much
weight on the 6-digit level because apparel is artificially detailed due to customs tariffs.37
The magnitude of the consequential downward bias on the HS6 OLS coefficient (pooled
regression) is demonstrated in Table A.11. Estimating (4.16)-(4.18) separately for apparel
and non-apparel shows a significant positive effect of income similarity on the intensive
margin for all products but apparel (1’028 HS6 codes) and a significantly negative effect
for apparel (233 HS6 codes), for both OLS and Cosslett.
The findings on disaggregate trade margins are robust. In Table A.12 I additionally
control for similarity of average incomes. As this does not change the results the above
effects really reflect similarity in income distributions. The findings above are based on
data of 2002. The results on the extensive margin are extremely robust regarding time.
In all years and for all measures of similarity, I find a significantly positive relationship
between similarity in income distributions and the probability of a positive trade flow,
see Table A.13. Furthermore, pooling all cross sections, and including importer-year
and exporter-year fixed effects, also shows the results for 2002 to be both qualitatively
and quantitatively representative for the whole period from 1995 to 2007, see first panel
of Table A.14. Regarding the intensive margin, in some years the results are not as
supportive as in 2002. In some years the marginal effect of the overlap on the intensive
margin is significantly positive, in some it is positive but insignificant and in some the
estimator is very imprecise. Pooling all cross sections yields a positive but insignificant
effect of the overlap on the intensive margin. However, the alternative similarity measure,
Ownc, is significantly positively related to the intensive margin in all years, and also if all
cross sections are pooled. Moreover, the second to fourth panel of Table A.14 document
that for the HS 4-, 2- and 1-digit level the year 2002 is representative for the whole period
1995 to 2007.38
After having demonstrated that income similarity raises both the extensive and in-
apparel has on average only 3.7 HS6 codes. For illustration, “women’s or girls’ suit, dress, skirt, etc,
knit or crochet” (6104) is broken down into 25 HS6 codes, e.g. women’s or girls’ ensembles of wool,
knit (610421). In contrast, “Grape wines, alcoholic grape must” (2204) has only four sub-headings, e.g.
sparkling wine (220410).
37Figure A.6 illustrates that HS4 codes with a negative coefficient have disproportionately many sub-
headings and that this is driven by articles of apparel.
38Note that the qualitative results of Table 4.5 are unchanged if income similarity is used in logs in
equation (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18) or if observations are weighted by the total population of the country
pair.
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162 Income Similarity and Bilateral Trade
tensive margin within product categories, on all levels of disaggregation, I outline that
this holds also within various industries. Equations (4.16)-(4.18) are estimated for each
section of the SITC separately. I.e. all HS6 codes belonging to an SITC section are pooled
in one regression. Let me highlight two main findings from Table 4.7. (i) Documenting a
positive and highly significant relation between income similarity and the probability to
import a given product from a given exporter for each and every SITC section provides
strong evidence for my hypothesis on increasing trade due to similarity in demand struc-
tures. Moreover, the effect is largest for chemicals, machinery and transport equipment
and manufacturing goods, i.e. in industries with highly differentiated products. (ii) The
intensive margin of bilateral trade is significantly higher for country pairs with more sim-
ilar income distributions in all SITC sections but crude materials, manufactured goods
and miscellaneous manufactured articles. That trade in crude materials does not increase
in similarity does not challenge the supportive evidence for the hypothesis. The result of
miscellaneous manufactured articles is non-confirmative as apparel belongs to this indus-
try. Note that on the 4-digit level the relation between income similarity and trade in
manufactured goods is significantly positive.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates empirically how similarity of demand structures, approximated
by similarity of income distributions, affects trade patterns along the extensive and in-
tensive margin. The idea of similarity of demand structures to be intensifying trade has a
long tradition in the economic literature, originally put forth by Linder (1961), and more
recently by Markusen (1986) or Foellmi et al. (2010).
The three main findings of this chapter provide comprehensive and consistent evidence
that similarity of demand structures is an important determinant of bilateral trade mar-
gins. First, the more similar two countries are regarding their income distributions, the
higher is their bilateral trade volume in consumer goods. This effect is driven by both
margins. The magnitudes of the effects are economically relevant. On average, countries
with a one standard deviation higher overlap have a 35% higher trade value, trade a 22%
more diversified bundle of goods (extensive margin) and trade 13% more within a given
set of goods (intensive margin). Second, the two novel measures characterizing the over-
lap area are also positively related to both trade margins. I find that not only the extent
to which two income distributions overlap but also at which income levels the overlap is
concentrated, matters for trade. Moreover, measuring income similarity with the width
of the overlap area implies as well that bilateral trade margins increase in similarity of
demand patterns. Third, both margins of disaggregate trade flows increase in similarity
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of income distributions. I document that both the probability that two countries trade a
given product (extensive margin) and the trade value within a given category (intensive
margin) increase in income similarity. Thus, both aggregate as well as disaggregate trade
flows increase along both margins in income distribution similarity.
I make two major contributions. First, I decompose the effect of income similarity
on trade values into an effect on the extensive and intensive margin. Second, in this
chapter the relationship between similarity of income distributions, as opposed to simi-
larity of average incomes, and bilateral trade flows is analyzed. Furthermore, I make two
methodological contributions by establishing two novel measures for similarity of income
distributions and by developing a new procedure to compute national income distributions
with income shares and per capita incomes.
The present analysis could be extended in several ways. So far, the quality margin has
not been taken into account. Murphy and Shleifer (1997), Hallak (2010) or Fajgelbaum
et al. (2011b) predict that countries with more similar demand structures trade more with
each other since such country pairs demand and produce goods of similar quality. For the
empirical analysis this implies that countries with more similar income distributions trade
more (which has already been shown in this chapter) and the more similar two countries
are, the more similar are the quality levels they trade. In addition, these models predict
that countries whose income distributions overlap at higher levels of income trade goods
of higher quality. Furthermore, working out a formal model based on non-homothetic
preferences in which consumption and production patterns overlap and trade emerges
due to product differentiation and love for variety would be of interest. In particular,
such a model would shed light on aggregation effects from the product to the aggregate
level, and whether such aggregation effects differ when non-homotheticity is horizontal,
i.e. horizontally differentiated goods with varying income elasticities, instead of vertical
as in Hallak (2010).
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Inequality Data
I use the income shares reported in the WIID as it is the only database about within-
country inequality which covers a large number of countries. In the raw data s˜dat (s˜
q
at), the
income share earned by decile d (quintile q) in country a and year t, where d ∈ {1, . . . , 10}
(q ∈ {1, . . . , 5}), is observed. There are mainly two issues to be considered with these
data. (i) The underlying surveys differ along several dimensions, both across countries
and over time (for a given country), e.g. income versus expenditure inequality. (ii) If a
country is included in the WIID the corresponding income shares are usually not observed
in every year. In order to create a dataset which is as comparable as possible and which
covers a large number of countries I choose for each country the “best” observation within
a given time span and use this observation for the whole corresponding period. This
mitigates both above mentioned issues. I can choose as consistent surveys as possible
(across countries) and increase data quality by picking the “best” observation out of all
available observations within a time span. This addresses some of the problems of using
“secondary” datasets discussed in Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). Moreover, there are
no missing country-year observations, within a time span, by assumption. The following
time spans are defined: 1992-2002, 1997-2007 and 1999-2009. Using an observation for
several years is a minor issue as inequality changes slowly over time. Figure A.1 shows
for two exemplary countries that quintile income shares are fairly stable over a decade.
Figure A.1: Evolution of Quintile Income Shares over Time
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Notes: Japan cannot be used as an example as there is only
one observation in the WIID from 1992-2002.
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The criteria for selecting the “best” available observation about inequality for each
country and time span are (i) decile shares rather than quintile shares, (ii) income in-
equality rather than consumption inequality, (iii) net income inequality rather than gross
income inequality, (iv) high quality inequality data rather than low quality inequality data
according to 4-level quality rating in WIID2c which is based on wether the underlying
concepts are known and on the quality of the income concept and the survey (see UNU-
WIDER (2008a)), (v) inequality data with full area, population and age coverage rather
than inequality data with partial area, population and age coverage, (vi) inequality re-
garding individuals rather than inequality regarding households and (vii) inequality data
adjusted to person inequality rather than unadjusted inequality data. If more than one
observation, per country and time span, fulfill these criteria likewise I take the arithmetic
mean (over time). The “best” observation for a, selected according to (i)-(vii), is denoted
by s˘da respectively s˘qa and is used for the whole time span.39
Choosing as consistent surveys as possible mitigates the problem of comparability
across countries but does not resolve it completely. For example, if there is no survey
based on income inequality for a country in a given time span. In order to account for the
well known difference between income and consumption inequality all expenditure based
inequality measures are adjusted as in Foellmi et al. (2011), which is similar to the ad-
justment in Dollar and Kraay (2002). s˘d,ba denotes the share of total income (expenditure)
which is earned (spent) by decile d in country a. For b = inc the decile reflects inequality
in income and for b = exp inequality in expenditure. Each expenditure based decile is
multiplied by its adjustment factor Ad which equals the ratio between the sample mean
of income based deciles and the sample mean of expenditure based deciles.40 The scaling
factor Sdeca ensures that the adjusted decile shares sda add up to 1.
sda =
s˘d,ba AdSdeca if b = exps˘d,ba if b = inc , Ad =
1
Nd,inc
∑
a
∑
t s˜
d,inc
at
1
Nd,exp
∑
a
∑
t s˜
d,exp
at
, Sdeca =
1∑
d s˘
d,exp
a Ad
,
∑
d
sda = 1
Expenditure based quintiles are adjusted accordingly. As all inequality measures of rich
countries are income based only observations of middle income and poor countries need to
be adjusted. The adjustment factors are therefore calculated with data of middle income
and poor countries only.
After choosing from all available observations (s˜dat) the “best” observation for each
country and time span (s˘da), and where required adjusting it from expenditure to income
inequality (sda), I have income shares for 102 countries for the time span from 1992 to
39An observation is composed of all income shares, i.e. (s˘1a, . . . , s˘10a ) or (s˘1a, . . . , s˘5a).
40A1=0.58, A2=0.73, A3=0.79, A4=0.83, A5=0.86, A6=0.90, A7=0.93, A8=0.97, A9=1.02, A10=1.19
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2002. For 94 countries I have decile income shares (s1a, . . . , s10a ) and for 8 countries
quintile income shares (s1a, . . . , s5a). For the period 1997 to 2007 income shares are
available for 91 countries (deciles for 66 and quintiles for 25 countries) and from 1999 to
2009 for 88 countries (deciles for 55 and quintiles for 33 countries).
One might find it intuitive to think of a Lorenz curve rather than income shares.
The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative distribution function of
income. LCda =
∑d
δ=1 s
δ
a is the share of total income of country a earned by individuals
belonging to decile d or lower. Note that piecewise linear Lorenz curves, as used in this
chapter, underestimate inequality.
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4.A.2 Figures
Figure A.2: A Discrete Empirical Income Distribution for a Sample of Countries
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Notes: The decile (quintile) income shares sda (s
q
a) are for time span 1992-2002.
The average income levels of deciles (quintiles) xdat (x
q
at) are for t = 2002. This is
a random sample of 9 rich, 9 middle income and 9 poor countries.
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Figure A.3: World Income Inequality Database (WIID) versus Luxembourg Income Study
(LIS)
Canada’s Income Distribution with LIS (percentiles)
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The time span of income shares sdCAN is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdCAN,t.
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Figure A.4: Overlap of Japan’s and Mexico’s Income Distributions
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The time span of income shares sda is 1992−2002 and t=2002 for average income levels xdat.
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Figure A.5: Histogram of Similarity Measures
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Figure A.6: The Effect of Articles of Apparel when Disaggregating from HS4 to HS6 Level
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The βi,HS6’s are weighted by the number of observations. The size of the circle represents the
number of HS6 codes within a HS4 code. 4 observations are omitted in order to improve readablity.
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4.A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Examples of the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) Classification, Version 1992
HS 6-digit code Name
080130 Cashew nuts, fresh or dried
081010 Strawberries, fresh
091050 Curry
200970 Apple juice not fermented or spirited
220300 Beer made from malt
220830 Whiskies
220410 Grape wines, sparkling
220421 Grape wines nes, fortified wine or must, pack < 2l
220429 Grape wines, alcoholic grape must nes
220430 Grape must, unfermented, except as fruit juice
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc.
610421 Women’s, girls ensembles, of wool or hair, knit
610422 Women’s, girls ensembles, of cotton, knit
610423 Women’s, girls ensembles, synthetic fibres, knit
610429 Women’s, girls ensembles, of material nes, knit
841821 Refrigerators, household compression type
842211 Dish washing machines (domestic)
851650 Microwave ovens
870321 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of < 1000 cc
870322 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1000-1500 cc
870323 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of 1500-3000 cc
870324 Automobiles, spark ignition engine of > 3000 cc
871110 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of < 50 cc
871120 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 50-250 cc
871130 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 250-500 cc
871140 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 500-800 cc
871150 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of > 800 cc
871190 Motorcycles with other than a spark ignition engine
900410 Sunglasses
Notes: The HS has four hierarchical levels. The 1-digit level corresponds to sec-
tions, the 2-digit level represents chapters, the 4-digit codes identify headings
and the 6-digit codes represent sub-headings. For instance, the HS4 code 8703,
vehicles for transport of persons, comprises the following HS6 codes: 870310
(Snowmobiles, golf cars, similar vehicles), 870321/2/3/4 (Automobiles, spark
ignition engine of <1000 cc/1000-1500 cc/1500-3000 cc/>3000 cc), 870331/2/3
(Automobiles, diesel engine of <1500 cc/1500-2500 cc/>2500 cc), 870390 (Au-
tomobiles nes including gas turbine powered).
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Table A.3: List of Countries and Dispersion of Similarity Measures within Countries
Country† income Onc Ox¯nc Ownc
group min median max min median max min median max N
Albania middle 0.123 0.444 0.952 0.295 0.598 1.073 1.5 2.5 2.5 58
Algeria middle 0.178 0.699 0.958 0.289 0.707 1.871 1.0 4.5 4.5 76
Argentina middle 0.295 0.543 0.920 0.366 1.215 3.257 1.5 8.0 10.5 73
Australia high 0.148 0.381 0.864 0.423 1.677 4.505 1.0 6.5 15.0 91
Austria high 0.044 0.197 0.941 0.385 2.200 3.722 1.0 6.0 12.5 97
Bangladesh low 0.088 0.507 0.992 0.257 0.401 0.836 1.0 2.0 2.0 72
Belgium-Lux. high 0.048 0.229 0.925 0.374 2.068 4.036 1.0 6.0 15.0 98
Bolivia middle 0.168 0.530 0.997 0.299 0.744 1.839 1.5 4.5 4.5 66
Brazil middle 0.260 0.674 0.955 0.250 0.875 3.645 0.5 7.0 12.0 83
Bulgaria middle 0.182 0.511 0.960 0.250 0.757 1.890 0.5 4.5 4.5 79
Burkina Faso low 0.127 0.444 0.987 0.263 0.532 1.290 1.0 3.0 3.0 64
Burundi low 0.044 0.095 0.955 0.256 0.313 0.385 1.0 1.0 1.0 39
Cambodia low 0.142 0.408 0.997 0.307 0.581 1.160 1.5 2.5 2.5 56
Cameroon middle 0.148 0.440 0.972 0.297 0.711 1.571 1.5 3.5 3.5 56
Canada high 0.042 0.255 0.940 0.250 2.004 4.137 0.5 6.0 15.0 97
Central Afr. Rep. low 0.097 0.324 0.997 0.292 0.428 0.750 1.5 1.5 1.5 39
Chile middle 0.321 0.523 0.933 0.378 1.158 4.410 1.5 7.5 15.0 75
China middle 0.174 0.729 0.940 0.250 0.588 1.744 0.5 4.0 4.0 90
Colombia middle 0.227 0.702 0.941 0.259 0.898 2.951 1.0 7.5 9.0 79
Costa Rica middle 0.272 0.547 0.931 0.375 1.129 2.954 1.5 8.0 9.0 71
Cote D’Ivoire low 0.132 0.555 0.994 0.282 0.502 1.195 1.0 2.5 2.5 75
Denmark high 0.069 0.221 0.941 0.500 2.158 3.652 1.0 6.0 12.0 93
Dominican Rp middle 0.244 0.647 0.909 0.326 1.103 2.783 1.5 8.0 8.0 63
Ecuador middle 0.198 0.600 0.964 0.283 0.932 2.653 1.0 7.5 7.5 69
Egypt middle 0.181 0.801 0.990 0.282 0.694 2.391 1.0 6.0 6.5 81
El Salvador middle 0.183 0.643 0.959 0.350 0.872 2.213 2.0 5.5 5.5 62
Ethiopia low 0.064 0.482 0.995 0.274 0.332 0.605 1.0 1.5 1.5 69
Finland high 0.069 0.236 0.944 0.500 2.100 3.421 1.0 6.5 11.5 90
Fm Czechoslovakia high 0.073 0.342 0.901 0.332 1.520 2.514 1.0 6.0 6.5 93
Fm Ussr middle 0.208 0.481 0.953 0.250 0.813 2.044 0.5 5.0 5.0 95
Fm Yugoslavia middle 0.142 0.326 0.857 0.250 0.955 1.814 0.5 4.0 4.0 97
France high 0.042 0.247 0.948 0.250 1.870 3.687 0.5 5.5 12.5 101
Gambia low 0.125 0.449 0.996 0.265 0.490 1.137 1.0 2.5 2.5 58
Germany high 0.039 0.240 0.922 0.250 1.918 3.742 0.5 5.5 13.0 101
Ghana low 0.083 0.648 0.994 0.250 0.348 0.767 0.5 1.5 1.5 82
Greece high 0.084 0.362 0.925 0.321 1.556 3.450 1.0 6.2 11.5 90
Guatemala middle 0.205 0.674 0.963 0.325 0.920 2.606 1.5 7.0 7.0 70
Guinea low 0.189 0.607 0.969 0.250 0.690 2.024 0.5 5.5 5.5 71
Guinea-Bissau low 0.127 0.401 0.992 0.257 0.564 1.154 1.0 2.5 2.5 52
Haiti low 0.132 0.408 0.962 0.299 0.511 1.055 1.5 2.5 2.5 56
Honduras middle 0.151 0.594 0.969 0.283 0.599 1.565 1.0 3.5 3.5 73
Hong Kong high 0.083 0.372 0.883 0.250 1.543 4.372 0.5 6.0 15.0 94
Hungary high 0.072 0.423 0.901 0.250 1.362 2.378 0.5 6.0 6.0 82
India middle 0.137 0.758 0.989 0.250 0.427 1.234 0.5 2.5 2.5 91
Indonesia middle 0.165 0.797 0.953 0.286 0.562 1.633 1.0 4.0 4.0 87
Iran middle 0.274 0.538 0.878 0.305 1.027 3.092 1.0 7.0 7.0 61
Ireland high 0.047 0.234 0.929 0.377 2.138 4.204 1.0 6.0 15.0 95
Israel high 0.129 0.412 0.954 0.472 1.561 3.571 1.0 6.5 12.0 83
Italy high 0.053 0.275 0.951 0.250 1.777 3.919 0.5 5.8 14.5 100
Jamaica middle 0.252 0.676 0.950 0.313 1.048 3.283 1.5 8.5 10.5 69
Japan high 0.057 0.271 0.882 0.250 1.826 3.798 0.5 6.0 12.5 98
† I report summary statistics of the dispersion of income similarity for each importer. As similarity is symmetric and
as the vast majority of aggregate trade flows is two-way (88%) a corresponding table for exporters looks very similar.
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[Table A.3 continued]
Country income Onc Ox¯nc Ownc
group min median max min median max min median max N
Jordan middle 0.175 0.627 0.956 0.250 0.772 1.962 0.5 5.0 5.0 71
Kenya low 0.127 0.696 0.990 0.250 0.434 1.146 0.5 2.5 2.5 79
Korea Rp (South) high 0.098 0.372 0.925 0.311 1.468 3.188 1.0 6.0 10.0 94
Laos P.Dem.R low 0.083 0.229 0.946 0.307 0.668 0.769 1.5 1.5 1.5 30
Madagascar low 0.069 0.420 0.984 0.276 0.353 0.648 1.0 1.5 1.5 63
Malawi low 0.061 0.496 0.940 0.275 0.383 0.581 1.0 1.5 1.5 56
Malaysia middle 0.294 0.494 0.933 0.337 1.078 4.163 1.0 6.5 15.0 83
Mali low 0.125 0.584 0.996 0.264 0.440 1.163 1.0 2.5 2.5 66
Mauritania low 0.155 0.456 0.955 0.280 0.680 1.566 1.0 4.0 4.0 58
Mexico middle 0.274 0.555 0.920 0.310 0.956 3.551 1.0 6.5 11.5 85
Mongolia middle 0.097 0.177 0.917 0.296 0.655 0.794 1.5 1.5 1.5 39
Morocco middle 0.176 0.716 0.950 0.284 0.692 1.886 1.0 4.5 4.5 73
Mozambique low 0.092 0.504 0.992 0.257 0.403 0.858 1.0 2.0 2.0 62
Nepal low 0.129 0.185 0.972 0.312 0.806 1.004 2.0 2.0 2.0 36
Netherlands high 0.032 0.195 0.933 0.250 2.113 3.996 0.5 5.5 14.0 101
New Zealand high 0.138 0.415 0.922 0.459 1.651 3.901 1.0 7.0 14.0 81
Nicaragua middle 0.133 0.486 0.997 0.308 0.526 1.213 1.5 2.5 2.5 69
Niger low 0.055 0.424 1.000 0.263 0.318 0.512 1.0 1.0 1.0 62
Nigeria low 0.113 0.670 0.998 0.250 0.394 1.012 0.5 2.0 2.0 89
Norway high 0.055 0.205 0.781 0.500 2.399 4.505 1.0 6.5 15.0 91
Pakistan low 0.136 0.472 0.989 0.282 0.583 1.227 1.0 2.5 2.5 63
Panama middle 0.236 0.680 0.961 0.295 0.950 2.814 1.0 8.0 8.5 73
Papua N.Guinea low 0.167 0.510 0.946 0.283 0.555 1.209 1.0 2.5 2.5 54
Paraguay middle 0.181 0.489 0.990 0.341 0.963 2.292 2.0 6.0 6.0 56
Peru middle 0.182 0.675 0.969 0.300 0.790 2.399 1.5 6.5 6.5 75
Philippines middle 0.167 0.640 0.969 0.283 0.618 1.864 1.0 4.5 4.5 78
Poland middle 0.151 0.396 0.857 0.250 1.158 2.432 0.5 6.5 6.5 81
Portugal high 0.129 0.432 0.954 0.448 1.520 3.616 1.0 6.5 12.5 89
Romania middle 0.175 0.511 0.960 0.319 0.720 1.662 1.0 3.5 3.5 77
Rwanda low 0.055 0.531 0.939 0.257 0.365 0.583 1.0 1.0 1.0 56
Senegal low 0.110 0.516 0.998 0.269 0.418 0.998 1.0 2.0 2.0 75
Somalia low 0.028 0.078 0.917 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.5 0.5 0.5 33
South Africa middle 0.243 0.706 0.925 0.250 0.662 4.121 0.5 6.0 14.0 95
Spain high 0.053 0.278 0.938 0.250 1.800 3.851 0.5 6.0 14.0 98
Sri Lanka middle 0.185 0.487 0.925 0.278 0.969 2.881 1.0 8.0 8.0 63
Sweden high 0.036 0.236 0.944 0.250 2.032 3.855 0.5 6.2 13.5 92
Switzerland high 0.094 0.262 0.940 0.500 1.962 4.306 1.0 6.0 15.0 96
Thailand middle 0.249 0.669 0.961 0.250 0.832 2.941 0.5 6.5 9.0 87
Trinidad-Tobago high 0.268 0.522 0.915 0.357 1.238 4.018 1.0 7.5 14.5 75
Tunisia middle 0.278 0.553 0.954 0.306 0.883 2.785 1.0 6.0 6.0 75
Turkey middle 0.199 0.707 0.955 0.293 0.763 2.357 1.0 6.0 6.0 81
USA high 0.050 0.265 0.905 0.250 1.790 4.428 0.5 5.5 15.0 101
Uganda low 0.083 0.475 0.994 0.256 0.371 0.750 1.0 1.5 1.5 64
United Kingdom high 0.046 0.253 0.951 0.250 1.832 3.962 0.5 5.5 15.0 101
Untd Rp Tanzania low 0.055 0.617 1.000 0.250 0.297 0.510 0.5 1.0 1.0 72
Uruguay middle 0.259 0.539 0.967 0.353 1.069 2.624 1.5 7.5 7.5 68
Venezuela middle 0.264 0.519 0.967 0.327 1.091 2.654 1.0 7.5 7.5 75
Vietnam low 0.130 0.381 0.994 0.312 0.638 1.170 1.5 2.5 2.5 58
Yemen low 0.055 0.248 0.994 0.275 0.357 0.500 1.0 1.0 1.0 54
Zambia low 0.102 0.443 0.992 0.269 0.435 0.936 1.0 2.0 2.0 62
Zimbabwe low 0.151 0.493 0.947 0.282 0.787 1.882 1.0 4.5 4.5 55
Notes: Income classes are according to World Bank List of Economies July 2008
(http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN0B8YU0). Economies are grouped according to 2007 GNI per capita (calcu-
lated using the World Bank Atlas method). low income: $1 - $935, middle income: $936 - $11,455, high income:
$11,456 or more. The unit of both Ox¯nc and Ownc is 10’000$.
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Table A.7: Ync – All Years
(a) Onc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 1.200??? 0.637??? 0.563???
(0.167) (0.157) (0.141)
1996 1.111??? 0.728??? 0.382???
(0.156) (0.152) (0.134)
1997 1.153??? 0.591??? 0.562??? 1.185??? 0.831??? 0.354??
(0.144) (0.140) (0.126) (0.164) (0.167) (0.153)
1998 1.133??? 0.673??? 0.460??? 1.192??? 0.823??? 0.370??
(0.148) (0.140) (0.126) (0.167) (0.161) (0.150)
1999 1.183??? 0.523??? 0.660??? 1.229??? 0.670??? 0.559??? 1.141??? 0.666??? 0.475???
(0.142) (0.135) (0.125) (0.166) (0.158) (0.149) (0.177) (0.168) (0.160)
2000 1.198??? 0.671??? 0.527??? 1.268??? 0.727??? 0.540??? 1.135??? 0.703??? 0.432???
(0.139) (0.134) (0.125) (0.163) (0.158) (0.149) (0.173) (0.168) (0.158)
2001 1.057??? 0.634??? 0.423??? 1.204??? 0.812??? 0.392??? 1.037??? 0.809??? 0.228
(0.142) (0.137) (0.125) (0.162) (0.154) (0.149) (0.171) (0.164) (0.156)
2002 1.204??? 0.755??? 0.449??? 1.218??? 0.871??? 0.347?? 1.049??? 0.829??? 0.220
(0.138) (0.138) (0.128) (0.163) (0.164) (0.153) (0.171) (0.172) (0.161)
2003 1.470??? 0.836??? 0.634??? 1.326??? 0.796??? 0.530???
(0.161) (0.158) (0.145) (0.171) (0.165) (0.152)
2004 1.618??? 0.913??? 0.705??? 1.404??? 0.776??? 0.628???
(0.157) (0.148) (0.147) (0.165) (0.156) (0.155)
2005 1.765??? 0.912??? 0.853??? 1.537??? 0.800??? 0.737???
(0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.163) (0.154) (0.147)
2006 1.487??? 0.678??? 0.810??? 1.217??? 0.603??? 0.613???
(0.154) (0.143) (0.140) (0.162) (0.149) (0.145)
2007 1.697??? 0.871??? 0.825??? 1.410??? 0.619??? 0.791???
(0.145) (0.139) (0.129) (0.154) (0.146) (0.138)
(b) Ownc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 0.122??? 0.049??? 0.074???
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1996 0.132??? 0.061??? 0.071???
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
1997 0.120??? 0.049??? 0.072??? 0.095??? 0.048??? 0.047???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1998 0.113??? 0.038??? 0.075??? 0.094??? 0.031?? 0.063???
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1999 0.119??? 0.047??? 0.072??? 0.095??? 0.036??? 0.059??? 0.096??? 0.039??? 0.057???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
2000 0.116??? 0.055??? 0.061??? 0.092??? 0.039??? 0.053??? 0.091??? 0.037??? 0.055???
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2001 0.106??? 0.053??? 0.052??? 0.089??? 0.053??? 0.035??? 0.089??? 0.053??? 0.036???
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
2002 0.114??? 0.065??? 0.048??? 0.091??? 0.059??? 0.032??? 0.093??? 0.067??? 0.026??
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2003 0.117??? 0.071??? 0.047??? 0.113??? 0.074??? 0.040???
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
2004 0.100??? 0.069??? 0.031??? 0.092??? 0.070??? 0.023?
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
2005 0.112??? 0.061??? 0.050??? 0.107??? 0.065??? 0.042???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
2006 0.104??? 0.063??? 0.042??? 0.095??? 0.062??? 0.033???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
2007 0.103??? 0.055??? 0.047??? 0.094??? 0.046??? 0.048???
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
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[Table A.7 continued]
(c) Onc and Ox¯nc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc) ln(Vnc) ln(EMnc) ln(IMnc)
1995 0.748??? 0.444??? 0.304??
(0.171) (0.164) (0.147)
0.530??? 0.225??? 0.304???
(0.064) (0.061) (0.061)
1996 0.670??? 0.513??? 0.157
(0.157) (0.157) (0.141)
0.528??? 0.258??? 0.271???
(0.060) (0.059) (0.056)
1997 0.764??? 0.388??? 0.376??? 0.836??? 0.672??? 0.164
(0.146) (0.145) (0.132) (0.170) (0.175) (0.163)
0.455??? 0.237??? 0.218??? 0.317??? 0.144?? 0.173???
(0.057) (0.055) (0.053) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
1998 0.767??? 0.516??? 0.251? 0.860??? 0.758??? 0.102
(0.151) (0.146) (0.130) (0.174) (0.173) (0.158)
0.406??? 0.174??? 0.232??? 0.289??? 0.056 0.233???
(0.056) (0.055) (0.050) (0.057) (0.057) (0.054)
1999 0.770??? 0.284?? 0.486??? 0.836??? 0.505??? 0.331?? 0.734??? 0.530??? 0.204
(0.143) (0.141) (0.129) (0.171) (0.168) (0.160) (0.186) (0.181) (0.175)
0.457??? 0.265??? 0.192??? 0.338??? 0.142??? 0.196??? 0.312??? 0.104? 0.208???
(0.054) (0.051) (0.048) (0.056) (0.053) (0.052) (0.060) (0.057) (0.057)
2000 0.785??? 0.461??? 0.324?? 0.889??? 0.571??? 0.318?? 0.731??? 0.564??? 0.167
(0.144) (0.140) (0.132) (0.172) (0.168) (0.161) (0.188) (0.181) (0.177)
0.427??? 0.218??? 0.210??? 0.317??? 0.131?? 0.186??? 0.301??? 0.104? 0.197???
(0.052) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056) (0.052) (0.051) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056)
2001 0.717??? 0.427??? 0.290?? 0.892??? 0.645??? 0.246 0.715??? 0.672??? 0.043
(0.147) (0.145) (0.131) (0.169) (0.165) (0.158) (0.183) (0.179) (0.171)
0.370??? 0.225??? 0.145??? 0.272??? 0.146??? 0.127?? 0.251??? 0.106?? 0.144???
(0.051) (0.048) (0.047) (0.054) (0.050) (0.051) (0.057) (0.053) (0.054)
2002 0.838??? 0.518??? 0.320?? 0.876??? 0.632??? 0.244 0.680??? 0.554??? 0.126
(0.142) (0.144) (0.136) (0.170) (0.176) (0.165) (0.183) (0.188) (0.178)
0.392??? 0.254??? 0.138??? 0.299??? 0.209??? 0.090? 0.292??? 0.217??? 0.074
(0.050) (0.049) (0.046) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055)
2003 1.000??? 0.570??? 0.429??? 0.821??? 0.489??? 0.333??
(0.166) (0.167) (0.153) (0.181) (0.179) (0.165)
0.426??? 0.241??? 0.185??? 0.413??? 0.251??? 0.161???
(0.052) (0.051) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055) (0.050)
2004 1.298??? 0.714??? 0.583??? 1.113??? 0.572??? 0.541???
(0.161) (0.152) (0.151) (0.174) (0.163) (0.164)
0.309??? 0.191??? 0.117?? 0.257??? 0.180??? 0.077
(0.052) (0.047) (0.048) (0.056) (0.050) (0.052)
2005 1.442??? 0.756??? 0.687??? 1.232??? 0.637??? 0.595???
(0.160) (0.149) (0.144) (0.173) (0.162) (0.156)
0.307??? 0.149??? 0.159??? 0.262??? 0.140??? 0.122??
(0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.054) (0.048) (0.048)
2006 1.152??? 0.494??? 0.658??? 0.922??? 0.431??? 0.491???
(0.154) (0.145) (0.144) (0.166) (0.154) (0.152)
0.329??? 0.180??? 0.149??? 0.261??? 0.153??? 0.109??
(0.049) (0.046) (0.045) (0.052) (0.046) (0.048)
2007 1.433??? 0.744??? 0.689??? 1.186??? 0.520??? 0.666???
(0.147) (0.142) (0.134) (0.158) (0.152) (0.144)
0.254??? 0.122??? 0.131??? 0.197??? 0.087? 0.110??
(0.047) (0.044) (0.043) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
(clustered by country pairs) are given in parentheses. In panel (c), the first coefficient in a year applies to Onc and
the second to Ox¯nc. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border,
common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for NN, SS,
NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer and exporter fixed effects (Ac and An). Sample: countries with population >
1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. This table reports the estimation results from equation (4.13),
estimated for each year separately. The dependent variables are defined in equations (4.9)-(4.11). The income similarity
measures are defined in equations (4.4)-(4.6).
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Table A.8: Y˜nc – All Years
(a) Onc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc)
1995 1.225??? 0.465??? 0.760???
(0.165) (0.093) (0.113)
1996 1.106??? 0.426??? 0.680???
(0.154) (0.089) (0.105)
1997 1.195??? 0.480??? 0.715??? 1.211??? 0.566??? 0.645???
(0.144) (0.084) (0.099) (0.163) (0.096) (0.116)
1998 1.159??? 0.469??? 0.691??? 1.225??? 0.542??? 0.683???
(0.147) (0.081) (0.101) (0.166) (0.093) (0.116)
1999 1.208??? 0.526??? 0.682??? 1.257??? 0.603??? 0.654??? 1.172??? 0.562??? 0.611???
(0.142) (0.080) (0.099) (0.165) (0.091) (0.116) (0.177) (0.098) (0.124)
2000 1.225??? 0.581??? 0.645??? 1.294??? 0.606??? 0.688??? 1.147??? 0.516??? 0.631???
(0.139) (0.079) (0.096) (0.162) (0.091) (0.114) (0.172) (0.098) (0.120)
2001 1.063??? 0.500??? 0.563??? 1.200??? 0.569??? 0.631??? 1.039??? 0.488??? 0.550???
(0.141) (0.080) (0.096) (0.162) (0.091) (0.112) (0.170) (0.097) (0.117)
2002 1.216??? 0.646??? 0.570??? 1.222??? 0.666??? 0.556??? 1.051??? 0.586??? 0.464???
(0.137) (0.079) (0.095) (0.162) (0.091) (0.114) (0.170) (0.098) (0.119)
2003 1.447??? 0.691??? 0.756??? 1.304??? 0.598??? 0.706???
(0.160) (0.089) (0.112) (0.170) (0.096) (0.119)
2004 1.618??? 0.731??? 0.887??? 1.414??? 0.597??? 0.817???
(0.156) (0.087) (0.108) (0.164) (0.092) (0.115)
2005 1.744??? 0.695??? 1.049??? 1.516??? 0.565??? 0.951???
(0.154) (0.082) (0.107) (0.162) (0.087) (0.113)
2006 1.474??? 0.594??? 0.880??? 1.205??? 0.459??? 0.746???
(0.153) (0.082) (0.107) (0.160) (0.087) (0.113)
2007 1.690??? 0.616??? 1.074??? 1.405??? 0.476??? 0.929???
(0.145) (0.078) (0.102) (0.154) (0.083) (0.109)
(b) Ownc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc)
1995 0.126??? 0.039??? 0.087???
(0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1996 0.130??? 0.046??? 0.084???
(0.014) (0.008) (0.009)
1997 0.124??? 0.046??? 0.078??? 0.098??? 0.039??? 0.060???
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1998 0.115??? 0.035??? 0.080??? 0.095??? 0.027??? 0.068???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
1999 0.119??? 0.042??? 0.077??? 0.096??? 0.033??? 0.062??? 0.097??? 0.038??? 0.059???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2000 0.119??? 0.046??? 0.072??? 0.094??? 0.033??? 0.061??? 0.092??? 0.034??? 0.058???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2001 0.106??? 0.037??? 0.069??? 0.089??? 0.032??? 0.057??? 0.089??? 0.032??? 0.058???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
2002 0.115??? 0.047??? 0.068??? 0.092??? 0.037??? 0.055??? 0.094??? 0.039??? 0.055???
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2003 0.116??? 0.038??? 0.078??? 0.112??? 0.039??? 0.073???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2004 0.101??? 0.038??? 0.063??? 0.094??? 0.035??? 0.059???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
2005 0.110??? 0.036??? 0.075??? 0.106??? 0.035??? 0.071???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.010)
2006 0.104??? 0.035??? 0.069??? 0.095??? 0.031??? 0.064???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010)
2007 0.103??? 0.028??? 0.075??? 0.094??? 0.025??? 0.069???
(0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
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[Table A.8 continued]
(c) Onc and Ox¯nc, calculated with quintile and decile data from time span
1992 to 2002 (102 countries) 1997 to 2007 (91 countries) 1999 to 2009 (88 countries)
year ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc) ln(V˜nc) ln(E˜Mnc) ln(I˜Mnc)
1995 0.768??? 0.274??? 0.494???
(0.169) (0.098) (0.116)
0.531??? 0.222??? 0.309???
(0.064) (0.036) (0.045)
1996 0.676??? 0.236?? 0.440???
(0.156) (0.092) (0.108)
0.514??? 0.227??? 0.287???
(0.059) (0.035) (0.043)
1997 0.801??? 0.299??? 0.501??? 0.852??? 0.410??? 0.443???
(0.145) (0.086) (0.101) (0.169) (0.101) (0.122)
0.461??? 0.211??? 0.250??? 0.326??? 0.142??? 0.184???
(0.057) (0.033) (0.041) (0.060) (0.034) (0.044)
1998 0.792??? 0.328??? 0.464??? 0.897??? 0.440??? 0.457???
(0.150) (0.085) (0.104) (0.173) (0.099) (0.122)
0.407??? 0.156??? 0.251??? 0.285??? 0.089??? 0.196???
(0.055) (0.032) (0.039) (0.057) (0.033) (0.041)
1999 0.798??? 0.350??? 0.448??? 0.866??? 0.449??? 0.417??? 0.768??? 0.392??? 0.376???
(0.143) (0.083) (0.100) (0.171) (0.098) (0.122) (0.186) (0.107) (0.135)
0.452??? 0.193??? 0.259??? 0.336??? 0.132??? 0.204??? 0.309??? 0.130??? 0.179???
(0.053) (0.032) (0.038) (0.056) (0.033) (0.041) (0.060) (0.035) (0.045)
2000 0.813??? 0.412??? 0.401??? 0.917??? 0.475??? 0.442??? 0.749??? 0.371??? 0.377???
(0.144) (0.083) (0.101) (0.171) (0.098) (0.122) (0.186) (0.107) (0.134)
0.425??? 0.174??? 0.251??? 0.315??? 0.109??? 0.205??? 0.297??? 0.108??? 0.189???
(0.052) (0.030) (0.036) (0.055) (0.031) (0.040) (0.059) (0.033) (0.043)
2001 0.722??? 0.372??? 0.350??? 0.886??? 0.467??? 0.419??? 0.713??? 0.399??? 0.315??
(0.146) (0.084) (0.101) (0.169) (0.097) (0.118) (0.182) (0.106) (0.127)
0.369??? 0.139??? 0.230??? 0.273??? 0.089??? 0.184??? 0.253??? 0.070?? 0.183???
(0.051) (0.029) (0.036) (0.053) (0.030) (0.039) (0.057) (0.032) (0.042)
2002 0.848??? 0.502??? 0.346??? 0.875??? 0.538??? 0.337??? 0.678??? 0.457??? 0.221?
(0.141) (0.083) (0.099) (0.169) (0.097) (0.121) (0.182) (0.106) (0.130)
0.392??? 0.153??? 0.238??? 0.302??? 0.112??? 0.190??? 0.294??? 0.102??? 0.192???
(0.050) (0.029) (0.035) (0.052) (0.030) (0.039) (0.056) (0.032) (0.042)
2003 0.983??? 0.556??? 0.427??? 0.807??? 0.451??? 0.355???
(0.166) (0.094) (0.117) (0.181) (0.104) (0.128)
0.418??? 0.122??? 0.296??? 0.405??? 0.120??? 0.285???
(0.052) (0.030) (0.038) (0.057) (0.032) (0.041)
2004 1.292??? 0.616??? 0.676??? 1.116??? 0.497??? 0.619???
(0.160) (0.090) (0.112) (0.173) (0.098) (0.121)
0.312??? 0.109??? 0.202??? 0.261??? 0.088??? 0.173???
(0.052) (0.029) (0.037) (0.056) (0.031) (0.040)
2005 1.420??? 0.600??? 0.820??? 1.210??? 0.479??? 0.731???
(0.159) (0.085) (0.112) (0.172) (0.092) (0.120)
0.308??? 0.090??? 0.218??? 0.262??? 0.074?? 0.189???
(0.050) (0.028) (0.036) (0.054) (0.029) (0.038)
2006 1.143??? 0.487??? 0.657??? 0.917??? 0.372??? 0.545???
(0.153) (0.083) (0.108) (0.164) (0.090) (0.116)
0.324??? 0.105??? 0.219??? 0.254??? 0.076??? 0.178???
(0.049) (0.027) (0.036) (0.051) (0.028) (0.038)
2007 1.423??? 0.563??? 0.860??? 1.178??? 0.448??? 0.730???
(0.146) (0.080) (0.104) (0.158) (0.086) (0.112)
0.256??? 0.051?? 0.205??? 0.199??? 0.024 0.175???
(0.047) (0.026) (0.034) (0.050) (0.027) (0.037)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
(clustered by country pairs) are given in parentheses. In panel (c), the first coefficient in a year applies to Onc and the
second to Ox¯nc. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement, currency union, common border,
common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for NN, SS,
NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer and exporter fixed effects (Ac and An). Sample: countries with population >
1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. This table reports the estimation results from equation (4.13),
estimated for each year separately. The dependent variables are defined in equation (4.12). The income similarity
measures are defined in equations (4.4)-(4.6).
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Table A.10: βˆi – Estimating Equation (4.17) for each HS4 Product Category separately
min 25th perc. median mean 75th perc. max N
HS4 codes, ex-
cept apparel
-2.94 -0.26 0.28 0.27 0.90 2.86 279
HS4 codes,
apparel
-2.10 -1.01 -0.71 -0.79 -0.57 0.14 34
all HS4 codes -2.94 -0.51 0.14 0.16 0.79 2.86 313
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of the distribution of βˆi. βˆi is obtained by estimating
equation (4.17) separately for each HS4 code i, i.e. estimating ln(IMnci) = αi + βiOnc + τ ′ncγi +
Aci +Ani + nci for each i separately.
Table A.11: Ynci – Apparel versus Non-Apparel Categories
HS6 codes containing apparel HS6 codes not containing apparel
EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
Mean 0.092 3.668 0.076 3.889
Standard dev. 0.290 2.115 0.265 2.204
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
Onc 0.132??? -0.827??? -0.558??? 0.115??? 0.202?? 0.580???
[0.135] [-0.104] [-0.070] [0.128] [0.025] [0.071]
(0.009) (0.143) (0.156) (0.006) (0.083) (0.100)
Selection? No Yes No Yes
# observations 2,400,366 221,701 221,701 10,590,456 806,449 806,449
Adjusted R2 0.371 0.410 0.427 0.304 0.292 0.323
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors (clustered by country pairs) are given in round brackets. Standardized beta
coefficients are given in square brackets. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade
agreement, currency union, common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties,
dummy variable allowing for a different intercept for NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer,
exporter and HS6 code fixed effects (Ac, An and Ai). Sample: countries with population > 1 mil-
lion, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Year=2002. Income distributions are calculated
with quintile and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation results from
equation (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18), where J = 100. The dependent variables are defined in equation
(4.7) and (4.8). The income similarity measure Onc is defined in equation (4.4). A HS6 code belongs
to apparel if its higher-ranking HS2 code is 61 (articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet) or
62 (articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crocheted).
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Table A.13: Ynci – All Years
year EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci) EMnci ln(IMnci)
OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett OLS Cosslett
1995 Onc 0.120??? -0.186? -0.097 0.087??? -0.155 -0.277??
(0.007) (0.105) (0.115) (0.008) (0.109) (0.116)
Ox¯nc 0.033??? -0.044 0.202???
(0.004) (0.044) (0.047)
Ownc 0.011??? -0.016? 0.016?
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
1996 Onc 0.123??? -0.138 0.050 0.092??? -0.092 -0.100
(0.007) (0.103) (0.119) (0.008) (0.107) (0.120)
Ox¯nc 0.030??? -0.066 0.172???
(0.004) (0.042) (0.044)
Ownc 0.011??? -0.017? 0.025??
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010)
1997 Onc 0.122??? -0.136 0.136 0.092??? -0.090 -0.026
(0.007) (0.098) (0.114) (0.008) (0.101) (0.113)
Ox¯nc 0.030??? -0.068? 0.168???
(0.004) (0.040) (0.041)
Ownc 0.010??? -0.020?? 0.025???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1998 Onc 0.111??? -0.139 0.046 0.080??? -0.099 -0.126
(0.006) (0.088) (0.102) (0.007) (0.090) (0.100)
Ox¯nc 0.030??? -0.060 0.180???
(0.004) (0.037) (0.038)
Ownc 0.010??? -0.019?? 0.022???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
1999 Onc 0.109??? -0.159? 0.127 0.078??? -0.117 -0.058
(0.006) (0.087) (0.100) (0.008) (0.089) (0.097)
Ox¯nc 0.029??? -0.061? 0.192???
(0.004) (0.036) (0.036)
Ownc 0.010??? -0.019?? 0.026???
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2000 Onc 0.111??? -0.148? 0.195? 0.088??? -0.074 0.079
(0.006) (0.088) (0.106) (0.007) (0.090) (0.104)
Ox¯nc 0.022??? -0.100??? 0.119???
(0.004) (0.035) (0.036)
Ownc 0.009??? -0.025??? 0.020??
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2001 Onc 0.113??? -0.116 0.227?? 0.092??? -0.034 0.130
(0.006) (0.088) (0.104) (0.008) (0.090) (0.103)
Ox¯nc 0.020??? -0.114??? 0.094???
(0.004) (0.035) (0.035)
Ownc 0.009??? -0.026??? 0.016?
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
2002 Onc 0.118??? -0.074 0.296??? 0.099??? 0.009 0.213??
(0.006) (0.090) (0.106) (0.008) (0.091) (0.105)
Ox¯nc 0.018??? -0.120??? 0.080??
(0.004) (0.034) (0.035)
Ownc 0.008??? -0.027??? 0.015?
(0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes: ???, ??, ? denote statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard errors
(clustered by country pairs) are given in parentheses. Controls: geographic distance, dummies for free trade agreement,
currency union, common border, common legal system, common language, colonial ties, dummy variable allowing for
a different intercept for NN, SS, NS and SN trade flows (τnc), importer, exporter and HS6 code fixed effects (Ac,
An and Ai). Sample: countries with population > 1 million, HS6 codes which include consumer goods. Income
distributions are calculated with quintile and decile data from 1992 until 2002. This table reports the estimation
results from equation (4.16), (4.17) and (4.18), where J = 100, for each year between 1995 and 2002. The dependent
variables are defined in equation (4.7) and (4.8). The income similarity measures are defined in equations (4.4)-(4.6).
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